Update sample torrc file for 0.2.3.x

Fix broken URLs.

Tell readers about the OutboundBindAddress, ExitPolicyRejectPrivate,
and PublishServerDescriptor options.
This commit is contained in:
Roger Dingledine 2012-02-08 04:40:26 -05:00
parent 92862c6d48
commit 9bcf315e9b
2 changed files with 37 additions and 18 deletions

5
changes/bug4652 Normal file
View File

@ -0,0 +1,5 @@
o Minor features:
- Fix broken URLs in the sample torrc file, and tell readers about
the OutboundBindAddress, ExitPolicyRejectPrivate, and
PublishServerDescriptor options. Addresses bug 4652.

View File

@ -1,16 +1,16 @@
## Configuration file for a typical Tor user
## Last updated 16 July 2009 for Tor 0.2.2.1-alpha.
## (May or may not work for much older or much newer versions of Tor.)
## Last updated 8 February 2012 for Tor 0.2.3.12-alpha.
## (may or may not work for much older or much newer versions of Tor.)
##
## Lines that begin with "## " try to explain what's going on. Lines
## that begin with just "#" are disabled commands: you can enable them
## by removing the "#" symbol.
##
## See 'man tor', or https://www.torproject.org/tor-manual.html,
## See 'man tor', or https://www.torproject.org/docs/tor-manual.html,
## for more options you can use in this file.
##
## Tor will look for this file in various places based on your platform:
## https://wiki.torproject.org/noreply/TheOnionRouter/TorFAQ#torrc
## https://www.torproject.org/docs/faq#torrc
## Replace this with "SocksPort 0" if you plan to run Tor only as a
@ -21,7 +21,9 @@ SocksListenAddress 127.0.0.1 # accept connections only from localhost
## Entry policies to allow/deny SOCKS requests based on IP address.
## First entry that matches wins. If no SocksPolicy is set, we accept
## all (and only) requests from SocksListenAddress.
## all (and only) requests from SocksListenAddress. Untrusted users who
## can access your SocksPort may be able to learn about the connections
## you make.
#SocksPolicy accept 192.168.0.0/16
#SocksPolicy reject *
@ -86,13 +88,17 @@ SocksListenAddress 127.0.0.1 # accept connections only from localhost
## yourself to make this work.
#ORListenAddress 0.0.0.0:9090
## The IP address or full DNS name for incoming connections to your
## relay. Leave commented out and Tor will guess.
#Address noname.example.com
## If you have multiple network interfaces, you can specify one for
## outgoing traffic to use.
# OutboundBindAddress 10.0.0.5
## A handle for your relay, so people don't have to refer to it by key.
#Nickname ididnteditheconfig
## The IP address or full DNS name for your relay. Leave commented out
## and Tor will guess.
#Address noname.example.com
## Define these to limit how much relayed traffic you will allow. Your
## own traffic is still unthrottled. Note that RelayBandwidthRate must
## be at least 20 KB.
@ -100,9 +106,9 @@ SocksListenAddress 127.0.0.1 # accept connections only from localhost
#RelayBandwidthBurst 200 KB # But allow bursts up to 200KB/s (1600Kbps)
## Use these to restrict the maximum traffic per day, week, or month.
## Note that this threshold applies to sent _and_ to received bytes,
## not to their sum: Setting "4 GB" may allow up to 8 GB
## total before hibernating.
## Note that this threshold applies separately to sent and received bytes,
## not to their sum: setting "4 GB" may allow up to 8 GB total before
## hibernating.
##
## Set a maximum of 4 gigabytes each way per period.
#AccountingMax 4 GB
@ -117,7 +123,7 @@ SocksListenAddress 127.0.0.1 # accept connections only from localhost
## indexes this, so spammers might also collect it.
#ContactInfo Random Person <nobody AT example dot com>
## You might also include your PGP or GPG fingerprint if you have one:
#ContactInfo 1234D/FFFFFFFF Random Person <nobody AT example dot com>
#ContactInfo 0xFFFFFFFF Random Person <nobody AT example dot com>
## Uncomment this to mirror directory information for others. Please do
## if you have enough bandwidth.
@ -137,7 +143,7 @@ SocksListenAddress 127.0.0.1 # accept connections only from localhost
## key fingerprint of each Tor relay you control, even if they're on
## different networks. You declare it here so Tor clients can avoid
## using more than one of your relays in a single circuit. See
## https://wiki.torproject.org/noreply/TheOnionRouter/TorFAQ#MultipleServers
## https://www.torproject.org/docs/faq#MultipleRelays
#MyFamily $keyid,$keyid,...
## A comma-separated list of exit policies. They're considered first
@ -155,16 +161,24 @@ SocksListenAddress 127.0.0.1 # accept connections only from localhost
## you should update your exit policy to reflect this -- otherwise Tor
## users will be told that those destinations are down.
##
## For security, by default Tor rejects connections to private (local)
## networks, including to your public IP address. See the man page entry
## for ExitPolicyRejectPrivate if you want to allow "exit enclaving".
##
#ExitPolicy accept *:6660-6667,reject *:* # allow irc ports but no more
#ExitPolicy accept *:119 # accept nntp as well as default exit policy
#ExitPolicy reject *:* # no exits allowed
#
## Bridge relays (or "bridges") are Tor relays that aren't listed in the
## main directory. Since there is no complete public list of them, even if an
## ISP is filtering connections to all the known Tor relays, they probably
## main directory. Since there is no complete public list of them, even an
## ISP that filters connections to all the known Tor relays probably
## won't be able to block all the bridges. Also, websites won't treat you
## differently because they won't know you're running Tor. If you can
## be a real relay, please do; but if not, be a bridge!
#BridgeRelay 1
#ExitPolicy reject *:*
## By default, Tor will advertise your bridge to users through various
## mechanisms like https://bridges.torproject.org/. If you want to run
## a private bridge, for example because you'll give out your bridge
## address manually to your friends, uncomment this line:
#PublishServerDescriptor 0