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Slight improvements to DH coverage.

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This commit is contained in:
Nick Mathewson 2016-05-03 14:15:00 -04:00
parent c395334879
commit d88656ec06
2 changed files with 20 additions and 0 deletions
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9
src/common/crypto.c
View File

@ -2269,10 +2269,13 @@ crypto_dh_new(int dh_type)
return res;
err:
/* LCOV_EXCL_START
* This error condition is only reached when an allocation fails */
crypto_log_errors(LOG_WARN, "creating DH object");
if (res->dh) DH_free(res->dh); /* frees p and g too */
tor_free(res);
return NULL;
/* LCOV_EXCL_STOP */
}
/** Return a copy of <b>dh</b>, sharing its internal state. */
@ -2304,10 +2307,15 @@ crypto_dh_generate_public(crypto_dh_t *dh)
{
again:
if (!DH_generate_key(dh->dh)) {
/* LCOV_EXCL_START
* To test this we would need some way to tell openssl to break DH. */
crypto_log_errors(LOG_WARN, "generating DH key");
return -1;
/* LCOV_EXCL_STOP */
}
if (tor_check_dh_key(LOG_WARN, dh->dh->pub_key)<0) {
/* LCOV_EXCL_START
* If this happens, then openssl's DH implementation is busted. */
log_warn(LD_CRYPTO, "Weird! Our own DH key was invalid. I guess once-in-"
"the-universe chances really do happen. Trying again.");
/* Free and clear the keys, so OpenSSL will actually try again. */
@ -2315,6 +2323,7 @@ crypto_dh_generate_public(crypto_dh_t *dh)
BN_clear_free(dh->dh->priv_key);
dh->dh->pub_key = dh->dh->priv_key = NULL;
goto again;
/* LCOV_EXCL_STOP */
}
return 0;
}

11
src/test/test_crypto.c
View File

@ -27,6 +27,7 @@ static void
test_crypto_dh(void *arg)
{
crypto_dh_t *dh1 = crypto_dh_new(DH_TYPE_CIRCUIT);
crypto_dh_t *dh1_dup = NULL;
crypto_dh_t *dh2 = crypto_dh_new(DH_TYPE_CIRCUIT);
char p1[DH_BYTES];
char p2[DH_BYTES];
@ -41,6 +42,9 @@ test_crypto_dh(void *arg)
memset(p1, 0, DH_BYTES);
memset(p2, 0, DH_BYTES);
tt_mem_op(p1,OP_EQ, p2, DH_BYTES);
tt_int_op(-1, OP_EQ, crypto_dh_get_public(dh1, p1, 6)); /* too short */
tt_assert(! crypto_dh_get_public(dh1, p1, DH_BYTES));
tt_mem_op(p1,OP_NE, p2, DH_BYTES);
tt_assert(! crypto_dh_get_public(dh2, p2, DH_BYTES));
@ -54,6 +58,12 @@ test_crypto_dh(void *arg)
tt_int_op(s1len,OP_EQ, s2len);
tt_mem_op(s1,OP_EQ, s2, s1len);
/* test dh_dup; make sure it works the same. */
dh1_dup = crypto_dh_dup(dh1);
s1len = crypto_dh_compute_secret(LOG_WARN, dh1_dup, p2, DH_BYTES, s1, 50);
tt_mem_op(s1,OP_EQ, s2, s1len);
{
/* XXXX Now fabricate some bad values and make sure they get caught,
* Check 0, 1, N-1, >= N, etc.
@ -63,6 +73,7 @@ test_crypto_dh(void *arg)
done:
crypto_dh_free(dh1);
crypto_dh_free(dh2);
crypto_dh_free(dh1_dup);
}
static void