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test: Add ESTABLISH_INTRO unit tests

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This commit adds 3 unit tests which validates a wrong signature length, a
wrong authentication key length and a wrong MAC in the cell.

Closes #20992

Signed-off-by: David Goulet <dgoulet@torproject.org>
This commit is contained in:
David Goulet 2017-01-10 09:24:21 -05:00
parent 655ffeadd5
commit c0a0c19725
1 changed files with 168 additions and 0 deletions
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168
src/test/test_hs_intropoint.c
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@ -12,12 +12,14 @@
#define CIRCUITLIST_PRIVATE
#include "test.h"
#include "log_test_helpers.h"
#include "crypto.h"
#include "or.h"
#include "ht.h"
#include "hs/cell_establish_intro.h"
#include "hs_common.h"
#include "hs_service.h"
#include "hs_circuitmap.h"
#include "hs_intropoint.h"
@ -143,6 +145,163 @@ test_establish_intro_wrong_keytype2(void *arg)
circuit_free(TO_CIRCUIT(intro_circ));
}
/* Send a legit ESTABLISH_INTRO cell but with a wrong MAC. Should fail. */
static void
test_establish_intro_wrong_mac(void *arg)
{
int retval;
hs_cell_establish_intro_t *establish_intro_cell = NULL;
or_circuit_t *intro_circ = or_circuit_new(0,NULL);;
uint8_t cell_body[RELAY_PAYLOAD_SIZE];
ssize_t cell_len = 0;
uint8_t circuit_key_material[DIGEST_LEN] = {0};
(void)arg;
/* Get the auth key of the intro point */
crypto_rand((char *) circuit_key_material, sizeof(circuit_key_material));
helper_prepare_circ_for_intro(intro_circ, circuit_key_material);
/* Create outgoing ESTABLISH_INTRO cell and extract its payload so that we
attempt to parse it. */
establish_intro_cell = generate_establish_intro_cell(circuit_key_material,
sizeof(circuit_key_material));
tt_assert(establish_intro_cell);
/* Mangle one byte of the MAC. */
uint8_t *handshake_ptr =
hs_cell_establish_intro_getarray_handshake_mac(establish_intro_cell);
handshake_ptr[TRUNNEL_SHA3_256_LEN - 1]++;
/* We need to resign the payload with that change. */
{
ed25519_signature_t sig;
ed25519_keypair_t key_struct;
/* New keypair for the signature since we don't have access to the private
* key material generated earlier when creating the cell. */
retval = ed25519_keypair_generate(&key_struct, 0);
tt_int_op(retval, OP_EQ, 0);
uint8_t *auth_key_ptr =
hs_cell_establish_intro_getarray_auth_key(establish_intro_cell);
memcpy(auth_key_ptr, key_struct.pubkey.pubkey, ED25519_PUBKEY_LEN);
/* Encode payload so we can sign it. */
cell_len = get_establish_intro_payload(cell_body, sizeof(cell_body),
establish_intro_cell);
tt_int_op(cell_len, >, 0);
retval = ed25519_sign_prefixed(&sig, cell_body,
cell_len -
(ED25519_SIG_LEN +
sizeof(establish_intro_cell->sig_len)),
ESTABLISH_INTRO_SIG_PREFIX, &key_struct);
tt_int_op(retval, OP_EQ, 0);
/* And write the signature to the cell */
uint8_t *sig_ptr =
hs_cell_establish_intro_getarray_sig(establish_intro_cell);
memcpy(sig_ptr, sig.sig, establish_intro_cell->sig_len);
/* Re-encode with the new signature. */
cell_len = get_establish_intro_payload(cell_body, sizeof(cell_body),
establish_intro_cell);
}
/* Receive the cell. Should fail because our MAC is wrong. */
setup_full_capture_of_logs(LOG_INFO);
retval = hs_intro_received_establish_intro(intro_circ, cell_body, cell_len);
expect_log_msg_containing("ESTABLISH_INTRO handshake_auth not as expected");
teardown_capture_of_logs();
tt_int_op(retval, ==, -1);
done:
hs_cell_establish_intro_free(establish_intro_cell);
circuit_free(TO_CIRCUIT(intro_circ));
}
/* Send a legit ESTABLISH_INTRO cell but with a wrong auth key length. Should
