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@ -1135,8 +1135,8 @@ We also worry about attacks to deceive a
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client about the router membership list, topology, or current network
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state. Such \emph{partitioning attacks} on client knowledge help an
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adversary to efficiently deploy resources
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when attacking a target.
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% XXX Cite for partitioning attacks?
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when attacking a target \cite{minion-design}.
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Tor uses a small group of redundant, well-known onion routers to
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track changes in network topology and node state, including keys and
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@ -1896,8 +1896,7 @@ retrieval presents a scaling problem, since clients currently
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download a description of the entire network state every 15
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minutes. As the state grows larger and clients more numerous, we
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may need to move to a solution in which clients only receive
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incremental updates to directory state, or where directories are
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cached at the ORs to avoid high loads on the directory servers.
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incremental updates to directory state.
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\emph{Implementing location-hidden servers:} While
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Section~\ref{sec:rendezvous} describes a design for rendezvous
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