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https://gitlab.torproject.org/tpo/core/tor.git
synced 2024-11-10 13:13:44 +01:00
add H(K|1) to the onionskin reply
verify it at the client end abstract the onionskin handshake lengths breaks backward compatibility (again) svn:r941
This commit is contained in:
parent
f3b165fdc0
commit
961ecf7abf
@ -114,6 +114,10 @@ static void circuit_free_cpath_node(crypt_path_t *victim) {
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crypto_free_cipher_env(victim->f_crypto);
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if(victim->b_crypto)
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crypto_free_cipher_env(victim->b_crypto);
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if(victim->f_digest)
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crypto_free_digest_env(victim->f_digest);
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if(victim->b_digest)
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crypto_free_digest_env(victim->b_digest);
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if(victim->handshake_state)
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crypto_dh_free(victim->handshake_state);
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free(victim);
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@ -319,6 +323,12 @@ int circuit_deliver_relay_cell(cell_t *cell, circuit_t *circ,
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if(recognized) {
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if(cell_direction == CELL_DIRECTION_OUT) {
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#if 0
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if(relay_update_digest(circ->n_digest, cell) < 0) {
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log_fn(LOG_WARN,"outgoing cell failed integrity check. Closing circ.");
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return -1;
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}
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#endif
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++stats_n_relay_cells_delivered;
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log_fn(LOG_DEBUG,"Sending to exit.");
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if (connection_edge_process_relay_cell(cell, circ, conn, EDGE_EXIT, NULL) < 0) {
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@ -327,6 +337,12 @@ int circuit_deliver_relay_cell(cell_t *cell, circuit_t *circ,
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}
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}
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if(cell_direction == CELL_DIRECTION_IN) {
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#if 0
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if(relay_update_digest(layer_hint->p_digest, cell) < 0) {
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log_fn(LOG_WARN,"outgoing cell failed integrity check. Closing circ.");
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return -1;
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}
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#endif
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++stats_n_relay_cells_delivered;
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log_fn(LOG_DEBUG,"Sending to AP.");
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if (connection_edge_process_relay_cell(cell, circ, conn, EDGE_AP, layer_hint) < 0) {
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@ -365,7 +381,8 @@ int relay_crypt(circuit_t *circ, char *in, int inlen, char cell_direction,
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assert(inlen < 256);
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if(cell_direction == CELL_DIRECTION_IN) {
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if(circ->cpath) { /* we're at the beginning of the circuit. We'll want to do layered crypts. */
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if(circ->cpath) { /* we're at the beginning of the circuit.
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We'll want to do layered crypts. */
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thishop = circ->cpath;
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if(thishop->state != CPATH_STATE_OPEN) {
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log_fn(LOG_WARN,"Relay cell before first created cell?");
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@ -845,7 +862,7 @@ int circuit_send_next_onion_skin(circuit_t *circ) {
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memset(&cell, 0, sizeof(cell_t));
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cell.command = CELL_CREATE;
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cell.circ_id = circ->n_circ_id;
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cell.length = DH_ONIONSKIN_LEN;
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cell.length = ONIONSKIN_CHALLENGE_LEN;
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if(onion_skin_create(circ->n_conn->onion_pkey, &(circ->cpath->handshake_state), cell.payload) < 0) {
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log_fn(LOG_WARN,"onion_skin_create (first hop) failed.");
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@ -883,7 +900,7 @@ int circuit_send_next_onion_skin(circuit_t *circ) {
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SET_CELL_RELAY_COMMAND(cell, RELAY_COMMAND_EXTEND);
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SET_CELL_STREAM_ID(cell, ZERO_STREAM);
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cell.length = RELAY_HEADER_SIZE + 6 + DH_ONIONSKIN_LEN;
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cell.length = RELAY_HEADER_SIZE + 6 + ONIONSKIN_CHALLENGE_LEN;
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*(uint32_t*)(cell.payload+RELAY_HEADER_SIZE) = htonl(hop->addr);
