r12154@catbus: nickm | 2007-03-11 23:20:58 -0400

Add "sybil-checking.txt" as "109-no-sharing-ips.txt"


svn:r9805
This commit is contained in:
Nick Mathewson 2007-03-12 13:04:20 +00:00
parent f4913b4070
commit a70be61dd5
2 changed files with 78 additions and 0 deletions

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@ -27,3 +27,4 @@ Proposals by number:
106 Checking fewer things during TLS handshakes [CLOSED]
107 Uptime Sanity Checking [CLOSED]
108 Base "Stable" Flag on Mean Time Between Failures [OPEN]
109 No more than one server per IP address [OPEN]

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@ -0,0 +1,77 @@
Filename: 109-no-sharing-ips.txt
Title: No more than one server per IP address.
Version:
Last-Modified:
Author: Kevin Bauer & Damon McCoy
Created: 9-March-2007
Status: Open
Overview:
This document describes a solution to a Sybil attack vulnerability in the
directory servers. Currently, it is possible for a single IP address to
host an arbitrarily high number of Tor routers. We propose that the
directory servers limit the number of Tor routers that may be registered at
a particular IP address to some small (fixed) number, perhaps just one Tor
router per IP address.
While Tor never uses more than one server from a given /16 in the same
circuit, an attacker with multiple servers in the same place is still
dangerous because he can get around the per-server bandwidth cap that is
designed to prevent a single server from attracting too much of the overall
traffic.
Motivation:
Since it is possible for an attacker to register an arbitrarily large
number of Tor routers, it is possible for malicious parties to do this to
as part of a traffic analysis attack.
Security implications:
This countermeasure will increase the number of IP addresses that an
attacker must control in order to carry out traffic analysis.
Specification:
We propose that the directory servers check if an incoming Tor router IP
address is already registered under another router. If this is the case,
then prevent this router from joining the network.
Compatibility:
Upon inspection of a directory server, we found that the following IP
addresses have more than one Tor router:
Scruples 68.5.113.81 ip68-5-113-81.oc.oc.cox.net 443
WiseUp 68.5.113.81 ip68-5-113-81.oc.oc.cox.net 9001
Unnamed 62.1.196.71 pc01-megabyte-net-arkadiou.megabyte.gr 9001
Unnamed 62.1.196.71 pc01-megabyte-net-arkadiou.megabyte.gr 9001
Unnamed 62.1.196.71 pc01-megabyte-net-arkadiou.megabyte.gr 9001
aurel 85.180.62.138 e180062138.adsl.alicedsl.de 9001
sokrates 85.180.62.138 e180062138.adsl.alicedsl.de 9001
moria1 18.244.0.188 moria.mit.edu 9001
peacetime 18.244.0.188 moria.mit.edu 9100
There may exist compatibility issues with this proposed fix. Reasons why
more than one server would share an IP address include:
* Testing. moria1, moria2, peacetime, and other morias all run on one
computer at MIT, because that way we get testing. Moria1 and moria2 are
run by Roger, and peacetime is run by Nick.
* NAT. If there are several servers but they port-forward through the same
IP address, ... we can hope that the operators coordinate with each
other. Also, we should recognize that while they help the network in
terms of increased capacity, they don't help as much as they could in
terms of location diversity. But our approach so far has been to take
what we can get.
* People who have more than 1.5MB/s and want to help out more. For
example, for a while Tonga was offering 10MB/s and its Tor server
would only make use of a bit of it. So Roger suggested that he run
two Tor servers, to use more.
Alternatives:
Roger suggested that instead of capping number of servers per IP to 1, we
should cap total declared bandwidth per IP to some N, and total declared
servers to some M. (He suggested N=5MB/s and M=5.)
Roger also suggested that rather than not listing servers, we mark them as
not Valid.