mirror of
https://gitlab.torproject.org/tpo/core/tor.git
synced 2024-11-23 20:03:31 +01:00
Prop#329: Add purposes for conflux circuits
Because UNLINKED circuits must never be used for streams, but LINKED circuits can be, we want these separate.
This commit is contained in:
parent
cf715a56f1
commit
a4ee0c29ee
@ -1444,6 +1444,7 @@ route_len_for_purpose(uint8_t purpose, extend_info_t *exit_ei)
|
||||
switch (purpose) {
|
||||
/* These purposes connect to a router that we chose, so DEFAULT_ROUTE_LEN
|
||||
* is safe: */
|
||||
case CIRCUIT_PURPOSE_CONFLUX_UNLINKED:
|
||||
case CIRCUIT_PURPOSE_TESTING:
|
||||
/* router reachability testing */
|
||||
known_purpose = 1;
|
||||
@ -1927,6 +1928,7 @@ choose_good_exit_server(origin_circuit_t *circ,
|
||||
* since it should be random. */
|
||||
tor_assert_nonfatal(is_internal);
|
||||
FALLTHROUGH;
|
||||
case CIRCUIT_PURPOSE_CONFLUX_UNLINKED:
|
||||
case CIRCUIT_PURPOSE_C_GENERAL:
|
||||
if (is_internal) /* pick it like a middle hop */
|
||||
return router_choose_random_node(NULL, options->ExcludeNodes, flags);
|
||||
@ -1974,6 +1976,8 @@ warn_if_last_router_excluded(origin_circuit_t *circ,
|
||||
case CIRCUIT_PURPOSE_S_HSDIR_POST:
|
||||
case CIRCUIT_PURPOSE_C_HSDIR_GET:
|
||||
case CIRCUIT_PURPOSE_C_GENERAL:
|
||||
case CIRCUIT_PURPOSE_CONFLUX_UNLINKED:
|
||||
case CIRCUIT_PURPOSE_CONFLUX_LINKED:
|
||||
if (circ->build_state->is_internal)
|
||||
return;
|
||||
description = "requested exit node";
|
||||
@ -2109,8 +2113,11 @@ onion_pick_cpath_exit(origin_circuit_t *circ, extend_info_t *exit_ei,
|
||||
}
|
||||
exit_ei = extend_info_from_node(node, state->onehop_tunnel,
|
||||
/* for_exit_use */
|
||||
!state->is_internal && TO_CIRCUIT(circ)->purpose ==
|
||||
CIRCUIT_PURPOSE_C_GENERAL);
|
||||
!state->is_internal && (
|
||||
TO_CIRCUIT(circ)->purpose ==
|
||||
CIRCUIT_PURPOSE_C_GENERAL ||
|
||||
TO_CIRCUIT(circ)->purpose ==
|
||||
CIRCUIT_PURPOSE_CONFLUX_UNLINKED));
|
||||
if (BUG(exit_ei == NULL))
|
||||
return -1;
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
@ -841,6 +841,11 @@ circuit_purpose_to_controller_string(uint8_t purpose)
|
||||
case CIRCUIT_PURPOSE_C_CIRCUIT_PADDING:
|
||||
return "CIRCUIT_PADDING";
|
||||
|
||||
case CIRCUIT_PURPOSE_CONFLUX_UNLINKED:
|
||||
return "CONFLUX_UNLINKED";
|
||||
case CIRCUIT_PURPOSE_CONFLUX_LINKED:
|
||||
return "CONFLUX_LINKED";
|
||||
|
||||
default:
|
||||
tor_snprintf(buf, sizeof(buf), "UNKNOWN_%d", (int)purpose);
|
||||
return buf;
|
||||
@ -870,6 +875,8 @@ circuit_purpose_to_controller_hs_state_string(uint8_t purpose)
|
||||
case CIRCUIT_PURPOSE_PATH_BIAS_TESTING:
|
||||
case CIRCUIT_PURPOSE_HS_VANGUARDS:
|
||||
case CIRCUIT_PURPOSE_C_CIRCUIT_PADDING:
|
||||
case CIRCUIT_PURPOSE_CONFLUX_UNLINKED:
|
||||
case CIRCUIT_PURPOSE_CONFLUX_LINKED:
|
||||
return NULL;
|
||||
|
||||
case CIRCUIT_PURPOSE_INTRO_POINT:
|
||||
@ -973,6 +980,12 @@ circuit_purpose_to_string(uint8_t purpose)
|
||||
case CIRCUIT_PURPOSE_C_CIRCUIT_PADDING:
|
||||
return "Circuit kept open for padding";
|
||||
|
||||
case CIRCUIT_PURPOSE_CONFLUX_UNLINKED:
