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New authentication types to use RFC5705.
See proposal 244. This feature lets us stop looking at the internals of SSL objects, *and* should let us port better to more SSL libraries, if they have RFC5705 support. Preparatory for #19156
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@ -2448,6 +2448,28 @@ tor_tls_get_tlssecrets,(tor_tls_t *tls, uint8_t *secrets_out))
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return 0;
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}
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/** Using the RFC5705 key material exporting construction, and the
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* provided <b>context</b> (<b>context_len</b> bytes long) and
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* <b>label</b> (a NUL-terminated string), compute a 32-byte secret in
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* <b>secrets_out</b> that only the parties to this TLS session can
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* compute. Return 0 on success and -1 on failure.
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*/
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MOCK_IMPL(int,
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tor_tls_export_key_material,(tor_tls_t *tls, uint8_t *secrets_out,
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const uint8_t *context,
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size_t context_len,
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const char *label))
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{
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tor_assert(tls);
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tor_assert(tls->ssl);
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int r = SSL_export_keying_material(tls->ssl,
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secrets_out, DIGEST256_LEN,
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label, strlen(label),
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context, context_len, 1);
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return (r == 1) ? 0 : -1;
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}
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/** Examine the amount of memory used and available for buffers in <b>tls</b>.
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* Set *<b>rbuf_capacity</b> to the amount of storage allocated for the read
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* buffer and *<b>rbuf_bytes</b> to the amount actually used.
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@ -226,6 +226,11 @@ int tor_tls_used_v1_handshake(tor_tls_t *tls);
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int tor_tls_get_num_server_handshakes(tor_tls_t *tls);
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int tor_tls_server_got_renegotiate(tor_tls_t *tls);
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MOCK_DECL(int,tor_tls_get_tlssecrets,(tor_tls_t *tls, uint8_t *secrets_out));
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MOCK_DECL(int,tor_tls_export_key_material,(
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tor_tls_t *tls, uint8_t *secrets_out,
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const uint8_t *context,
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size_t context_len,
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const char *label));
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/* Log and abort if there are unhandled TLS errors in OpenSSL's error stack.
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*/
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@ -2318,15 +2318,34 @@ connection_or_compute_authenticate_cell_body(or_connection_t *conn,
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auth1_t *auth = NULL;
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auth_ctx_t *ctx = auth_ctx_new();
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int result;
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int old_tlssecrets_algorithm = 0;
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const char *authtype_str = NULL;
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int is_ed = 0;
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const int authtype = 1; /* XXXX this should be an argument. */
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/* assert state is reasonable XXXX */
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ctx->is_ed = 0;
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switch (authtype) {
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case AUTHTYPE_RSA_SHA256_TLSSECRET:
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authtype_str = "AUTH0001";
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old_tlssecrets_algorithm = 1;
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break;
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case AUTHTYPE_RSA_SHA256_RFC5705:
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authtype_str = "AUTH0002";
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break;
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case AUTHTYPE_ED25519_SHA256_RFC5705:
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authtype_str = "AUTH0003";
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is_ed = 1;
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break;
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default:
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tor_assert(0);
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break;
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}
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auth = auth1_new();
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/* Type: 8 bytes. */
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memcpy(auth1_getarray_type(auth), "AUTH0001", 8);
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memcpy(auth1_getarray_type(auth), authtype_str, 8);
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{
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const tor_x509_cert_t *id_cert=NULL, *link_cert=NULL;
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@ -2380,7 +2399,8 @@ connection_or_compute_authenticate_cell_body(or_connection_t *conn,
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cert = freecert;
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}
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if (!cert) {
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log_warn(LD_OR, "Unable to find cert when making AUTH1 data.");
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log_warn(LD_OR, "Unable to find cert when making %s data.",
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authtype_str);
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goto err;
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}
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@ -2392,7 +2412,16 @@ connection_or_compute_authenticate_cell_body(or_connection_t *conn,
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}
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/* HMAC of clientrandom and serverrandom using master key : 32 octets */
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tor_tls_get_tlssecrets(conn->tls, auth->tlssecrets);
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if (old_tlssecrets_algorithm) {
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tor_tls_get_tlssecrets(conn->tls, auth->tlssecrets);
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} else {
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char label[128];
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tor_snprintf(label, sizeof(label),
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"EXPORTER FOR TOR TLS CLIENT BINDING %s", authtype_str);
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tor_tls_export_key_material(conn->tls, auth->tlssecrets,
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auth->cid, sizeof(auth->cid),
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label);
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}
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/* 8 octets were reserved for the current time, but we're trying to get out
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* of the habit of sending time around willynilly. Fortunately, nothing
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23
src/or/or.h
23
src/or/or.h
@ -1348,13 +1348,34 @@ typedef struct listener_connection_t {
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#define OR_CERT_TYPE_RSA_ED_CROSSCERT 7
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/**@}*/
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/** The one currently supported type of AUTHENTICATE cell. It contains
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/** The first supported type of AUTHENTICATE cell. It contains
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* a bunch of structures signed with an RSA1024 key. The signed
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* structures include a HMAC using negotiated TLS secrets, and a digest
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* of all cells sent or received before the AUTHENTICATE cell (including
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* the random server-generated AUTH_CHALLENGE cell).
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*/
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#define AUTHTYPE_RSA_SHA256_TLSSECRET 1
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/** As AUTHTYPE_RSA_SHA256_TLSSECRET, but instead of using the
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* negotiated TLS secrets, uses exported keying material from the TLS
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* session as described in RFC 5705.
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*
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* Not used by today's tors, since everything that supports this
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* also supports ED25519_SHA3_5705, which is better.
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**/
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#define AUTHTYPE_RSA_SHA256_RFC5705 2
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/** As AUTHTYPE_RSA_SHA256_RFC5705, but uses an Ed25519 identity key to
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* authenticate. */
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#define AUTHTYPE_ED25519_SHA256_RFC5705 3
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/*
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* NOTE: authchallenge_type_is_better() relies on these AUTHTYPE codes
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* being sorted in order of preference. If we someday add one with
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* a higher numerical value that we don't like as much, we should revise
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* authchallenge_type_is_better().
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*/
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/** The length of the part of the AUTHENTICATE cell body that the client and
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* server can generate independently (when using RSA_SHA256_TLSSECRET). It
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