* fail. */
static void
test_establish_intro_wrong_auth_key_len(void *arg)
{
int retval;
hs_cell_establish_intro_t *establish_intro_cell = NULL;
or_circuit_t *intro_circ = or_circuit_new(0,NULL);;
uint8_t cell_body[RELAY_PAYLOAD_SIZE];
ssize_t cell_len = 0;
size_t bad_auth_key_len = ED25519_PUBKEY_LEN - 1;
uint8_t circuit_key_material[DIGEST_LEN] = {0};
(void)arg;
/* Get the auth key of the intro point */
crypto_rand((char *) circuit_key_material, sizeof(circuit_key_material));
helper_prepare_circ_for_intro(intro_circ, circuit_key_material);
/* Create outgoing ESTABLISH_INTRO cell and extract its payload so that we
attempt to parse it. */
establish_intro_cell = generate_establish_intro_cell(circuit_key_material,
sizeof(circuit_key_material));
tt_assert(establish_intro_cell);
/* Mangle the auth key length. */
hs_cell_establish_intro_set_auth_key_len(establish_intro_cell,
bad_auth_key_len);
hs_cell_establish_intro_setlen_auth_key(establish_intro_cell,
bad_auth_key_len);
cell_len = get_establish_intro_payload(cell_body, sizeof(cell_body),
establish_intro_cell);
tt_int_op(cell_len, >, 0);
/* Receive the cell. Should fail. */
setup_full_capture_of_logs(LOG_INFO);
retval = hs_intro_received_establish_intro(intro_circ, cell_body, cell_len);
expect_log_msg_containing("ESTABLISH_INTRO auth key length is invalid");
teardown_capture_of_logs();
tt_int_op(retval, ==, -1);
done:
hs_cell_establish_intro_free(establish_intro_cell);
circuit_free(TO_CIRCUIT(intro_circ));
}
/* Send a legit ESTABLISH_INTRO cell but with a wrong sig length. Should
* fail. */
static void
test_establish_intro_wrong_sig_len(void *arg)
{
int retval;
hs_cell_establish_intro_t *establish_intro_cell = NULL;
or_circuit_t *intro_circ = or_circuit_new(0,NULL);;
uint8_t cell_body[RELAY_PAYLOAD_SIZE];
ssize_t cell_len = 0;
size_t bad_sig_len = ED25519_SIG_LEN - 1;
uint8_t circuit_key_material[DIGEST_LEN] = {0};
(void)arg;
/* Get the auth key of the intro point */
crypto_rand((char *) circuit_key_material, sizeof(circuit_key_material));
helper_prepare_circ_for_intro(intro_circ, circuit_key_material);
/* Create outgoing ESTABLISH_INTRO cell and extract its payload so that we
attempt to parse it. */
establish_intro_cell = generate_establish_intro_cell(circuit_key_material,
sizeof(circuit_key_material));
tt_assert(establish_intro_cell);
/* Mangle the signature length. */
hs_cell_establish_intro_set_sig_len(establish_intro_cell, bad_sig_len);
hs_cell_establish_intro_setlen_sig(establish_intro_cell, bad_sig_len);
cell_len = get_establish_intro_payload(cell_body, sizeof(cell_body),
establish_intro_cell);
tt_int_op(cell_len, >, 0);
/* Receive the cell. Should fail. */
setup_full_capture_of_logs(LOG_INFO);
retval = hs_intro_received_establish_intro(intro_circ, cell_body, cell_len);
expect_log_msg_containing("ESTABLISH_INTRO sig len is invalid");
teardown_capture_of_logs();
tt_int_op(retval, ==, -1);
done:
hs_cell_establish_intro_free(establish_intro_cell);
circuit_free(TO_CIRCUIT(intro_circ));
}
/* Send a legit ESTABLISH_INTRO cell but slightly change the signature. Should
* fail. */
static void
@ -356,6 +515,15 @@ struct testcase_t hs_intropoint_tests[] = {
{ "receive_establish_intro_wrong_sig",
test_establish_intro_wrong_sig, TT_FORK, NULL, NULL },
{ "receive_establish_intro_wrong_sig_len",
test_establish_intro_wrong_sig_len, TT_FORK, NULL, NULL },
{ "receive_establish_intro_wrong_auth_key_len",
test_establish_intro_wrong_auth_key_len, TT_FORK, NULL, NULL },
{ "receive_establish_intro_wrong_mac",
test_establish_intro_wrong_mac, TT_FORK, NULL, NULL },
END_OF_TESTCASES
};