From b770cc8e6ee7beffa97a3a78b79384e7114a72a8 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Roger Dingledine Date: Fri, 7 Mar 2008 21:19:21 +0000 Subject: [PATCH] add some details on why we haven't done proposal 127 yet, and may not ever do it. svn:r13884 --- .../127-dirport-mirrors-downloads.txt | 20 +++++++++++++++++++ 1 file changed, 20 insertions(+) diff --git a/doc/spec/proposals/127-dirport-mirrors-downloads.txt b/doc/spec/proposals/127-dirport-mirrors-downloads.txt index 9a07dcdc0d..1b55a02d61 100644 --- a/doc/spec/proposals/127-dirport-mirrors-downloads.txt +++ b/doc/spec/proposals/127-dirport-mirrors-downloads.txt @@ -135,3 +135,23 @@ Status: Draft answers to popular requests, so we don't have to keep getting them again.) +6. Outstanding problems + + 1) HTTP proxies already exist. Why waste our time cloning one + badly? When we clone existing stuff, we usually regret it. + + 2) It's overbroad. We only seem to need a secure get-a-tor feature, + and instead we're contemplating building a locked-down HTTP proxy. + + 3) It's going to add a fair bit of complexity to our code. We do + not currently implement HTTPS. We'd need to refactor lots of the + low-level connection stuff so that "SSL" and "Cell-based" were no + longer synonymous. + + 4) It's still unclear how effective this proposal would be in + practice. You need to know that this feature exists, which means + somebody needs to tell you about a bridge (mirror) address and tell + you how to use it. And if they're doing that, they could (e.g.) tell + you about a gmail autoresponder address just as easily, and then you'd + get better authentication of the Tor program to boot. +