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*(uint16_t*)(cell.payload+RELAY_HEADER_SIZE+4) = htons(hop->port);
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if(onion_skin_create(router->onion_pkey, &(hop->handshake_state), cell.payload+RELAY_HEADER_SIZE+6) < 0) {
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@ -954,9 +971,10 @@ int circuit_extend(cell_t *cell, circuit_t *circ) {
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memset(&newcell, 0, sizeof(cell_t));
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newcell.command = CELL_CREATE;
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newcell.circ_id = circ->n_circ_id;
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newcell.length = DH_ONIONSKIN_LEN;
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newcell.length = ONIONSKIN_CHALLENGE_LEN;
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memcpy(newcell.payload, cell->payload+RELAY_HEADER_SIZE+6, DH_ONIONSKIN_LEN);
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memcpy(newcell.payload, cell->payload+RELAY_HEADER_SIZE+6,
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ONIONSKIN_CHALLENGE_LEN);
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connection_or_write_cell_to_buf(&newcell, circ->n_conn);
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return 0;
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@ -103,7 +103,7 @@ static void command_process_create_cell(cell_t *cell, connection_t *conn) {
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circ = circuit_new(cell->circ_id, conn);
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circ->state = CIRCUIT_STATE_ONIONSKIN_PENDING;
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if(cell->length != DH_ONIONSKIN_LEN) {
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if(cell->length != ONIONSKIN_CHALLENGE_LEN) {
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log_fn(LOG_WARN,"Bad cell length %d. Dropping.", cell->length);
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circuit_close(circ);
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return;
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@ -135,7 +135,7 @@ static void command_process_created_cell(cell_t *cell, connection_t *conn) {
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circuit_close(circ);
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return;
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}
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assert(cell->length == DH_KEY_LEN);
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assert(cell->length == ONIONSKIN_REPLY_LEN);
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if(circ->cpath) { /* we're the OP. Handshake this. */
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log_fn(LOG_DEBUG,"at OP. Finishing handshake.");
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@ -153,7 +153,7 @@ static void command_process_created_cell(cell_t *cell, connection_t *conn) {
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} else { /* pack it into an extended relay cell, and send it. */
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log_fn(LOG_INFO,"Converting created cell to extended relay cell, sending.");
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connection_edge_send_command(NULL, circ, RELAY_COMMAND_EXTENDED,
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cell->payload, DH_KEY_LEN, NULL);
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cell->payload, cell->length, NULL);
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}
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}
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@ -9,8 +9,8 @@ extern or_options_t options; /* command-line and config-file options */
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#define MIN_CPUWORKERS 1
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#define TAG_LEN 8
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#define LEN_ONION_QUESTION (1+TAG_LEN+DH_ONIONSKIN_LEN)
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#define LEN_ONION_RESPONSE (1+TAG_LEN+DH_KEY_LEN+32)
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#define LEN_ONION_QUESTION (1+TAG_LEN+ONIONSKIN_CHALLENGE_LEN)
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#define LEN_ONION_RESPONSE (1+TAG_LEN+ONIONSKIN_REPLY_LEN+32)
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int num_cpuworkers=0;
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int num_cpuworkers_busy=0;
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@ -95,7 +95,7 @@ int connection_cpu_process_inbuf(connection_t *conn) {
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circuit_close(circ);
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goto done_processing;
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}
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if(onionskin_answer(circ, buf+1+TAG_LEN, buf+1+TAG_LEN+DH_KEY_LEN) < 0) {
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if(onionskin_answer(circ, buf+1+TAG_LEN, buf+1+TAG_LEN+ONIONSKIN_REPLY_LEN) < 0) {
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log_fn(LOG_WARN,"onionskin_answer failed. Closing.");
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circuit_close(circ);
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goto done_processing;
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@ -113,14 +113,14 @@ done_processing:
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}
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int cpuworker_main(void *data) {
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unsigned char question[DH_ONIONSKIN_LEN];
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unsigned char question[ONIONSKIN_CHALLENGE_LEN];
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unsigned char question_type;
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int *fdarray = data;
