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TODO: strippd out volunteer items
svn:r4416
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@ -199,94 +199,3 @@ Blue-sky:
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streams, at least according to the protocol. But we handle all that
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streams, at least according to the protocol. But we handle all that
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we've seen in the wild.
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we've seen in the wild.
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(Pending a user who needs this)
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(Pending a user who needs this)
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Volunteer projects: [Phobos moves these to contribute.html]
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- use openssl aes when available
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- do the kernel buffer style design
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- Server instructions for OSX and Windows operators.
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- Improve and clarify the wiki entry on port forwarding.
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- how do ulimits work on win32, anyway? (We should handle WSAENOBUFS as
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needed, look at the MaxConnections registry entry, look at the
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MaxUserPort entry, and look at the TcpTimedWaitDelay entry. We may also
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want to provide a way to set them as needed. See bug 98.)
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- Implement reverse DNS (already specified)
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- It would be nice to have a FirewalledIPs thing that works like
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FirewallPorts.
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- Make configure.in handle cross-compilation
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- Have NULL_REP_IS_ZERO_BYTES default to 1.
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- Make with-ssl-dir disable search for ssl.
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- Packaging, docs, etc:
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- Exit node caching: tie into squid or other caching web proxy.
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- Have clients and dirservers preserve reputation info over
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reboots.
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- Support egd or other non-OS-integrated strong entropy sources
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- password protection for on-disk identity key
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- Possible to get autoconf to easily install things into ~/.tor?
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- server descriptor declares min log level, clients avoid servers
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that are too loggy.
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- Separate node discovery from routing to allow neat extensions. [Goodell?]
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- Add SetServerStatus control event to adjust verified/running status of
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nodes.
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- Add NoDownload config option to prevent regular directory downloads
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from happening.
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- Choosing exit node by meta-data, e.g. country.
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- What info squeaks by Privoxy? Are other scrubbers better?
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- web proxy gateways to let normal people browse hidden services.
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(This has been done a few times, but nobody has sent us code.)
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- Use cpuworker for more heavy lifting.
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- Signing (and verifying) hidserv descriptors
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- Signing (and verifying) intro/rend requests
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- Signing (and verifying) router descriptors
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- Signing (and verifying) directories
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- Doing TLS handshake (this is very hard to separate out, though)
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- Buffer size pool: allocate a maximum size for all buffers, not a maximum
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size for each buffer. So we don't have to give up as quickly (and kill
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the thickpipe!) when there's congestion.
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- Congestion control. Is our current design sufficient once we have heavy
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use? Need to measure and tweak, or maybe overhaul.
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- Add alternative versions of crypto.c and tortls.c to use libnss or
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libgcrypt+gnutls.
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- If we have a trusted directory on port 80, optionally stop falling back
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to forbidden ports when fascistfirewall blocks all good dirservers.
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Research projects: [Phobos moves these to contribute.html]
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- Arranging membership management for independence.
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Sybil defenses without having a human bottleneck.
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How to gather random sample of nodes.
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How to handle nodelist recommendations.
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Consider incremental switches: a p2p tor with only 50 users has
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different anonymity properties than one with 10k users, and should
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be treated differently.
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- Incentives to relay; incentives to exit.
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- Allowing dissidents to relay through Tor clients.
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- Experiment with mid-latency systems. How do they impact usability,
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how do they impact safety?
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- Understand how powerful fingerprinting attacks are, and experiment
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with ways to foil them (long-range padding?).
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- Come up with practical approximations to picking entry and exit in
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different routing zones.
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- Find ideal churn rate for helper nodes; how safe is it?
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- Attacking freenet-gnunet/timing-delay-randomness-arguments.
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- Is exiting from the middle of the circuit always a bad idea?
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- IPv6 support (For exit addresses)
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- Spec issue: if a resolve returns an IP4 and an IP6 address,
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which to use?
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- Add to exit policy code
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- Make tor_gethostbyname into tor_getaddrinfo
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- Make everything that uses uint32_t as an IP address change to use
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a generalize address struct.
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- Change relay cell types to accept new addresses.
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- Add flag to serverdescs to tell whether IPv6 is supported.
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- patch tsocks with our current patches + gethostbyname, getpeername, etc.
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- make freecap (or whichever) do what we want.
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- scrubbing proxies for protocols other than http.
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- We need better default privoxy configs to ship.
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- We need a good scrubbing HTTP proxy; privoxy is unmaintained and sucky.
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- A DNS proxy would let unmodified socks4/socks5 apps to work well.
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- Add SOCKS support to more applications
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- store hidden service information to disk: dirservers forget service
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descriptors when they restart; nodes offering hidden services forget
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their chosen intro points when they restart.
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