Merge branch 'underpinning_squashed'

This commit is contained in:
Nick Mathewson 2015-09-24 11:29:14 -04:00
commit a395d1aa46
8 changed files with 127 additions and 44 deletions

7
changes/bug17135 Normal file
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@ -0,0 +1,7 @@
o Major features (Ed25519 keys, keypinning)
- The key-pinning option on directory authorities is now
advisory-only by default. In a future version, or when the
AuthDirPinKeys option is set, pins are enforced again.
Disabling key-pinning seemed like a good idea so that we can
survive the fallout of any usability problems associated with
ed25519 keys. Closes ticket 17135.

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@ -2081,6 +2081,13 @@ on the public Tor network.
or more is always sufficient to satisfy the bandwidth requirement
for the Guard flag. (Default: 250 KBytes)
[[AuthDirPinKeys]] **AuthDirPinKeys** **0**|**1**::
Authoritative directories only. If non-zero, do not allow any relay to
publish a descriptor if any other relay has reserved its <Ed25519,RSA>
identity keypair. In all cases, Tor records every keypair it accepts
in a journal if it is new, or if it differs from the most recently
accepted pinning for one of the keys it contains. (Default: 0)
[[BridgePassword]] **BridgePassword** __Password__::
If set, contains an HTTP authenticator that tells a bridge authority to
serve all requested bridge information. Used by the (only partially

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@ -162,6 +162,7 @@ static config_var_t option_vars_[] = {
V(AuthDirInvalidCCs, CSV, ""),
V(AuthDirFastGuarantee, MEMUNIT, "100 KB"),
V(AuthDirGuardBWGuarantee, MEMUNIT, "2 MB"),
V(AuthDirPinKeys, BOOL, "0"),
V(AuthDirReject, LINELIST, NULL),
V(AuthDirRejectCCs, CSV, ""),
OBSOLETE("AuthDirRejectUnlisted"),

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@ -248,6 +248,7 @@ dirserv_router_get_status(const routerinfo_t *router, const char **msg,
int severity)
{
char d[DIGEST_LEN];
const int key_pinning = get_options()->AuthDirPinKeys;
if (crypto_pk_get_digest(router->identity_pkey, d)) {
log_warn(LD_BUG,"Error computing fingerprint");
@ -261,14 +262,16 @@ dirserv_router_get_status(const routerinfo_t *router, const char **msg,
if (KEYPIN_MISMATCH ==
keypin_check((const uint8_t*)router->cache_info.identity_digest,
router->signing_key_cert->signing_key.pubkey)) {
if (msg) {
*msg = "Ed25519 identity key or RSA identity key has changed.";
}
log_fn(severity, LD_DIR,
"Descriptor from router %s has an Ed25519 key, "
"but the <rsa,ed25519> keys don't match what they were before.",
router_describe(router));
return FP_REJECT;
if (key_pinning) {
if (msg) {
*msg = "Ed25519 identity key or RSA identity key has changed.";
}
return FP_REJECT;
}
}
} else {
/* No ed25519 key */
@ -277,13 +280,15 @@ dirserv_router_get_status(const routerinfo_t *router, const char **msg,
log_fn(severity, LD_DIR,
"Descriptor from router %s has no Ed25519 key, "
"when we previously knew an Ed25519 for it. Ignoring for now, "
"since Tor 0.2.6 is under development.",
"since Ed25519 keys are fairly new.",
router_describe(router));
#ifdef DISABLE_DISABLING_ED25519
if (msg) {
*msg = "Ed25519 identity key has disappeared.";
if (key_pinning) {
if (msg) {
*msg = "Ed25519 identity key has disappeared.";
}
return FP_REJECT;
}
return FP_REJECT;
#endif
}
}
@ -582,6 +587,7 @@ dirserv_add_descriptor(routerinfo_t *ri, const char **msg, const char *source)
char *desc, *nickname;
const size_t desclen = ri->cache_info.signed_descriptor_len +
ri->cache_info.annotations_len;
const int key_pinning = get_options()->AuthDirPinKeys;
*msg = NULL;
/* If it's too big, refuse it now. Otherwise we'll cache it all over the
@ -626,7 +632,8 @@ dirserv_add_descriptor(routerinfo_t *ri, const char **msg, const char *source)
if (ri->signing_key_cert) {
keypin_status = keypin_check_and_add(
(const uint8_t*)ri->cache_info.identity_digest,
ri->signing_key_cert->signing_key.pubkey);
ri->signing_key_cert->signing_key.pubkey,
! key_pinning);
} else {
keypin_status = keypin_check_lone_rsa(
(const uint8_t*)ri->cache_info.identity_digest);
@ -635,7 +642,7 @@ dirserv_add_descriptor(routerinfo_t *ri, const char **msg, const char *source)
keypin_status = KEYPIN_NOT_FOUND;
#endif
}
if (keypin_status == KEYPIN_MISMATCH) {
if (keypin_status == KEYPIN_MISMATCH && key_pinning) {
log_info(LD_DIRSERV, "Dropping descriptor from %s (source: %s) because "
"its key did not match an older RSA/Ed25519 keypair",
router_describe(ri), source);