|
||||
return "Unlinked conflux circuit";
|
||||
|
||||
case CIRCUIT_PURPOSE_CONFLUX_LINKED:
|
||||
return "Linked conflux circuit";
|
||||
|
||||
default:
|
||||
tor_snprintf(buf, sizeof(buf), "UNKNOWN_%d", (int)purpose);
|
||||
return buf;
|
||||
@ -1841,6 +1854,9 @@ get_circuit_purpose_needed_to_cannibalize(uint8_t purpose)
|
||||
* circuits so that we get the same path construction logic. */
|
||||
return CIRCUIT_PURPOSE_HS_VANGUARDS;
|
||||
} else {
|
||||
/* Conflux purposes should never get here */
|
||||
tor_assert_nonfatal(purpose != CIRCUIT_PURPOSE_CONFLUX_UNLINKED &&
|
||||
purpose != CIRCUIT_PURPOSE_CONFLUX_LINKED);
|
||||
/* If no vanguards are used just get a general circuit! */
|
||||
return CIRCUIT_PURPOSE_C_GENERAL;
|
||||
}
|
||||
@ -1886,6 +1902,10 @@ circuit_find_to_cannibalize(uint8_t purpose_to_produce, extend_info_t *info,
|
||||
tor_assert_nonfatal(purpose_to_search_for == CIRCUIT_PURPOSE_C_GENERAL ||
|
||||
purpose_to_search_for == CIRCUIT_PURPOSE_HS_VANGUARDS);
|
||||
|
||||
tor_assert_nonfatal(purpose_to_search_for !=
|
||||
CIRCUIT_PURPOSE_CONFLUX_UNLINKED);
|
||||
tor_assert_nonfatal(purpose_to_produce != CIRCUIT_PURPOSE_CONFLUX_UNLINKED);
|
||||
|
||||
log_debug(LD_CIRC,
|
||||
"Hunting for a circ to cannibalize: purpose %d, uptime %d, "
|
||||
"capacity %d, internal %d",
|
||||
|
@ -130,7 +130,14 @@
|
||||
* actual needed HS purpose. */
|
||||
#define CIRCUIT_PURPOSE_HS_VANGUARDS 24
|
||||
|
||||
#define CIRCUIT_PURPOSE_MAX_ 24
|
||||
/**
|
||||
* These two purposes are for conflux. The first is for circuits that are
|
||||
* being built, but not yet linked. The second is for circuits that are
|
||||
* linked and ready to use for streams. */
|
||||
#define CIRCUIT_PURPOSE_CONFLUX_UNLINKED 25
|
||||
#define CIRCUIT_PURPOSE_CONFLUX_LINKED 26
|
||||
|
||||
#define CIRCUIT_PURPOSE_MAX_ 26
|
||||
/** A catch-all for unrecognized purposes. Currently we don't expect
|
||||
* to make or see any circuits with this purpose. */
|
||||
#define CIRCUIT_PURPOSE_UNKNOWN 255
|
||||
|
@ -138,7 +138,8 @@ circuit_is_acceptable(const origin_circuit_t *origin_circ,
|
||||
purpose == CIRCUIT_PURPOSE_C_HSDIR_GET ||
|
||||
purpose == CIRCUIT_PURPOSE_S_HSDIR_POST ||
|
||||
purpose == CIRCUIT_PURPOSE_HS_VANGUARDS ||
|
||||
purpose == CIRCUIT_PURPOSE_C_REND_JOINED) {
|
||||
purpose == CIRCUIT_PURPOSE_C_REND_JOINED ||
|
||||
purpose == CIRCUIT_PURPOSE_CONFLUX_LINKED) {
|
||||
if (circ->timestamp_dirty &&
|
||||
circ->timestamp_dirty+get_options()->MaxCircuitDirtiness <= now)
|
||||
return 0;
|
||||
@ -162,6 +163,8 @@ circuit_is_acceptable(const origin_circuit_t *origin_circ,
|
||||
return 0;
|
||||
|
||||
if (purpose == CIRCUIT_PURPOSE_C_GENERAL ||
|
||||
purpose == CIRCUIT_PURPOSE_CONFLUX_UNLINKED ||
|
||||
purpose == CIRCUIT_PURPOSE_CONFLUX_LINKED ||
|
||||
purpose == CIRCUIT_PURPOSE_S_HSDIR_POST ||
|
||||
purpose == CIRCUIT_PURPOSE_C_HSDIR_GET) {
|
||||
tor_addr_t addr;
|
||||
@ -1003,7 +1006,8 @@ circuit_stream_is_being_handled(entry_connection_t *conn,
|
||||
