Part of incremental encryption logic for buffers: there is a subtle yucky point documented in a comment.

svn:r6637
This commit is contained in:
Nick Mathewson 2006-06-18 07:27:47 +00:00
parent 630e9cd510
commit cd38511a1e

View File

@ -249,15 +249,18 @@ buf_resize(buf_t *buf, size_t new_capacity)
static INLINE int static INLINE int
buf_ensure_capacity(buf_t *buf, size_t capacity) buf_ensure_capacity(buf_t *buf, size_t capacity)
{ {
size_t new_len; size_t new_len, min_len;
if (buf->len >= capacity) /* Don't grow if we're already big enough. */ if (buf->len >= capacity) /* Don't grow if we're already big enough. */
return 0; return 0;
if (capacity > MAX_BUF_SIZE) /* Don't grow past the maximum. */ if (capacity > MAX_BUF_SIZE) /* Don't grow past the maximum. */
return -1; return -1;
/* Find the smallest new_len equal to (2**X)*len for some X; such that /* Find the smallest new_len equal to (2**X) for some X; such that
* new_len is at least capacity. * new_len is at least capacity, and at least 2*buf->len.
*/ */
new_len = buf->len*2; min_len = buf->len*2;
new_len = 16;
while (new_len < min_len)
new_len *= 2;
while (new_len < capacity) while (new_len < capacity)
new_len *= 2; new_len *= 2;
/* Resize the buffer. */ /* Resize the buffer. */
@ -1284,6 +1287,54 @@ fetch_from_buf_line(buf_t *buf, char *data_out, size_t *data_len)
return 1; return 1;
} }
/** DOCDOC */
int
write_to_buf_zlib(buf_t *buf, tor_zlib_state_t *state,
const char *data, size_t data_len,
int done)
{
char *next;
size_t old_avail, avail;
while (1) {
buf_ensure_capacity(buf, buf->datalen + 1024);
next = _buf_end(buf);
if (next < buf->cur)
old_avail = avail = buf->cur - next;
else
old_avail = avail = (buf->mem + buf->datalen) - buf->cur;
switch (tor_zlib_process(state, &next, &avail, &data, &data_len, done)) {
case TOR_ZLIB_DONE:
return 0;
case TOR_ZLIB_ERR:
return -1;
case TOR_ZLIB_OK:
if (data_len == 0)
return 0;
break;
case TOR_ZLIB_BUF_FULL:
if (avail && buf->len >= 1024 + buf->datalen) {
/* Zlib says we need more room (ZLIB_BUF_FULL), and we're not about
* to wrap around (avail != 0), and resizing won't actually make us
* un-full: we're at the end of the buffer, and zlib refuses to
* append more here, but there's a pile of free space at the start
* of the buffer (about 1K). So chop a few characters off the
* end of the buffer. This feels silly; anybody got a better hack?
*
* (We don't just want to expand the buffer nevertheless. Consider a
* 1/3 full buffer with a single byte free at the end. zlib will
* often refuse to append to that, and so we want to use the
* beginning, not double the buffer to be just 1/6 full.)
*/
tor_assert(next >= buf->cur);
buf->len -= avail;
}
break;
}
buf->datalen += old_avail - avail;
buf_total_used += old_avail - avail;
}
}
/** Log an error and exit if <b>buf</b> is corrupted. /** Log an error and exit if <b>buf</b> is corrupted.
*/ */
void void