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synced 2024-11-11 05:33:47 +01:00
Add ifdefs to disable #3332 assertions
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@ -907,8 +907,12 @@ directory_initiate_command_rend(const char *address, const tor_addr_t *_addr,
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log_debug(LD_DIR, "Initiating %s", dir_conn_purpose_to_string(dir_purpose));
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#ifndef NON_ANONYMOUS_MODE_ENABLED
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tor_assert(!(is_sensitive_dir_purpose(dir_purpose) &&
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!anonymized_connection));
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#else
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(void)is_sensitive_dir_purpose;
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#endif
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/* ensure that we don't make direct connections when a SOCKS server is
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* configured. */
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@ -139,8 +139,10 @@ rend_client_send_introduction(origin_circuit_t *introcirc,
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tor_assert(rendcirc->rend_data);
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tor_assert(!rend_cmp_service_ids(introcirc->rend_data->onion_address,
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rendcirc->rend_data->onion_address));
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#ifndef NON_ANONYMOUS_MODE_ENABLED
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tor_assert(!(introcirc->build_state->onehop_tunnel));
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tor_assert(!(rendcirc->build_state->onehop_tunnel));
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#endif
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if (rend_cache_lookup_entry(introcirc->rend_data->onion_address, -1,
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&entry) < 1) {
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@ -331,7 +333,9 @@ rend_client_introduction_acked(origin_circuit_t *circ,
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}
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tor_assert(circ->build_state->chosen_exit);
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#ifndef NON_ANONYMOUS_MODE_ENABLED
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tor_assert(!(circ->build_state->onehop_tunnel));
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#endif
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tor_assert(circ->rend_data);
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if (request_len == 0) {
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@ -343,7 +347,9 @@ rend_client_introduction_acked(origin_circuit_t *circ,
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rendcirc = circuit_get_by_rend_query_and_purpose(
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circ->rend_data->onion_address, CIRCUIT_PURPOSE_C_REND_READY);
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if (rendcirc) { /* remember the ack */
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#ifndef NON_ANONYMOUS_MODE_ENABLED
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tor_assert(!(rendcirc->build_state->onehop_tunnel));
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#endif
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rendcirc->_base.purpose = CIRCUIT_PURPOSE_C_REND_READY_INTRO_ACKED;
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/* Set timestamp_dirty, because circuit_expire_building expects
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* it to specify when a circuit entered the
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@ -910,7 +910,9 @@ rend_service_introduce(origin_circuit_t *circuit, const uint8_t *request,
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time_t *access_time;
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const or_options_t *options = get_options();
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#ifndef NON_ANONYMOUS_MODE_ENABLED
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tor_assert(!(circuit->build_state->onehop_tunnel));
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#endif
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tor_assert(circuit->rend_data);
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base32_encode(serviceid, REND_SERVICE_ID_LEN_BASE32+1,
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@ -1394,7 +1396,9 @@ rend_service_intro_has_opened(origin_circuit_t *circuit)
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crypto_pk_env_t *intro_key;
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tor_assert(circuit->_base.purpose == CIRCUIT_PURPOSE_S_ESTABLISH_INTRO);
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#ifndef NON_ANONYMOUS_MODE_ENABLED
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tor_assert(!(circuit->build_state->onehop_tunnel));
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#endif
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tor_assert(circuit->cpath);
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tor_assert(circuit->rend_data);
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@ -1550,7 +1554,9 @@ rend_service_rendezvous_has_opened(origin_circuit_t *circuit)
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tor_assert(circuit->_base.purpose == CIRCUIT_PURPOSE_S_CONNECT_REND);
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tor_assert(circuit->cpath);
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tor_assert(circuit->build_state);
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#ifndef NON_ANONYMOUS_MODE_ENABLED
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tor_assert(!(circuit->build_state->onehop_tunnel));
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#endif
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tor_assert(circuit->rend_data);
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hop = circuit->build_state->pending_final_cpath;
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tor_assert(hop);
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