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int fd;
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/* variables for onion processing */
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unsigned char keys[32];
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unsigned char reply_to_proxy[DH_KEY_LEN];
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unsigned char reply_to_proxy[ONIONSKIN_REPLY_LEN];
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unsigned char buf[LEN_ONION_RESPONSE];
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char tag[TAG_LEN];
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@ -140,7 +140,7 @@ int cpuworker_main(void *data) {
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spawn_exit();
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}
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if(read_all(fd, question, DH_ONIONSKIN_LEN) != DH_ONIONSKIN_LEN) {
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if(read_all(fd, question, ONIONSKIN_CHALLENGE_LEN) != ONIONSKIN_CHALLENGE_LEN) {
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log_fn(LOG_ERR,"read question failed. Exiting.");
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spawn_exit();
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}
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@ -156,8 +156,8 @@ int cpuworker_main(void *data) {
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log_fn(LOG_INFO,"onion_skin_server_handshake succeeded.");
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buf[0] = 1; /* 1 means success */
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memcpy(buf+1,tag,TAG_LEN);
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memcpy(buf+1+TAG_LEN,reply_to_proxy,DH_KEY_LEN);
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memcpy(buf+1+TAG_LEN+DH_KEY_LEN,keys,32);
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memcpy(buf+1+TAG_LEN,reply_to_proxy,ONIONSKIN_REPLY_LEN);
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memcpy(buf+1+TAG_LEN+ONIONSKIN_REPLY_LEN,keys,32);
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}
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if(write_all(fd, buf, LEN_ONION_RESPONSE) != LEN_ONION_RESPONSE) {
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log_fn(LOG_ERR,"writing response buf failed. Exiting.");
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@ -272,7 +272,7 @@ int assign_to_cpuworker(connection_t *cpuworker, unsigned char question_type,
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connection_write_to_buf(&question_type, 1, cpuworker);
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connection_write_to_buf(tag, sizeof(tag), cpuworker);
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connection_write_to_buf(circ->onionskin, DH_ONIONSKIN_LEN, cpuworker);
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connection_write_to_buf(circ->onionskin, ONIONSKIN_CHALLENGE_LEN, cpuworker);
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}
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return 0;
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}
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127
src/or/onion.c
127
src/or/onion.c
@ -124,13 +124,13 @@ int onionskin_answer(circuit_t *circ, unsigned char *payload, unsigned char *key
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memset(&cell, 0, sizeof(cell_t));
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cell.command = CELL_CREATED;
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cell.circ_id = circ->p_circ_id;
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cell.length = DH_KEY_LEN;
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cell.length = ONIONSKIN_REPLY_LEN;
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circ->state = CIRCUIT_STATE_OPEN;
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log_fn(LOG_DEBUG,"Entering.");
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memcpy(cell.payload, payload, DH_KEY_LEN);
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memcpy(cell.payload, payload, ONIONSKIN_REPLY_LEN);
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log_fn(LOG_DEBUG,"init cipher forward %d, backward %d.", *(int*)keys, *(int*)(keys+16));
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@ -548,52 +548,56 @@ int onion_extend_cpath(crypt_path_t **head_ptr, cpath_build_state_t *state, rout
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/*----------------------------------------------------------------------*/
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/* Given a router's public key, generates a 144-byte encrypted DH pubkey,
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* and stores it into onion_skin out. Stores the DH private key into
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* handshake_state_out for later completion of the handshake.
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/* Given a router's 128 byte public key,
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stores the following in onion_skin_out:
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[16 bytes] Symmetric key for encrypting blob past RSA
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[112 bytes] g^x part 1 (inside the RSA)
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[16 bytes] g^x part 2 (symmetrically encrypted)
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[ 6 bytes] Meeting point (IP/port)
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[ 8 bytes] Meeting cookie
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[16 bytes] End-to-end authentication [optional]
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* Stores the DH private key into handshake_state_out for later completion
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* of the handshake.
