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r14227@Kushana: nickm | 2007-08-27 11:33:28 -0400
Add a new ClientDNSRejectInternalAddresses option (default: on) to refuse to believe that any address can map to or from an internal address. This blocks some kinds of potential browser-based attacks, especially on hosts using DNSPort. Also clarify behavior in some comments. Backport candiate? svn:r11287
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@ -1,3 +1,9 @@
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Changes in version 0.2.0.6-alpha - 2007-??-??
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o Minor features (security):
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- As a client, do not believe any server that tells us that any address
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maps to an internal address space.
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Changes in version 0.2.0.6-alpha - 2007-08-26
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o New directory authorities:
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- Set up Tonga as the default bridge directory authority.
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@ -676,6 +676,13 @@ Bind to this address to listen for DNS connections.
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(Default: 127.0.0.1).
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.LP
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.TP
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\fBClientDNSRejectInternalAddresses\fP \fR\fB0\fR|\fB1\fR\fP
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If true, Tor does not believe any anonymously retrieved DNS answer that tells
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it that an address resolves to an internal address (like 127.0.0.1 or
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192.168.0.1). This option prevents certain browser-based attacks; don't turn
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it off unless you know what you're doing. (Default: 1).
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.LP
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.TP
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\fBDownloadExtraInfo\fP \fR\fB0\fR|\fB1\fR\fP
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If true, Tor downloads and caches "extra-info" documents. These
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documents contain information about servers other than the information
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@ -2601,7 +2601,9 @@ tor_addr_to_str(char *dest, const tor_addr_t *addr, int len)
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}
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/** Convert the string in <b>src</b> to a tor_addr_t <b>addr</b>.
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*/
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*
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* Return an address family on success, or -1 if an invalid address string is
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* provided. */
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int
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tor_addr_from_str(tor_addr_t *addr, const char *src)
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{
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@ -143,6 +143,8 @@ static config_var_t _option_vars[] = {
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VAR("Bridge", LINELIST, Bridges, NULL),
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VAR("CircuitBuildTimeout", INTERVAL, CircuitBuildTimeout, "1 minute"),
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VAR("CircuitIdleTimeout", INTERVAL, CircuitIdleTimeout, "1 hour"),
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VAR("ClientDNSRejectInternalAddresses", BOOL,
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ClientDNSRejectInternalAddresses, "1"),
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VAR("ClientOnly", BOOL, ClientOnly, "0"),
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VAR("ConnLimit", UINT, ConnLimit, "1000"),
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VAR("ConstrainedSockets", BOOL, ConstrainedSockets, "0"),
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@ -827,7 +829,8 @@ options_act_reversible(or_options_t *old_options, char **msg)
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int logs_marked = 0;
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/* Daemonize _first_, since we only want to open most of this stuff in
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* the subprocess. */
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* the subprocess. Libevent bases can't be reliably inherited across
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* processes. */
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if (running_tor && options->RunAsDaemon) {
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/* No need to roll back, since you can't change the value. */
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start_daemon();
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@ -1247,6 +1247,19 @@ connection_ap_handshake_rewrite_and_attach(edge_connection_t *conn,
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END_STREAM_REASON_FLAG_ALREADY_SOCKS_REPLIED);
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return 0;
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}
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if (options->ClientDNSRejectInternalAddresses) {
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/* Don't let people try to do a reverse lookup on 10.0.0.1. */
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tor_addr_t addr;
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if (tor_addr_from_str(&addr, socks->address) >= 0 &&
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tor_addr_is_internal(&addr, 0)) {
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connection_ap_handshake_socks_resolved(conn, RESOLVED_TYPE_ERROR,
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0, NULL, -1, TIME_MAX);
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connection_mark_unattached_ap(conn,
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END_STREAM_REASON_SOCKSPROTOCOL |
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END_STREAM_REASON_FLAG_ALREADY_SOCKS_REPLIED);
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return -1;
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}
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}
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} else if (!automap) {
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/* For address map controls, remap the address. */
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if (addressmap_rewrite(socks->address, sizeof(socks->address),
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@ -191,7 +191,8 @@
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#define DEFAULT_DNS_TTL (30*60)
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/** How long can a TTL be before we stop believing it? */
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#define MAX_DNS_TTL (3*60*60)
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/** How small can a TTL be before we stop believing it? */
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/** How small can a TTL be before we stop believing it? Provides rudimentary
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* pinning. */
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#define MIN_DNS_TTL (60)
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/** How often do we rotate onion keys? */
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@ -2093,6 +2094,11 @@ typedef struct {
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* if we are a cache). For authorities, this is always true. */
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int DownloadExtraInfo;
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/** If true, do not believe anybody who tells us that a domain resolves
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* to an internal address, or that an internal address has a PTR mapping.
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* Helps avoid some cross-site attacks. */
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int ClientDNSRejectInternalAddresses;
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/** The length of time that we think a consensus should be fresh. */
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int V3AuthVotingInterval;
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/** The length of time we think it will take to distribute votes */
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@ -900,9 +900,14 @@ connection_edge_process_relay_cell_not_open(
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if (rh->length >= 4) {
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uint32_t addr = ntohl(get_uint32(cell->payload+RELAY_HEADER_SIZE));
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int ttl;
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if (!addr) {
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if (!addr || (get_options()->ClientDNSRejectInternalAddresses &&
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is_internal_IP(addr, 0))) {
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char buf[INET_NTOA_BUF_LEN];
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struct in_addr a;
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a.s_addr = htonl(addr);
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tor_inet_ntoa(&a, buf, sizeof(buf));
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log_info(LD_APP,
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"...but it claims the IP address was 0.0.0.0. Closing.");
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"...but it claims the IP address was %s. Closing.", buf);
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connection_edge_end(conn, END_STREAM_REASON_TORPROTOCOL);
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connection_mark_unattached_ap(conn, END_STREAM_REASON_TORPROTOCOL);
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return 0;
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@ -946,13 +951,28 @@ connection_edge_process_relay_cell_not_open(
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connection_mark_unattached_ap(conn, END_STREAM_REASON_TORPROTOCOL);
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return 0;
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}
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answer_type = cell->payload[RELAY_HEADER_SIZE];
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if (rh->length >= answer_len+6)
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ttl = (int)ntohl(get_uint32(cell->payload+RELAY_HEADER_SIZE+
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2+answer_len));
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else
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ttl = -1;
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answer_type = cell->payload[RELAY_HEADER_SIZE];
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if (answer_type == RESOLVED_TYPE_IPV4 && answer_len >= 4) {
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uint32_t addr = ntohl(get_uint32(cell->payload+RELAY_HEADER_SIZE+2));
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if (get_options()->ClientDNSRejectInternalAddresses &&
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is_internal_IP(addr, 0)) {
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char buf[INET_NTOA_BUF_LEN];
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struct in_addr a;
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a.s_addr = htonl(addr);
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tor_inet_ntoa(&a, buf, sizeof(buf));
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log_info(LD_APP,"Got a resolve with answer %s. Rejecting.", buf);
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connection_ap_handshake_socks_resolved(conn,
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RESOLVED_TYPE_ERROR_TRANSIENT,
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0, NULL, 0, TIME_MAX);
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connection_mark_unattached_ap(conn, END_STREAM_REASON_TORPROTOCOL);
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return 0;
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}
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}
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connection_ap_handshake_socks_resolved(conn,
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answer_type,
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cell->payload[RELAY_HEADER_SIZE+1], /*answer_len*/
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