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a new style file. and blow away a section that turned out to be dumb.

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svn:r13223
This commit is contained in:
Roger Dingledine 2008-01-22 05:50:58 +00:00
parent 8505ee8310
commit d2a04d7e06
2 changed files with 47 additions and 30 deletions
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70
doc/design-paper/blocking.tex
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@ -1,4 +1,7 @@
\documentclass{llncs} %\documentclass{llncs}
\documentclass{usenixsubmit}
%\documentclass[twocolumn]{article}
%usepackage{usenix}
\usepackage{url} \usepackage{url}
\usepackage{amsmath} \usepackage{amsmath}
@ -18,15 +21,17 @@
% \setlength{\topsep}{0mm} % \setlength{\topsep}{0mm}
}}{\end{list}} }}{\end{list}}
\begin{document} \newcommand{\workingnote}[1]{} % The version that hides the note.
%\newcommand{\workingnote}[1]{(**#1)} % makes the note visible.
\date{}
\title{Design of a blocking-resistant anonymity system\\DRAFT} \title{Design of a blocking-resistant anonymity system\\DRAFT}
%\author{Roger Dingledine\inst{1} \and Nick Mathewson\inst{1}} %\author{Roger Dingledine\inst{1} \and Nick Mathewson\inst{1}}
\author{Roger Dingledine \and Nick Mathewson} \author{Roger Dingledine \\ The Tor Project \\ arma@torproject.org \and
\institute{The Free Haven Project\\ Nick Mathewson \\ The Tor Project \\ nickm@torproject.org}
\email{\{arma,nickm\}@freehaven.net}}
\begin{document}
\maketitle \maketitle
\pagestyle{plain} \pagestyle{plain}
@ -93,8 +98,8 @@ In sections~\ref{sec:bridges} through~\ref{sec:discovery}, we explore the
components of our designs in detail. Section~\ref{sec:security} considers components of our designs in detail. Section~\ref{sec:security} considers
security implications and Section~\ref{sec:reachability} presents other security implications and Section~\ref{sec:reachability} presents other
issues with maintaining connectivity and sustainability for the design. issues with maintaining connectivity and sustainability for the design.
Section~\ref{sec:future} speculates about future more complex designs, %Section~\ref{sec:future} speculates about future more complex designs,
and finally Section~\ref{sec:conclusion} summarizes our next steps and Finally Section~\ref{sec:conclusion} summarizes our next steps and
recommendations. recommendations.
% The other motivation is for places where we're concerned they will % The other motivation is for places where we're concerned they will
@ -278,7 +283,7 @@ that have been pressured
recently into revealing the identity of bloggers recently into revealing the identity of bloggers
%~\cite{arrested-bloggers} %~\cite{arrested-bloggers}
or treating clients differently depending on their network or treating clients differently depending on their network
location~\cite{goodell-syverson06}. location~\cite{netauth}.
%~\cite{google-geolocation}. %~\cite{google-geolocation}.
The Tor design provides other features as well that are not typically The Tor design provides other features as well that are not typically
@ -1700,6 +1705,32 @@ See Section~\ref{subsec:first-bridge} for more discussion.
% Ian suggests that we have every tor server distribute a signed copy of the % Ian suggests that we have every tor server distribute a signed copy of the
% software. % software.
\section{Next Steps}
\label{sec:conclusion}
Technical solutions won't solve the whole censorship problem. After all,
the firewalls in places like China are \emph{socially} very
successful, even if technologies and tricks exist to get around them.
However, having a strong technical solution is still necessary as one
important piece of the puzzle.
In this paper, we have shown that Tor provides a great set of building
blocks to start from. The next steps are to deploy prototype bridges and
bridge authorities, implement some of the proposed discovery strategies,
and then observe the system in operation and get more intuition about
the actual requirements and adversaries we're up against.
\bibliographystyle{plain} \bibliography{tor-design}
%\appendix
%\section{Counting Tor users by country}
%\label{app:geoip}
\end{document}
\section{Future designs} \section{Future designs}
\label{sec:future} \label{sec:future}
@ -1727,29 +1758,8 @@ and they would be a fine target to take down the network.
% Hidden services as bridge directory authorities. % Hidden services as bridge directory authorities.
\section{Next Steps}
\label{sec:conclusion}
Technical solutions won't solve the whole censorship problem. After all, ------------------------------------------
the firewalls in places like China are \emph{socially} very
successful, even if technologies and tricks exist to get around them.
However, having a strong technical solution is still necessary as one
important piece of the puzzle.
In this paper, we have shown that Tor provides a great set of building
blocks to start from. The next steps are to deploy prototype bridges and
bridge authorities, implement some of the proposed discovery strategies,
and then observe the system in operation and get more intuition about
the actual requirements and adversaries we're up against.
\bibliographystyle{plain} \bibliography{tor-design}
%\appendix
%\section{Counting Tor users by country}
%\label{app:geoip}
\end{document}
ship geoip db to bridges. they look up users who tls to them in the db, ship geoip db to bridges. they look up users who tls to them in the db,
and upload a signed list of countries and number-of-users each day. the and upload a signed list of countries and number-of-users each day. the

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doc/design-paper/usenixsubmit.cls Normal file
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% Created by Anil Somayaji
\ProvidesClass{usenixsubmit}
\LoadClass[11pt,letterpaper]{article}
\usepackage{times}
\usepackage[margin=1in]{geometry}