Merge branch 'maint-0.4.3'

This commit is contained in:
David Goulet 2020-03-30 13:38:58 -04:00
commit ca8e6451f2
3 changed files with 40 additions and 4 deletions

4
changes/bug31669 Normal file
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@ -0,0 +1,4 @@
o Minor bugfixes (onion services v3):
- Relax severity of a log message that can appear naturally when decoding
onion service descriptors as a relay. Also add some diagnostics to debug
any future bugs in that area. Fixes bug 31669; bugfix on 0.3.0.1-alpha.

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@ -56,6 +56,7 @@
#define HS_DESCRIPTOR_PRIVATE
#include "core/or/or.h"
#include "app/config/config.h"
#include "trunnel/ed25519_cert.h" /* Trunnel interface. */
#include "feature/hs/hs_descriptor.h"
#include "core/or/circuitbuild.h"
@ -1283,11 +1284,20 @@ cert_is_valid(tor_cert_t *cert, uint8_t type, const char *log_obj_type)
log_warn(LD_REND, "Signing key is NOT included for %s.", log_obj_type);
goto err;
}
/* The following will not only check if the signature matches but also the
* expiration date and overall validity. */
if (tor_cert_checksig(cert, &cert->signing_key, approx_time()) < 0) {
log_warn(LD_REND, "Invalid signature for %s: %s", log_obj_type,
tor_cert_describe_signature_status(cert));
if (cert->cert_expired) {
char expiration_str[ISO_TIME_LEN+1];
format_iso_time(expiration_str, cert->valid_until);
log_fn(LOG_PROTOCOL_WARN, LD_REND, "Invalid signature for %s: %s (%s)",
log_obj_type, tor_cert_describe_signature_status(cert),
expiration_str);
} else {
log_warn(LD_REND, "Invalid signature for %s: %s",
log_obj_type, tor_cert_describe_signature_status(cert));
}
goto err;
}

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@ -14,6 +14,7 @@
#include "lib/crypt_ops/crypto_rand.h"
#include "trunnel/ed25519_cert.h"
#include "core/or/or.h"
#include "app/config/config.h"
#include "feature/hs/hs_descriptor.h"
#include "test/test.h"
#include "feature/nodelist/torcert.h"
@ -37,7 +38,6 @@ test_cert_encoding(void *arg)
{
int ret;
char *encoded = NULL;
time_t now = time(NULL);
ed25519_keypair_t kp;
ed25519_public_key_t signed_key;
ed25519_secret_key_t secret_key;
@ -45,6 +45,10 @@ test_cert_encoding(void *arg)
(void) arg;
/* Change time to 03-01-2002 23:36 UTC */
update_approx_time(1010101010);
time_t now = approx_time();
ret = ed25519_keypair_generate(&kp, 0);
tt_int_op(ret, == , 0);
ret = ed25519_secret_key_generate(&secret_key, 0);
@ -88,13 +92,31 @@ test_cert_encoding(void *arg)
/* The cert did have the signing key? */
ret= ed25519_pubkey_eq(&parsed_cert->signing_key, &kp.pubkey);
tt_int_op(ret, OP_EQ, 1);
tor_cert_free(parsed_cert);
/* Get to the end part of the certificate. */
pos += b64_cert_len;
tt_int_op(strcmpstart(pos, "-----END ED25519 CERT-----"), OP_EQ, 0);
pos += strlen("-----END ED25519 CERT-----");
tt_str_op(pos, OP_EQ, "");
/* Check that certificate expiry works properly and emits the right log
message */
const char *msg = "fire";
/* Move us forward 4 hours so that the the certificate is definitely
expired */
update_approx_time(approx_time() + 3600*4);
setup_full_capture_of_logs(LOG_PROTOCOL_WARN);
ret = cert_is_valid(parsed_cert, CERT_TYPE_SIGNING_AUTH, msg);
tt_int_op(ret, OP_EQ, 0);
/* Since the current time at the creation of the cert was "03-01-2002
* 23:36", and the expiration date of the cert was two hours, the Tor code
* will ceiling that and make it 02:00. Make sure that the right log
* message is emitted */
expect_log_msg_containing("Invalid signature for fire: expired"
" (2002-01-04 02:00:00)");
teardown_capture_of_logs();
tor_cert_free(parsed_cert);
}
done: