From a3efc8e3d19a4b221c460f687f780915502542fb Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Roger Dingledine Date: Sun, 1 Oct 2006 22:16:55 +0000 Subject: [PATCH] - V1 authorities should set "HSAuthoritativeDir 1" to continue being hidden service authorities too. - Just because your DirPort is open doesn't mean people should be able to remotely teach you about hidden service descriptors. Now only accept rendezvous posts if you've got HSAuthoritativeDir set. svn:r8573 --- ChangeLog | 8 ++++++-- doc/TODO | 2 +- doc/tor.1.in | 5 +++++ src/or/config.c | 1 + src/or/directory.c | 25 +++++++++---------------- src/or/or.h | 4 +++- src/or/router.c | 2 +- 7 files changed, 26 insertions(+), 21 deletions(-) diff --git a/ChangeLog b/ChangeLog index b83e707a96..42b2ff061f 100644 --- a/ChangeLog +++ b/ChangeLog @@ -33,8 +33,9 @@ Changes in version 0.1.2.2-alpha - 2006-10-?? list if it stays that way for a long time. - Allow directory authorities to be marked separately as authorities for the v1 directory protocol, the v2 directory protocol, and as hidden - service directories. This should make it easier to migrate trust away - from one of the two authorities currently running on Moria. + service directories, to make it easier to retire old authorities. + V1 authorities should set "HSAuthoritativeDir 1" to continue being + hidden service authorities too. - Reserve the nickname "Unnamed" for routers that can't pick a hostname; any router can call itself Unnamed; directory servers will never allocate Unnamed to any particular router; clients won't believe that @@ -60,6 +61,9 @@ Changes in version 0.1.2.2-alpha - 2006-10-?? - Reject (most) attempts to use Tor as a one-hop proxy; if many people start using Tor as a one-hop proxy, exit nodes become a more attractive target for compromise. (Fixes bug 303.) + - Just because your DirPort is open doesn't mean people should be + able to remotely teach you about hidden service descriptors. Now + only accept rendezvous posts if you've got HSAuthoritativeDir set. o Major bugfixes: - Avoiding crashing on race condition in dns.c: diff --git a/doc/TODO b/doc/TODO index 7da1ba9239..9c390b0143 100644 --- a/doc/TODO +++ b/doc/TODO @@ -176,7 +176,7 @@ N - Later, servers will stop generating new descriptors simply - Critical but minor bugs, backport candidates. d - Failed rend desc fetches sometimes don't get retried. True/false? -R - non-v1 authorities should not accept rend descs. + o non-v1 authorities should not accept rend descs. R - support dir 503s better o clients don't log as loudly when they receive them - they don't count toward the 3-strikes rule diff --git a/doc/tor.1.in b/doc/tor.1.in index 1d03ba7d47..c3ad410c5f 100644 --- a/doc/tor.1.in +++ b/doc/tor.1.in @@ -716,6 +716,11 @@ registered binding. See \fBapproved-routers\fP in the \fBFILES\fP section below. .LP .TP +\fBHSAuthoritativeDir \fR\fB0\fR|\fB1\fR\fP +When this option is set in addition to \fBAuthoritativeDirectory\fP, Tor also +accepts and serves hidden service descriptors. (Default: 0) +.LP +.TP \fBDirPort \fR\fIPORT\fP Advertise the directory service on this port. .LP diff --git a/src/or/config.c b/src/or/config.c index f021fb9c19..8407367ee1 100644 --- a/src/or/config.c +++ b/src/or/config.c @@ -172,6 +172,7 @@ static config_var_t _option_vars[] = { VAR("HiddenServiceNodes", LINELIST_S, RendConfigLines, NULL), VAR("HiddenServiceOptions",LINELIST_V, RendConfigLines, NULL), VAR("HiddenServicePort", LINELIST_S, RendConfigLines, NULL), + VAR("HSAuthoritativeDir", BOOL, HSAuthoritativeDir, "0"), VAR("HttpProxy", STRING, HttpProxy, NULL), VAR("HttpProxyAuthenticator",STRING, HttpProxyAuthenticator,NULL), VAR("HttpsProxy", STRING, HttpsProxy, NULL), diff --git a/src/or/directory.c b/src/or/directory.c index 0de573286f..d874e18f5f 