diff --git a/doc/tor-design.tex b/doc/tor-design.tex
index a6b0ef031c..93ede41fca 100644
--- a/doc/tor-design.tex
+++ b/doc/tor-design.tex
@@ -1479,8 +1479,8 @@ an attacker who learns a node's identity key can replace that node
 indefinitely by sending new forged descriptors to the directory servers.
 
 \emph{Iterated compromise.} A roving adversary who can
-compromise ORs (by system intrusion, legal coersion, or extralegal
-coersion) could march down the circuit compromising the
+compromise ORs (by system intrusion, legal coercion, or extralegal
+coercion) could march down the circuit compromising the
 nodes until he reaches the end.  Unless the adversary can complete
 this attack within the lifetime of the circuit, however, the ORs
 will have discarded the necessary information before the attack can
@@ -1528,7 +1528,7 @@ anonymity of the endpoints of a circuit by its observations, a
 hostile node must be immediately adjacent to that endpoint. 
 If an adversary is able to
 run multiple ORs, and is able to persuade the directory servers
-that those ORs are trustworthy and independant, then occasionally
+that those ORs are trustworthy and independent, then occasionally
 some user will choose one of those ORs for the start and another
 as the end of a circuit.  When this happens, the user's
 anonymity is compromised for those streams.  If an adversary can
@@ -1572,7 +1572,7 @@ will result in a different negotiated session key, and so the rest
 of the recorded session can't be used.  
 
 \emph{Smear attacks.} An attacker could use the Tor network to
-engage in socially dissapproved acts, so as to try to bring the
+engage in socially disapproved acts, so as to try to bring the
 entire network into disrepute and get its operators to shut it down.
 Exit policies can help reduce the possibilities for abuse, but
 ultimately, the network will require volunteers who can tolerate