From c72d57c92e3fecd1ede89c76cdac7e3dfec0b977 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Nick Mathewson Date: Tue, 4 Nov 2003 07:35:58 +0000 Subject: [PATCH] Fixes to last checkin svn:r750 --- doc/tor-design.tex | 7 +++---- 1 file changed, 3 insertions(+), 4 deletions(-) diff --git a/doc/tor-design.tex b/doc/tor-design.tex index 67be8bffba..b2dcd28e49 100644 --- a/doc/tor-design.tex +++ b/doc/tor-design.tex @@ -1135,8 +1135,8 @@ We also worry about attacks to deceive a client about the router membership list, topology, or current network state. Such \emph{partitioning attacks} on client knowledge help an adversary to efficiently deploy resources -when attacking a target. -% XXX Cite for partitioning attacks? +when attacking a target \cite{minion-design}. + Tor uses a small group of redundant, well-known onion routers to track changes in network topology and node state, including keys and @@ -1896,8 +1896,7 @@ retrieval presents a scaling problem, since clients currently download a description of the entire network state every 15 minutes. As the state grows larger and clients more numerous, we may need to move to a solution in which clients only receive -incremental updates to directory state, or where directories are -cached at the ORs to avoid high loads on the directory servers. +incremental updates to directory state. \emph{Implementing location-hidden servers:} While Section~\ref{sec:rendezvous} describes a design for rendezvous