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patch the spec somewhat. it's still quite stale.
svn:r406
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@ -23,7 +23,7 @@ TODO: (very soon)
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All numeric values are encoded in network (big-endian) order.
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Unless otherwise specified, all symmetric ciphers are 3DES in OFB
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Unless otherwise specified, all symmetric ciphers are AES in counter
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mode, with an IV of all 0 bytes. Asymmetric ciphers are either RSA
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with 1024-bit keys and exponents of 65537, or DH with the safe prime
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from rfc2409, section 6.2, whose hex representation is:
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@ -34,8 +34,6 @@ TODO: (very soon)
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"A637ED6B0BFF5CB6F406B7EDEE386BFB5A899FA5AE9F24117C4B1FE6"
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"49286651ECE65381FFFFFFFFFFFFFFFF"
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[We will move to AES once we can assume everybody will have it. -RD]
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1. System overview
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@ -64,7 +62,8 @@ which reveals the downstream node.
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The client generates a pair of 16-byte symmetric keys (one
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[K_f] for the 'forward' stream from client to server, and one
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[K_b] for the 'backward' stream from server to client.
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[K_b] for the 'backward' stream from server to client) to be
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used for link encryption.
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The client then generates a 'Client authentication' message [M]
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containing:
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@ -72,8 +71,8 @@ which reveals the downstream node.
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(If client is an OP)
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The number 1 to signify OP handshake [2 bytes]
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Maximum bandwidth (bytes/s) [4 bytes]
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Forward key [K_f] [16 bytes]
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Backward key [K_b] [16 bytes]
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Forward link key [K_f] [16 bytes]
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Backward link key [K_b] [16 bytes]
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[Total: 38 bytes]
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(If client is an OR)
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@ -94,7 +93,7 @@ which reveals the downstream node.
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the 128-byte RSA-encrypted data to the server, and waits for a
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reply.
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2. The server receives the first handshake
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2. The server receives the first handshake:
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The OR waits for 128 bytes of data, and decrypts the resulting
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data with its private key, checking the PKCS1 padding. If
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@ -178,7 +177,7 @@ which reveals the downstream node.
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Once the handshake is complete, the two sides send cells
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(specified below) to one another. Cells are sent serially,
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encrypted with the 3DES-OFB keystream specified by the handshake
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encrypted with the AES-CNT keystream specified by the handshake
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protocol. Over a connection, communicants encrypt outgoing cells
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with the connection's K_f, and decrypt incoming cells with the
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connection's K_b.
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@ -201,6 +200,8 @@ which reveals the downstream node.
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do evil stuff. For instance, if I can guess that a cell is a
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TOPIC_COMMAND_BEGIN cell to www.slashdot.org:80 , I can change the
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address and port to point to a machine I control. -NM]
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[We're going to address this tagging issue with e2e-only hashes.
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See TODO file. -RD]
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3. Cell Packet format
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@ -386,7 +387,7 @@ which reveals the downstream node.
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Otherwise, if the OR is not at the OP edge of the circuit (that is,
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either an 'exit node' or a non-edge node), it de/encrypts the length
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field and the payload with 3DES/OFB, as follows:
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field and the payload with AES/CNT, as follows:
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'Forward' relay cell (same direction as CREATE):
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Use Kf as key; encrypt.
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'Back' relay cell (opposite direction from CREATE):
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@ -401,13 +402,13 @@ which reveals the downstream node.
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handshakes. -RD]
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Otherwise, if the data cell is coming from the OP edge of the
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circuit, the OP decrypts the length and payload fields with 3DES/OFB as
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circuit, the OP decrypts the length and payload fields with AES/CNT as
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follows:
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OP sends data cell to node R_M:
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For I=1...M, decrypt with Kf_I.
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Otherwise, if the data cell is arriving at the OP edge if the
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circuit, the OP encrypts the length and payload fields with 3DES/OFB as
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circuit, the OP encrypts the length and payload fields with AES/CNT as
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follows:
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OP receives data cell:
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For I=N...1,
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@ -465,7 +466,6 @@ which reveals the downstream node.
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Once a connection has been established, the OP and exit node
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package stream data in RELAY_DATA cells, and upon receiving such
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cells, echo their contents to the corresponding TCP stream.
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[XXX Mention zlib encoding. -NM]
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5.2. Closing streams
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@ -511,6 +511,10 @@ which reveals the downstream node.
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number of bytes per second on average, though they may use mechanisms
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to handle spikes (eg token buckets).
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[This isn't true anymore. Each node has a total bandwidth it's willing
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to accept from all nodes per second; it ignores negotiated
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per-connection bandwidths. -RD]
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Communicants rely on TCP's default flow control to push back when they
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stop reading, so nodes that don't obey this bandwidth limit can't do
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too much damage.
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