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Correct comment explaining why tor2web mode should disable entry guards
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@ -2523,15 +2523,13 @@ options_validate(or_options_t *old_options, or_options_t *options,
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}
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if (options->Tor2webMode && options->UseEntryGuards) {
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/* Tor2WebMode is incompatible with EntryGuards in two ways:
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*
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* - Tor2WebMode uses its guard nodes as rend and intro points.
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* This makes tor2web users fingerprintable by their continued
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* selection of the same 3 nodes for these circuits (their guard
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* nodes).
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*
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* - Tor2WebMode makes unexpected use of circuit path lengths
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* in ways that prevent us from applying the PathBias defense.
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/* tor2web mode clients do not (and should not) use entry guards
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* in any meaningful way. Further, tor2web mode causes the hidden
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* service client code to do things which break the path bias
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* detector, and it's far easier to turn off entry guards (and
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* thus the path bias detector with it) than to figure out how to
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* make a piece of code which cannot possibly help tor2web mode
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* users compatible with tor2web mode.
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*/
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log_notice(LD_CONFIG,
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"Tor2WebMode is enabled; disabling UseEntryGuards.");
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