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*
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* The encrypted pubkey is formed as follows:
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* 16 bytes of symmetric key
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* 128 bytes of g^x for DH.
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* The first 128 bytes are RSA-encrypted with the server's public key,
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* and the last 16 are encrypted with the symmetric key.
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* The meeting point/cookies and auth are zeroed out for now.
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*/
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int
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onion_skin_create(crypto_pk_env_t *dest_router_key,
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crypto_dh_env_t **handshake_state_out,
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char *onion_skin_out) /* Must be DH_ONIONSKIN_LEN bytes long */
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char *onion_skin_out) /* Must be ONIONSKIN_CHALLENGE_LEN bytes */
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{
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char iv[16];
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char *pubkey = NULL;
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char *challenge = NULL;
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crypto_dh_env_t *dh = NULL;
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crypto_cipher_env_t *cipher = NULL;
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int dhbytes, pkbytes;
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*handshake_state_out = NULL;
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memset(onion_skin_out, 0, DH_ONIONSKIN_LEN);
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memset(onion_skin_out, 0, ONIONSKIN_CHALLENGE_LEN);
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memset(iv, 0, 16);
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if (!(dh = crypto_dh_new()))
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goto err;
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dhbytes = crypto_dh_get_bytes(dh);
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pkbytes = crypto_pk_keysize(dest_router_key);
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assert(dhbytes+16 == DH_ONIONSKIN_LEN);
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pubkey = (char *)tor_malloc(dhbytes+16);
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assert(dhbytes == 128);
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assert(pkbytes == 128);
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challenge = (char *)tor_malloc_zero(ONIONSKIN_CHALLENGE_LEN);
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if (crypto_rand(16, pubkey))
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if (crypto_rand(16, challenge))
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goto err;
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/* You can't just run around RSA-encrypting any bitstream: if it's
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* greater than the RSA key, then OpenSSL will happily encrypt,
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* and later decrypt to the wrong value. So we set the first bit
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* of 'pubkey' to 0. This means that our symmetric key is really only
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* 127 bits long, but since it shouldn't be necessary to encrypt
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* DH public keys values in the first place, we should be fine.
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* of 'challenge' to 0. This means that our symmetric key is really
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* only 127 bits.
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*/
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pubkey[0] &= 0x7f;
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challenge[0] &= 0x7f;
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if (crypto_dh_get_public(dh, pubkey+16, dhbytes))
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if (crypto_dh_get_public(dh, challenge+16, dhbytes))
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goto err;
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#ifdef DEBUG_ONION_SKINS
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@ -601,65 +605,69 @@ onion_skin_create(crypto_pk_env_t *dest_router_key,
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{ int _i; for (_i = 0; _i<n; ++_i) printf("%02x ",((int)(a)[_i])&0xFF); }
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printf("Client: client g^x:");
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PA(pubkey+16,3);
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PA(challenge+16,3);
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printf("...");
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PA(pubkey+141,3);
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PA(challenge+141,3);
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puts("");
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printf("Client: client symkey:");
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PA(pubkey+0,16);
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PA(challenge+0,16);
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puts("");
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#endif
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cipher = crypto_create_init_cipher(ONION_CIPHER, pubkey, iv, 1);
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/* set meeting point, meeting cookie, etc here. Leave zero for now. */
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cipher = crypto_create_init_cipher(ONION_CIPHER, challenge, iv, 1);
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if (!cipher)
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goto err;
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if (crypto_pk_public_encrypt(dest_router_key, pubkey, pkbytes,
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if (crypto_pk_public_encrypt(dest_router_key, challenge, pkbytes,
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onion_skin_out, RSA_NO_PADDING)==-1)
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goto err;
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if (crypto_cipher_encrypt(cipher, pubkey+pkbytes, dhbytes+16-pkbytes,
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if (crypto_cipher_encrypt(cipher, challenge+pkbytes, ONIONSKIN_CHALLENGE_LEN-pkbytes,
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onion_skin_out+pkbytes))
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goto err;
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free(pubkey);
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tor_free(challenge);
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crypto_free_cipher_env(cipher);
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*handshake_state_out = dh;
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return 0;
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err:
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tor_free(pubkey);
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tor_free(challenge);
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if (dh) crypto_dh_free(dh);
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if (cipher) crypto_free_cipher_env(cipher);
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return -1;
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}
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/* Given an encrypted DH public key as generated by onion_skin_create,
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* and the private key for this onion router, generate the 128-byte DH
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* reply, and key_out_len bytes of key material, stored in key_out.
