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Fix parsing bug with unecognized token at EOS
In get_token(), we could read one byte past the end of the region. This is only a big problem in the case where the region itself is (a) potentially hostile, and (b) not explicitly nul-terminated. This patch fixes the underlying bug, and also makes sure that the one remaining case of not-NUL-terminated potentially hostile data gets NUL-terminated. Fix for bug 21018, TROVE-2016-12-002, and CVE-2016-1254
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changes/bug21018
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changes/bug21018
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o Major bugfixes (parsing, security):
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- Fix a bug in parsing that could cause clients to read a single
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byte past the end of an allocated region. This bug could be
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used to cause hardened clients (built with
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--enable-expensive-hardening) to crash if they tried to visit
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a hostile hidden service. Non-hardened clients are only
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affected depending on the details of their platform's memory
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allocator. Fixes bug 21018; bugfix on 0.2.0.8-alpha. Found by
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using libFuzzer. Also tracked as TROVE-2016-12-002 and as
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CVE-2016-1254.
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@ -3857,7 +3857,7 @@ get_next_token(memarea_t *area,
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if (tok->tp == ERR_) {
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if (tok->tp == ERR_) {
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/* No keyword matched; call it an "K_opt" or "A_unrecognized" */
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/* No keyword matched; call it an "K_opt" or "A_unrecognized" */
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if (**s == '@')
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if (*s < eol && **s == '@')
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tok->tp = A_UNKNOWN_;
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tok->tp = A_UNKNOWN_;
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else
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else
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tok->tp = K_OPT;
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tok->tp = K_OPT;
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@ -4863,7 +4863,7 @@ rend_decrypt_introduction_points(char **ipos_decrypted,
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crypto_cipher_free(cipher);
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crypto_cipher_free(cipher);
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len = ipos_encrypted_size - 2 - client_entries_len - CIPHER_IV_LEN;
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len = ipos_encrypted_size - 2 - client_entries_len - CIPHER_IV_LEN;
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dec = tor_malloc(len);
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dec = tor_malloc_zero(len + 1);
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declen = crypto_cipher_decrypt_with_iv(session_key, dec, len,
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declen = crypto_cipher_decrypt_with_iv(session_key, dec, len,
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ipos_encrypted + 2 + client_entries_len,
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ipos_encrypted + 2 + client_entries_len,
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ipos_encrypted_size - 2 - client_entries_len);
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ipos_encrypted_size - 2 - client_entries_len);
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@ -4895,7 +4895,7 @@ rend_decrypt_introduction_points(char **ipos_decrypted,
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"small.");
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"small.");
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return -1;
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return -1;
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}
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}
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dec = tor_malloc_zero(ipos_encrypted_size - CIPHER_IV_LEN - 1);
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dec = tor_malloc_zero(ipos_encrypted_size - CIPHER_IV_LEN - 1 + 1);
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declen = crypto_cipher_decrypt_with_iv(descriptor_cookie, dec,
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declen = crypto_cipher_decrypt_with_iv(descriptor_cookie, dec,
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ipos_encrypted_size -
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ipos_encrypted_size -
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