SMARTLIST_FOREACH_BEGIN(circuit_get_global_list(), circuit_t *, circ) {
|
||||
if (CIRCUIT_IS_ORIGIN(circ) &&
|
||||
!circ->marked_for_close &&
|
||||
circ->purpose == CIRCUIT_PURPOSE_C_GENERAL &&
|
||||
(circ->purpose == CIRCUIT_PURPOSE_C_GENERAL ||
|
||||
circ->purpose == CIRCUIT_PURPOSE_CONFLUX_LINKED) &&
|
||||
(!circ->timestamp_dirty ||
|
||||
circ->timestamp_dirty + get_options()->MaxCircuitDirtiness > now)) {
|
||||
origin_circuit_t *origin_circ = TO_ORIGIN_CIRCUIT(circ);
|
||||
@ -1450,6 +1454,8 @@ circuit_expire_old_circuits_clientside(void)
|
||||
if (timercmp(&circ->timestamp_began, &cutoff, OP_LT)) {
|
||||
if (circ->purpose == CIRCUIT_PURPOSE_C_GENERAL ||
|
||||
circ->purpose == CIRCUIT_PURPOSE_C_HSDIR_GET ||
|
||||
circ->purpose == CIRCUIT_PURPOSE_CONFLUX_UNLINKED ||
|
||||
circ->purpose == CIRCUIT_PURPOSE_CONFLUX_LINKED ||
|
||||
circ->purpose == CIRCUIT_PURPOSE_S_HSDIR_POST ||
|
||||
circ->purpose == CIRCUIT_PURPOSE_HS_VANGUARDS ||
|
||||
circ->purpose == CIRCUIT_PURPOSE_C_MEASURE_TIMEOUT ||
|
||||
@ -1655,6 +1661,8 @@ circuit_has_opened(origin_circuit_t *circ)
|
||||
hs_client_circuit_has_opened(circ);
|
||||
break;
|
||||
case CIRCUIT_PURPOSE_C_GENERAL:
|
||||
circuit_try_attaching_streams(circ);
|
||||
break;
|
||||
case CIRCUIT_PURPOSE_C_HSDIR_GET:
|
||||
case CIRCUIT_PURPOSE_S_HSDIR_POST:
|
||||
/* Tell any AP connections that have been waiting for a new
|
||||
@ -2030,6 +2038,11 @@ circuit_should_cannibalize_to_build(uint8_t purpose_to_build,
|
||||
return 0;
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
/* Do not cannibalize for conflux circuits */
|
||||
if (purpose_to_build == CIRCUIT_PURPOSE_CONFLUX_UNLINKED) {
|
||||
return 0;
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
return 1;
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
@ -2607,6 +2620,8 @@ link_apconn_to_circ(entry_connection_t *apconn, origin_circuit_t *circ,
|
||||
exitnode = node_get_by_id(cpath->extend_info->identity_digest);
|
||||
|
||||
/* See if we can use optimistic data on this circuit */
|
||||
// TODO-329-PURPOSE: Can conflux use optimistic data? Does
|
||||
// anything use optimistic data? Does anything use this?
|
||||
if (circ->base_.purpose == CIRCUIT_PURPOSE_C_GENERAL ||
|
||||
circ->base_.purpose == CIRCUIT_PURPOSE_C_HSDIR_GET ||
|
||||
circ->base_.purpose == CIRCUIT_PURPOSE_S_HSDIR_POST ||
|
||||
|
@ -1236,6 +1236,7 @@ connection_ap_expire_beginning(void)
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
if (circ->purpose != CIRCUIT_PURPOSE_C_GENERAL &&
|
||||
circ->purpose != CIRCUIT_PURPOSE_CONFLUX_LINKED &&
|
||||
circ->purpose != CIRCUIT_PURPOSE_CONTROLLER &&
|
||||
circ->purpose != CIRCUIT_PURPOSE_C_HSDIR_GET &&
|
||||
circ->purpose != CIRCUIT_PURPOSE_S_HSDIR_POST &&
|
||||
@ -3112,6 +3113,8 @@ connection_ap_supports_optimistic_data(const entry_connection_t *conn)
|
||||
const edge_connection_t *edge_conn = ENTRY_TO_EDGE_CONN(conn);
|
||||
/* We can only send optimistic data if we're connected to an open
|
||||
general circuit. */
|
||||
// TODO-329-PURPOSE: Can conflux circuits use optimistic data?