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* and the private key for this onion router, generate the reply (128-byte
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* DH plus the first 20 bytes of shared key material), and store the
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* next key_out_len bytes of key material in key_out.
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*/
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int
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onion_skin_server_handshake(char *onion_skin, /* DH_ONIONSKIN_LEN bytes long */
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onion_skin_server_handshake(char *onion_skin, /* ONIONSKIN_CHALLENGE_LEN bytes */
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crypto_pk_env_t *private_key,
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char *handshake_reply_out, /* DH_KEY_LEN bytes long */
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char *handshake_reply_out, /* ONIONSKIN_REPLY_LEN bytes */
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char *key_out,
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int key_out_len)
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{
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char buf[DH_ONIONSKIN_LEN];
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char challenge[ONIONSKIN_CHALLENGE_LEN];
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char iv[16];
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crypto_dh_env_t *dh = NULL;
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crypto_cipher_env_t *cipher = NULL;
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int pkbytes;
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int len;
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char *key_material=NULL;
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memset(iv, 0, 16);
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pkbytes = crypto_pk_keysize(private_key);
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if (crypto_pk_private_decrypt(private_key,
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onion_skin, pkbytes,
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buf, RSA_NO_PADDING) == -1)
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challenge, RSA_NO_PADDING) == -1)
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goto err;
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#ifdef DEBUG_ONION_SKINS
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@ -668,10 +676,10 @@ onion_skin_server_handshake(char *onion_skin, /* DH_ONIONSKIN_LEN bytes long */
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puts("");
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#endif
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cipher = crypto_create_init_cipher(ONION_CIPHER, buf, iv, 0);
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cipher = crypto_create_init_cipher(ONION_CIPHER, challenge, iv, 0);
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if (crypto_cipher_decrypt(cipher, onion_skin+pkbytes, DH_ONIONSKIN_LEN-pkbytes,
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buf+pkbytes))
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if (crypto_cipher_decrypt(cipher, onion_skin+pkbytes, ONIONSKIN_CHALLENGE_LEN-pkbytes,
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challenge+pkbytes))
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goto err;
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#ifdef DEBUG_ONION_SKINS
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@ -681,7 +689,7 @@ onion_skin_server_handshake(char *onion_skin, /* DH_ONIONSKIN_LEN bytes long */
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PA(buf+141,3);
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puts("");
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#endif
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dh = crypto_dh_new();
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if (crypto_dh_get_public(dh, handshake_reply_out, DH_KEY_LEN))
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goto err;
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@ -694,10 +702,18 @@ onion_skin_server_handshake(char *onion_skin, /* DH_ONIONSKIN_LEN bytes long */
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puts("");
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#endif
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len = crypto_dh_compute_secret(dh, buf+16, DH_KEY_LEN, key_out, key_out_len);
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key_material = tor_malloc(20+key_out_len);
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len = crypto_dh_compute_secret(dh, challenge+16, DH_KEY_LEN,
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key_material, 20+key_out_len);
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if (len < 0)
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goto err;
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/* send back H(K) as proof that we learned K. */
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memcpy(handshake_reply_out+DH_KEY_LEN, key_material, 20);
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/* use the rest of the key material for our shared keys, digests, etc */
|
||||
memcpy(key_out, key_material+20, key_out_len);
|
||||
|
||||
#ifdef DEBUG_ONION_SKINS
|
||||
printf("Server: key material:");
|
||||
PA(buf, DH_KEY_LEN);
|
||||
@ -707,10 +723,12 @@ onion_skin_server_handshake(char *onion_skin, /* DH_ONIONSKIN_LEN bytes long */
|
||||
puts("");
|
||||
#endif
|
||||
|
||||
tor_free(key_material);
|
||||
crypto_free_cipher_env(cipher);
|
||||
crypto_dh_free(dh);
|
||||
return 0;
|
||||
err:
|
||||
tor_free(key_material);
|
||||
if (cipher) crypto_free_cipher_env(cipher);
|
||||
if (dh) crypto_dh_free(dh);
|
||||
|
||||
@ -718,19 +736,22 @@ onion_skin_server_handshake(char *onion_skin, /* DH_ONIONSKIN_LEN bytes long */
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
/* Finish the client side of the DH handshake.
