Wipe all of the target space in tor_addr_{to,from}_sockaddr()

Otherwise we risk a subsequent memdup or memcpy copying
uninitialized RAM into some other place that might eventually expose
it.  Let's make sure that doesn't happen.

Closes ticket 14041
This commit is contained in:
Nick Mathewson 2014-12-29 10:06:12 -05:00
parent e85f0c650c
commit d7ecdd645a
2 changed files with 10 additions and 2 deletions

5
changes/bug14041 Normal file
View File

@ -0,0 +1,5 @@
o Minor features (security):
- Clear all memory targetted by tor_addr_{to,from}_sockaddr(),
not just the part that's used. This makes it harder for data leak
bugs to occur in the event of other programming failures.
Resolves ticket 14041.

View File

@ -89,13 +89,14 @@ tor_addr_to_sockaddr(const tor_addr_t *a,
struct sockaddr *sa_out,
socklen_t len)
{
memset(sa_out, 0, len);
sa_family_t family = tor_addr_family(a);
if (family == AF_INET) {
struct sockaddr_in *sin;
if (len < (int)sizeof(struct sockaddr_in))
return 0;
sin = (struct sockaddr_in *)sa_out;
memset(sin, 0, sizeof(struct sockaddr_in));
#ifdef HAVE_STRUCT_SOCKADDR_IN_SIN_LEN
sin->sin_len = sizeof(struct sockaddr_in);
#endif
@ -108,7 +109,6 @@ tor_addr_to_sockaddr(const tor_addr_t *a,
if (len < (int)sizeof(struct sockaddr_in6))
return 0;
sin6 = (struct sockaddr_in6 *)sa_out;
memset(sin6, 0, sizeof(struct sockaddr_in6));
#ifdef HAVE_STRUCT_SOCKADDR_IN6_SIN6_LEN
sin6->sin6_len = sizeof(struct sockaddr_in6);
#endif
@ -129,6 +129,9 @@ tor_addr_from_sockaddr(tor_addr_t *a, const struct sockaddr *sa,
{
tor_assert(a);
tor_assert(sa);
memset(a, 0, sizeof(*a));
if (sa->sa_family == AF_INET) {
struct sockaddr_in *sin = (struct sockaddr_in *) sa;
tor_addr_from_ipv4n(a, sin->sin_addr.s_addr);