blacklists, middleman nodes, pressure to shut down

svn:r3594
This commit is contained in:
Roger Dingledine 2005-02-09 05:06:56 +00:00
parent e4989f33c9
commit 97cd2230cd

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@ -730,21 +730,17 @@ This is a loss for both Tor
and Wikipedia: we don't want to compete for (or divvy up) the
NAT-protected entities of the world.
Worse, many IP blacklists are coarse-grained. Some
ignore Tor's exit policies, preferring to punish
Worse, many IP blacklists are coarse-grained: they ignore Tor's exit
policies, partly because it's easier to implement and partly
so they can punish
all Tor nodes. One IP blacklist even bans
every class C network that contains a Tor node, and recommends banning SMTP
from these networks even though Tor does not allow SMTP at all. This
coarse-grained approach is typically a strategic decision to discourage the
strategic decision aims to discourage the
operation of anything resembling an open proxy by encouraging its neighbors
to shut it down in order to get unblocked themselves.
%[****Since this is stupid and we oppose it, shouldn't we name names here -pfs]
%[XXX also, they're making \emph{middleman nodes leave} because they're caught
% up in the standoff!]
%[XXX Mention: it's not dumb, it's strategic!]
%[XXX Mention: for some servops, any blacklist is a blacklist too many,
% because it is risky. (Guy lives in apt _building_ with one IP.)]
%XXX roger should add more
to shut it down in order to get unblocked themselves. This pressure even
affects Tor nodes running in middleman mode (disallowing all exits) when
those nodes are blacklisted too.
Problems of abuse occur mainly with services such as IRC networks and
Wikipedia, which rely on IP blocking to ban abusive users. While at first