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@ -48,7 +48,9 @@ static int keypin_journal_append_entry(const uint8_t *rsa_id_digest,
const uint8_t *ed25519_id_key);
static int keypin_check_and_add_impl(const uint8_t *rsa_id_digest,
const uint8_t *ed25519_id_key,
int do_not_add);
const int do_not_add,
const int replace);
static int keypin_add_or_replace_entry_in_map(keypin_ent_t *ent);
static HT_HEAD(rsamap, keypin_ent_st) the_rsa_map = HT_INITIALIZER();
static HT_HEAD(edmap, keypin_ent_st) the_ed_map = HT_INITIALIZER();
@ -100,12 +102,17 @@ HT_GENERATE2(edmap, keypin_ent_st, edmap_node, keypin_ent_hash_ed,
* return KEYPIN_FOUND. If we find an entry that matches one key but
* not the other, return KEYPIN_MISMATCH. If we have no entry for either
* key, add such an entry to the table and return KEYPIN_ADDED.
*
* If <b>replace_existing_entry</b> is true, then any time we would have said
* KEYPIN_FOUND, we instead add this entry anyway and return KEYPIN_ADDED.
*/
int
keypin_check_and_add(const uint8_t *rsa_id_digest,
const uint8_t *ed25519_id_key)
const uint8_t *ed25519_id_key,
const int replace_existing_entry)
{
return keypin_check_and_add_impl(rsa_id_digest, ed25519_id_key, 0);
return keypin_check_and_add_impl(rsa_id_digest, ed25519_id_key, 0,
replace_existing_entry);
}
/**
@ -116,7 +123,7 @@ int
keypin_check(const uint8_t *rsa_id_digest,
const uint8_t *ed25519_id_key)
{
return keypin_check_and_add_impl(rsa_id_digest, ed25519_id_key, 1);
return keypin_check_and_add_impl(rsa_id_digest, ed25519_id_key, 1, 0);
}
/**
@ -125,7 +132,8 @@ keypin_check(const uint8_t *rsa_id_digest,
static int
keypin_check_and_add_impl(const uint8_t *rsa_id_digest,
const uint8_t *ed25519_id_key,
int do_not_add)
const int do_not_add,
const int replace)
{
keypin_ent_t search, *ent;
memset(&search, 0, sizeof(search));
@ -139,18 +147,21 @@ keypin_check_and_add_impl(const uint8_t *rsa_id_digest,
if (tor_memeq(ent->ed25519_key, ed25519_id_key,sizeof(ent->ed25519_key))) {
return KEYPIN_FOUND; /* Match on both keys. Great. */
} else {
return KEYPIN_MISMATCH; /* Found RSA with different Ed key */
if (!replace)
return KEYPIN_MISMATCH; /* Found RSA with different Ed key */
}
}
/* See if we know a different RSA key for this ed key */
ent = HT_FIND(edmap, &the_ed_map, &search);
if (ent) {
/* If we got here, then the ed key matches and the RSA doesn't */
tor_assert(fast_memeq(ent->ed25519_key, ed25519_id_key,
sizeof(ent->ed25519_key)));
tor_assert(fast_memneq(ent->rsa_id, rsa_id_digest, sizeof(ent->rsa_id)));
return KEYPIN_MISMATCH;
if (! replace) {
ent = HT_FIND(edmap, &the_ed_map, &search);
if (ent) {
/* If we got here, then the ed key matches and the RSA doesn't */
tor_assert(fast_memeq(ent->ed25519_key, ed25519_id_key,
sizeof(ent->ed25519_key)));
tor_assert(fast_memneq(ent->rsa_id, rsa_id_digest, sizeof(ent->rsa_id)));
return KEYPIN_MISMATCH;
}
}
/* Okay, this one is new to us. */
@ -158,7 +169,12 @@ keypin_check_and_add_impl(const uint8_t *rsa_id_digest,
return KEYPIN_NOT_FOUND;
ent = tor_memdup(&search, sizeof(search));
keypin_add_entry_to_map(ent);
int r = keypin_add_or_replace_entry_in_map(ent);
if (! replace) {
tor_assert(r == 1);
} else {
tor_assert(r != 0);
}
keypin_journal_append_entry(rsa_id_digest, ed25519_id_key);
return KEYPIN_ADDED;
}
@ -173,6 +189,57 @@ keypin_add_entry_to_map, (keypin_ent_t *ent))
HT_INSERT(edmap, &the_ed_map, ent);
}
/**
* Helper: add 'ent' to the maps, replacing any entries that contradict it.
* Take ownership of 'ent', freeing it if needed.
*
* Return 0 if the entry was a duplicate, -1 if there was a conflict,
* and 1 if there was no conflict.
*/
static int
keypin_add_or_replace_entry_in_map(keypin_ent_t *ent)
{
int r = 1;
keypin_ent_t *ent2 = HT_FIND(rsamap, &the_rsa_map, ent);
keypin_ent_t *ent3 = HT_FIND(edmap, &the_ed_map, ent);
if (ent2 &&
fast_memeq(ent2->ed25519_key, ent->ed25519_key, DIGEST256_LEN)) {
/* We already have this mapping stored. Ignore it. */
tor_free(ent);
return 0;
} else if (ent2 || ent3) {
/* We have a conflict. (If we had no entry, we would have ent2 == ent3
* == NULL. If we had a non-conflicting duplicate, we would have found
* it above.)
*
* We respond by having this entry (ent) supersede all entries that it
* contradicts (ent2 and/or ent3). In other words, if we receive
* <rsa,ed>, we remove all <rsa,ed'> and all <rsa',ed>, for rsa'!=rsa
* and ed'!= ed.
*/
const keypin_ent_t *t;
if (ent2) {
t = HT_REMOVE(rsamap, &the_rsa_map, ent2);
tor_assert(ent2 == t);
t = HT_REMOVE(edmap, &the_ed_map, ent2);
tor_assert(ent2 == t);
}
if (ent3 && ent2 != ent3) {
t = HT_REMOVE(rsamap, &the_rsa_map, ent3);
tor_assert(ent3 == t);
t = HT_REMOVE(edmap, &the_ed_map, ent3);
tor_assert(ent3 == t);
tor_free(ent3);
}
tor_free(ent2);
r = -1;
/* Fall through */
}
keypin_add_entry_to_map(ent);
return r;
}
/**
* Check whether we already have an entry in the key pinning table for a
* router with RSA ID digest <b>rsa_id_digest</b>. If we have no such entry,
@ -321,22 +388,13 @@ keypin_load_journal_impl(const char *data, size_t size)
continue;
}
const keypin_ent_t *ent2;
if ((ent2 = HT_FIND(rsamap, &the_rsa_map, ent))) {
if (fast_memeq(ent2->ed25519_key, ent->ed25519_key, DIGEST256_LEN)) {
++n_duplicates;
} else {
++n_conflicts;
}
tor_free(ent);
continue;
} else if (HT_FIND(edmap, &the_ed_map, ent)) {
tor_free(ent);
const int r = keypin_add_or_replace_entry_in_map(ent);
if (r == 0) {
++n_duplicates;
} else if (r == -1) {
++n_conflicts;
continue;
}
keypin_add_entry_to_map(ent);
++n_entries;
}

