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Merge branch 'maint-0.2.5' into maint-0.2.8
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commit
ba4a9cf0c0
10
changes/trove-2017-009
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10
changes/trove-2017-009
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o Major bugfixes (security):
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- When checking for replays in the INTRODUCE1 cell data for a (legacy)
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hiddden service, correctly detect replays in the RSA-encrypted part of
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the cell. We were previously checking for replays on the entire cell,
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but those can be circumvented due to the malleability of Tor's legacy
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hybrid encryption. This fix helps prevent a traffic confirmation
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attack. Fixes bug 24244; bugfix on 0.2.4.1-alpha. This issue is also
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tracked as TROVE-2017-009 and CVE-2017-8819.
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8
changes/trove-2017-011
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8
changes/trove-2017-011
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o Major bugfixes (security):
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- Fix a denial of service bug where an attacker could use a malformed
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directory object to cause a Tor instance to pause while OpenSSL would
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try to read a passphrase from the terminal. (If the terminal was not
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available, tor would continue running.) Fixes bug 24246; bugfix on
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every version of Tor. Also tracked as TROVE-2017-011 and
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CVE-2017-8821. Found by OSS-Fuzz as testcase 6360145429790720.
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6
changes/trove-2017-012-part1
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6
changes/trove-2017-012-part1
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o Major bugfixes (security, relay):
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- When running as a relay, make sure that we never build a path through
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ourselves, even in the case where we have somehow lost the version of
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our descriptor appearing in the consensus. Fixes part of bug 21534;
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bugfix on 0.2.0.1-alpha. This issue is also tracked as TROVE-2017-012
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and CVE-2017-8822.
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@ -666,11 +666,21 @@ MOCK_IMPL(int,
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return 0;
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}
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/** A PEM callback that always reports a failure to get a password */
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static int
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pem_no_password_cb(char *buf, int size, int rwflag, void *u)
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{
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(void)buf;
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(void)size;
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(void)rwflag;
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(void)u;
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return 0;
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}
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/** Read a PEM-encoded private key from the <b>len</b>-byte string <b>s</b>
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* into <b>env</b>. Return 0 on success, -1 on failure. If len is -1,
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* the string is nul-terminated.
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*/
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/* Used here, and used for testing. */
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int
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crypto_pk_read_private_key_from_string(crypto_pk_t *env,
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const char *s, ssize_t len)
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@ -689,7 +699,7 @@ crypto_pk_read_private_key_from_string(crypto_pk_t *env,
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if (env->key)
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RSA_free(env->key);
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env->key = PEM_read_bio_RSAPrivateKey(b,NULL,NULL,NULL);
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env->key = PEM_read_bio_RSAPrivateKey(b,NULL,pem_no_password_cb,NULL);
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BIO_free(b);
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@ -821,7 +831,7 @@ crypto_pk_read_public_key_from_string(crypto_pk_t *env, const char *src,
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if (env->key)
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RSA_free(env->key);
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env->key = PEM_read_bio_RSAPublicKey(b, NULL, NULL, NULL);
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env->key = PEM_read_bio_RSAPublicKey(b, NULL, pem_no_password_cb, NULL);
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BIO_free(b);
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if (!env->key) {
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crypto_log_errors(LOG_WARN, "reading public key from string");
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@ -1469,6 +1469,7 @@ rend_service_receive_introduction(origin_circuit_t *circuit,
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time_t now = time(NULL);
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time_t elapsed;
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int replay;
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size_t keylen;
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/* Do some initial validation and logging before we parse the cell */
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if (circuit->base_.purpose != CIRCUIT_PURPOSE_S_INTRO) {
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@ -1544,9 +1545,10 @@ rend_service_receive_introduction(origin_circuit_t *circuit,
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}
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/* check for replay of PK-encrypted portion. */
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keylen = crypto_pk_keysize(intro_key);
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replay = replaycache_add_test_and_elapsed(
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intro_point->accepted_intro_rsa_parts,
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parsed_req->ciphertext, parsed_req->ciphertext_len,
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parsed_req->ciphertext, MIN(parsed_req->ciphertext_len, keylen),
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&elapsed);
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if (replay) {
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@ -2536,7 +2536,10 @@ router_choose_random_node(smartlist_t *excludedsmartlist,
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});
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}
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if ((r = routerlist_find_my_routerinfo()))
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/* If the node_t is not found we won't be to exclude ourself but we
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* won't be able to pick ourself in router_choose_random_node() so
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* this is fine to at least try with our routerinfo_t object. */
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if ((r = router_get_my_routerinfo()))
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routerlist_add_node_and_family(excludednodes, r);
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router_add_running_nodes_to_smartlist(sl, allow_invalid,
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