mirror of
https://gitlab.torproject.org/tpo/core/tor.git
synced 2024-11-10 13:13:44 +01:00
Merge branch 'bug1184'
This commit is contained in:
commit
c18bcc8a55
9
changes/bug1184
Normal file
9
changes/bug1184
Normal file
@ -0,0 +1,9 @@
|
||||
o Minor bugfixes:
|
||||
- Never relay a cell for a circuit we have already destroyed.
|
||||
Between marking a circuit as closeable and finally closing it,
|
||||
it may have been possible for a few queued cells to get relayed,
|
||||
even though they would have been immediately dropped by the next
|
||||
OR in the circuit. Fix 1184; bugfix on 0.2.0.1-alpha.
|
||||
- Never queue a cell for a circuit that's already been marked
|
||||
for close.
|
||||
|
@ -597,6 +597,14 @@ see tor-design.pdf.
|
||||
cell to the next node in the circuit, and replies to the OP with a
|
||||
RELAY_TRUNCATED cell.
|
||||
|
||||
[Note: If an OR receives a TRUNCATE cell and it has any RELAY cells
|
||||
still queued on the circuit for the next node it will drop them
|
||||
without sending them. This is not considered conformant behavior,
|
||||
but it probably won't get fixed until a later version of Tor. Thus,
|
||||
clients SHOULD NOT send a TRUNCATE cell to a node running any current
|
||||
version of Tor if a) they have sent relay cells through that node,
|
||||
and b) they aren't sure whether those cells have been sent on yes.]
|
||||
|
||||
When an unrecoverable error occurs along one connection in a
|
||||
circuit, the nodes on either side of the connection should, if they
|
||||
are able, act as follows: the node closer to the OP should send a
|
||||
|
@ -1124,8 +1124,10 @@ _circuit_mark_for_close(circuit_t *circ, int reason, int line,
|
||||
rend_client_remove_intro_point(ocirc->build_state->chosen_exit,
|
||||
ocirc->rend_data);
|
||||
}
|
||||
if (circ->n_conn)
|
||||
if (circ->n_conn) {
|
||||
circuit_clear_cell_queue(circ, circ->n_conn);
|
||||
connection_or_send_destroy(circ->n_circ_id, circ->n_conn, reason);
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
if (! CIRCUIT_IS_ORIGIN(circ)) {
|
||||
or_circuit_t *or_circ = TO_OR_CIRCUIT(circ);
|
||||
@ -1149,8 +1151,10 @@ _circuit_mark_for_close(circuit_t *circ, int reason, int line,
|
||||
conn->on_circuit = NULL;
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
if (or_circ->p_conn)
|
||||
if (or_circ->p_conn) {
|
||||
circuit_clear_cell_queue(circ, or_circ->p_conn);
|
||||
connection_or_send_destroy(or_circ->p_circ_id, or_circ->p_conn, reason);
|
||||
}
|
||||
} else {
|
||||
origin_circuit_t *ocirc = TO_ORIGIN_CIRCUIT(circ);
|
||||
edge_connection_t *conn;
|
||||
|
@ -1323,10 +1323,6 @@ connection_or_send_destroy(circid_t circ_id, or_connection_t *conn, int reason)
|
||||
cell.payload[0] = (uint8_t) reason;
|
||||
log_debug(LD_OR,"Sending destroy (circID %d).", circ_id);
|
||||
|
||||
/* XXXX It's possible that under some circumstances, we want the destroy
|
||||
* to take precedence over other data waiting on the circuit's cell queue.
|
||||
*/
|
||||
|
||||
connection_or_write_cell_to_buf(&cell, conn);
|
||||
return 0;
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
@ -1194,6 +1194,7 @@ connection_edge_process_relay_cell(cell_t *cell, circuit_t *circ,
|
||||
}
|
||||
if (circ->n_conn) {
|
||||
uint8_t trunc_reason = *(uint8_t*)(cell->payload + RELAY_HEADER_SIZE);
|
||||
circuit_clear_cell_queue(circ, circ->n_conn);
|
||||
connection_or_send_destroy(circ->n_circ_id, circ->n_conn,
|
||||
trunc_reason);
|
||||
circuit_set_n_circid_orconn(circ, 0, NULL);
|
||||
@ -2377,6 +2378,9 @@ append_cell_to_circuit_queue(circuit_t *circ, or_connection_t *orconn,
|
||||
{
|
||||
cell_queue_t *queue;
|
||||
int streams_blocked;
|
||||
if (circ->marked_for_close)
|
||||
return;
|
||||
|
||||
if (direction == CELL_DIRECTION_OUT) {
|
||||
queue = &circ->n_conn_cells;
|
||||
streams_blocked = circ->streams_blocked_on_n_conn;
|
||||
@ -2479,6 +2483,25 @@ decode_address_from_payload(tor_addr_t *addr_out, const char *payload,
|
||||
return payload + 2 + (uint8_t)payload[1];
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
/** Remove all the cells queued on <b>circ</b> for <b>orconn</b>. */
|
||||
void
|
||||
circuit_clear_cell_queue(circuit_t *circ, or_connection_t *orconn)
|
||||
{
|
||||
cell_queue_t *queue;
|
||||
if (circ->n_conn == orconn) {
|
||||
queue = &circ->n_conn_cells;
|
||||
} else {
|
||||
or_circuit_t *orcirc = TO_OR_CIRCUIT(circ);
|
||||
tor_assert(orcirc->p_conn == orconn);
|
||||
queue = &orcirc->p_conn_cells;
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
if (queue->n)
|
||||
make_circuit_inactive_on_conn(circ,orconn);
|
||||
|
||||
cell_queue_clear(queue);
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
/** Fail with an assert if the active circuits ring on <b>orconn</b> is
|
||||
* corrupt. */
|
||||
void
|
||||
|
@ -62,6 +62,7 @@ const char *decode_address_from_payload(tor_addr_t *addr_out,
|
||||
unsigned cell_ewma_get_tick(void);
|
||||
void cell_ewma_set_scale_factor(or_options_t *options,
|
||||
networkstatus_t *consensus);
|
||||
void circuit_clear_cell_queue(circuit_t *circ, or_connection_t *orconn);
|
||||
|
||||
#endif
|
||||
|
||||
|
Loading…
Reference in New Issue
Block a user