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@ -7,7 +7,8 @@
#include "testsupport.h"
int keypin_check_and_add(const uint8_t *rsa_id_digest,
const uint8_t *ed25519_id_key);
const uint8_t *ed25519_id_key,
const int replace_existing_entry);
int keypin_check(const uint8_t *rsa_id_digest,
const uint8_t *ed25519_id_key);

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@ -3790,6 +3790,7 @@ typedef struct {
* number of servers per IP address shared
* with an authority. */
int AuthDirHasIPv6Connectivity; /**< Boolean: are we on IPv6? */
int AuthDirPinKeys; /**< Boolean: Do we enforce key-pinning? */
/** If non-zero, always vote the Fast flag for any relay advertising
* this amount of capacity or more. */

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@ -108,21 +108,21 @@ test_keypin_parse_file(void *arg)
;
tt_int_op(0, ==, keypin_load_journal_impl(data2, strlen(data2)));
tt_int_op(11, ==, smartlist_len(mock_addent_got));
tt_int_op(13, ==, smartlist_len(mock_addent_got));
ent = smartlist_get(mock_addent_got, 9);
tt_mem_op(ent->rsa_id, ==, "\"You have made a goo", 20);
tt_mem_op(ent->ed25519_key, ==, "d beginning.\" But no more. Wizar", 32);
ent = smartlist_get(mock_addent_got, 10);
ent = smartlist_get(mock_addent_got, 12);
tt_mem_op(ent->rsa_id, ==, "ds speak truth, and ", 20);
tt_mem_op(ent->ed25519_key, ==, "it was true that all the master\n", 32);
tt_mem_op(ent->ed25519_key, ==, "it was tru\xa5 that all the master\n", 32);
/* File truncated before NL */
const char data3[] =
"Tm8gZHJhZ29uIGNhbiByZXNpc3Q IHRoZSBmYXNjaW5hdGlvbiBvZiByaWRkbGluZyB0YWw";
tt_int_op(0, ==, keypin_load_journal_impl(data3, strlen(data3)));
tt_int_op(12, ==, smartlist_len(mock_addent_got));
ent = smartlist_get(mock_addent_got, 11);
tt_int_op(14, ==, smartlist_len(mock_addent_got));
ent = smartlist_get(mock_addent_got, 13);
tt_mem_op(ent->rsa_id, ==, "No dragon can resist", 20);
tt_mem_op(ent->ed25519_key, ==, " the fascination of riddling tal", 32);
@ -131,7 +131,8 @@ test_keypin_parse_file(void *arg)
smartlist_free(mock_addent_got);
}
#define ADD(a,b) keypin_check_and_add((const uint8_t*)(a),(const uint8_t*)(b))
#define ADD(a,b) keypin_check_and_add((const uint8_t*)(a),\
(const uint8_t*)(b),0)
#define LONE_RSA(a) keypin_check_lone_rsa((const uint8_t*)(a))
static void