|
||||
// Does anything use optimistic data?
|
||||
if (edge_conn->on_circuit == NULL ||
|
||||
edge_conn->on_circuit->state != CIRCUIT_STATE_OPEN ||
|
||||
(edge_conn->on_circuit->purpose != CIRCUIT_PURPOSE_C_GENERAL &&
|
||||
@ -3138,7 +3141,8 @@ connection_ap_get_begincell_flags(entry_connection_t *ap_conn)
|
||||
return 0;
|
||||
|
||||
/* No flags for hidden services. */
|
||||
if (edge_conn->on_circuit->purpose != CIRCUIT_PURPOSE_C_GENERAL)
|
||||
if (edge_conn->on_circuit->purpose != CIRCUIT_PURPOSE_C_GENERAL &&
|
||||
edge_conn->on_circuit->purpose != CIRCUIT_PURPOSE_CONFLUX_LINKED)
|
||||
return 0;
|
||||
|
||||
/* If only IPv4 is supported, no flags */
|
||||
@ -3222,6 +3226,7 @@ connection_ap_handshake_send_begin,(entry_connection_t *ap_conn))
|
||||
|
||||
tor_snprintf(payload,RELAY_PAYLOAD_SIZE, "%s:%d",
|
||||
(circ->base_.purpose == CIRCUIT_PURPOSE_C_GENERAL ||
|
||||
circ->base_.purpose == CIRCUIT_PURPOSE_CONFLUX_LINKED ||
|
||||
circ->base_.purpose == CIRCUIT_PURPOSE_CONTROLLER) ?
|
||||
ap_conn->socks_request->address : "",
|
||||
ap_conn->socks_request->port);
|
||||
@ -3323,7 +3328,8 @@ connection_ap_handshake_send_resolve(entry_connection_t *ap_conn)
|
||||
tor_assert(base_conn->type == CONN_TYPE_AP);
|
||||
tor_assert(base_conn->state == AP_CONN_STATE_CIRCUIT_WAIT);
|
||||
tor_assert(ap_conn->socks_request);
|
||||
tor_assert(circ->base_.purpose == CIRCUIT_PURPOSE_C_GENERAL);
|
||||
tor_assert(circ->base_.purpose == CIRCUIT_PURPOSE_C_GENERAL ||
|
||||
circ->base_.purpose == CIRCUIT_PURPOSE_CONFLUX_LINKED);
|
||||
|
||||
command = ap_conn->socks_request->command;
|
||||
tor_assert(SOCKS_COMMAND_IS_RESOLVE(command));
|
||||
|
@ -334,12 +334,23 @@ pathbias_should_count(origin_circuit_t *circ)
|
||||
* endpoint could be chosen maliciously.
|
||||
* Similarly, we can't count client-side intro attempts,
|
||||
* because clients can be manipulated into connecting to
|
||||
* malicious intro points. */
|
||||
* malicious intro points.
|
||||
*
|
||||
* Finally, avoid counting conflux circuits for now, because
|
||||
* a malicious exit could cause us to reconnect and blame
|
||||
* our guard...
|
||||
*
|
||||
* TODO-329-PURPOSE: This is not quite right, we could
|
||||
* instead avoid sending usable probes on conflux circs,
|
||||
* and count only linked circs as failures, but it is
|
||||
* not 100% clear that would result in accurate counts. */
|
||||
if (get_options()->UseEntryGuards == 0 ||
|
||||
circ->base_.purpose == CIRCUIT_PURPOSE_TESTING ||
|
||||
circ->base_.purpose == CIRCUIT_PURPOSE_CONTROLLER ||
|
||||
circ->base_.purpose == CIRCUIT_PURPOSE_S_CONNECT_REND ||
|
||||
circ->base_.purpose == CIRCUIT_PURPOSE_S_REND_JOINED ||
|
||||
circ->base_.purpose == CIRCUIT_PURPOSE_CONFLUX_UNLINKED ||
|
||||
circ->base_.purpose == CIRCUIT_PURPOSE_CONFLUX_LINKED ||
|
||||
(circ->base_.purpose >= CIRCUIT_PURPOSE_C_INTRODUCING &&
|
||||
circ->base_.purpose <= CIRCUIT_PURPOSE_C_INTRODUCE_ACKED)) {
|
||||
|
||||
|
Loading…
Reference in New Issue
Block a user