note another potential security problem with generating key material

from our DH handshake.


svn:r4724
This commit is contained in:
Roger Dingledine 2005-08-06 16:50:51 +00:00
parent 261bf4c4d4
commit b9a7482c02

View File

@ -1458,6 +1458,12 @@ int crypto_dh_compute_secret(crypto_dh_env_t *dh,
}
secret_len = result;
/* sometimes secret_len might be less than 128, e.g., 127. that's ok. */
/* Actually, http://www.faqs.org/rfcs/rfc2631.html says:
* Leading zeros MUST be preserved, so that ZZ occupies as many
* octets as p. For instance, if p is 1024 bits, ZZ should be 128
* bytes long.
* What are the security implications here?
*/
for (i = 0; i < secret_bytes_out; i += DIGEST_LEN) {
secret_tmp[secret_len] = (unsigned char) i/DIGEST_LEN;
if (crypto_digest(hash, secret_tmp, secret_len+1))