100644 --- a/src/or/directory.c +++ b/src/or/directory.c @@ -1433,6 +1433,7 @@ directory_handle_command_get(dir_connection_t *conn, char *headers, size_t dlen; const char *cp; char *url = NULL; + or_options_t *options = get_options(); /* We ignore the body of a GET request. */ (void)body; (void)body_len; @@ -1596,25 +1597,15 @@ directory_handle_command_get(dir_connection_t *conn, char *headers, return 0; } - if (!strcmpstart(url,"/tor/rendezvous/") || - !strcmpstart(url,"/tor/rendezvous1/")) { + if (options->HSAuthoritativeDir && + (!strcmpstart(url,"/tor/rendezvous/") || + !strcmpstart(url,"/tor/rendezvous1/"))) { /* rendezvous descriptor fetch */ const char *descp; size_t desc_len; int versioned = !strcmpstart(url,"/tor/rendezvous1/"); const char *query = url+strlen("/tor/rendezvous/")+(versioned?1:0); - if (!authdir_mode(get_options())) { - /* We don't hand out rend descs. In fact, it could be a security - * risk, since rend_cache_lookup_desc() below would provide it - * if we're gone to the site recently, and 404 if we haven't. - * - * Reject. */ - write_http_status_line(conn, 400, "Nonauthoritative directory does not " - "store rendezvous descriptors"); - tor_free(url); - return 0; - } switch (rend_cache_lookup_desc(query, versioned?-1:0, &descp, &desc_len)) { case 1: /* valid */ write_http_response_header(conn, desc_len, "application/octet-stream", @@ -1656,7 +1647,7 @@ directory_handle_command_get(dir_connection_t *conn, char *headers, if (!strcmp(url,"/tor/dir-all-weaselhack") && (conn->_base.addr == 0x7f000001ul) && - authdir_mode(get_options())) { + authdir_mode(options)) { /* XXX until weasel rewrites his scripts XXXX012 */ char *new_directory=NULL; @@ -1694,12 +1685,13 @@ directory_handle_command_post(dir_connection_t *conn, char *headers, char *body, size_t body_len) { char *url = NULL; + or_options_t *options = get_options(); log_debug(LD_DIRSERV,"Received POST command."); conn->_base.state = DIR_CONN_STATE_SERVER_WRITING; - if (!authdir_mode(get_options())) { + if (!authdir_mode(options)) { /* we just provide cached directories; we don't want to * receive anything. */ write_http_status_line(conn, 400, "Nonauthoritative directory does not " @@ -1736,7 +1728,8 @@ directory_handle_command_post(dir_connection_t *conn, char *headers, goto done; } - if (!strcmpstart(url,"/tor/rendezvous/publish")) { + if (options->HSAuthoritativeDir && + !strcmpstart(url,"/tor/rendezvous/publish")) { /* rendezvous descriptor post */ if (rend_cache_store(body, body_len) < 0) { // char tmp[1024*2+1]; diff --git a/src/or/or.h b/src/or/or.h index 4fe16012e7..a73b284bd9 100644 --- a/src/or/or.h +++ b/src/or/or.h @@ -1442,8 +1442,10 @@ typedef struct { int DirPort; /**< Port to listen on for directory connections. */ int AssumeReachable; /**< Whether to publish our descriptor regardless. */ int AuthoritativeDir; /**< Boolean: is this an authoritative directory? */ - int V1AuthoritativeDir; /**< Boolean: is this an authoritative directory? + int V1AuthoritativeDir; /**< Boolean: is this an authoritative directory * for version 1 directories? */ + int HSAuthoritativeDir; /**< Boolean: does this an authoritative directory + * handle hidden service requests? */ int NamingAuthoritativeDir; /**< Boolean: is this an authoritative directory * that's willing to bind names? */ int VersioningAuthoritativeDir; /**< Boolean: is this an authoritative diff --git a/src/or/router.c b/src/or/router.c index e43a593c86..b139440f53 100644 --- a/src/or/router.c +++ b/src/or/router.c @@ -364,7 +364,7 @@ init_keys(void) (uint16_t)options->DirPort, digest, options->V1AuthoritativeDir, /* v1 authority */ 1, /* v2 authority */ - options->V1AuthoritativeDir /* hidserv authority */); + options->HSAuthoritativeDir /* hidserv authority */); } return 0; /* success */ }