|
||||
* Given the 128 byte DH reply as generated by onion_skin_server_handshake
|
||||
* and the handshake state generated by onion_skin_create, generate
|
||||
* key_out_len bytes of shared key material and store them in key_out.
|
||||
* Given the 128 byte DH reply + 20 byte hash as generated by
|
||||
* onion_skin_server_handshake and the handshake state generated by
|
||||
* onion_skin_create, verify H(K) with the first 20 bytes of shared
|
||||
* key material, then generate key_out_len more bytes of shared key
|
||||
* material and store them in key_out.
|
||||
*
|
||||
* After the invocation, call crypto_dh_free on handshake_state.
|
||||
*/
|
||||
int
|
||||
onion_skin_client_handshake(crypto_dh_env_t *handshake_state,
|
||||
char *handshake_reply,/* Must be DH_KEY_LEN bytes long*/
|
||||
char *handshake_reply, /* Must be ONIONSKIN_REPLY_LEN bytes */
|
||||
char *key_out,
|
||||
int key_out_len)
|
||||
int key_out_len)
|
||||
{
|
||||
int len;
|
||||
char *key_material=NULL;
|
||||
assert(crypto_dh_get_bytes(handshake_state) == DH_KEY_LEN);
|
||||
|
||||
#ifdef DEBUG_ONION_SKINS
|
||||
@ -741,17 +762,29 @@ onion_skin_client_handshake(crypto_dh_env_t *handshake_state,
|
||||
puts("");
|
||||
#endif
|
||||
|
||||
key_material = tor_malloc(20+key_out_len);
|
||||
len = crypto_dh_compute_secret(handshake_state, handshake_reply, DH_KEY_LEN,
|
||||
key_out, key_out_len);
|
||||
key_material, 20+key_out_len);
|
||||
if (len < 0)
|
||||
return -1;
|
||||
|
||||
if(memcmp(key_material, handshake_reply+DH_KEY_LEN, 20)) {
|
||||
/* H(K) does *not* match. Something fishy. */
|
||||
tor_free(key_material);
|
||||
log_fn(LOG_WARN,"Digest DOES NOT MATCH on onion handshake. Bug or attack.");
|
||||
return -1;
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
/* use the rest of the key material for our shared keys, digests, etc */
|
||||
memcpy(key_out, key_material+20, key_out_len);
|
||||
|
||||
#ifdef DEBUG_ONION_SKINS
|
||||
printf("Client: keys out:");
|
||||
PA(key_out, key_out_len);
|
||||
puts("");
|
||||
#endif
|
||||
|
||||
tor_free(key_material);
|
||||
return 0;
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
|
19
src/or/or.h
19
src/or/or.h
@ -374,6 +374,9 @@ struct crypt_path_t {
|
||||
crypto_cipher_env_t *f_crypto;
|
||||
crypto_cipher_env_t *b_crypto;
|
||||
|
||||
crypto_digest_env_t *f_digest; /* for integrity checking */
|
||||
crypto_digest_env_t *b_digest;
|
||||
|
||||
crypto_dh_env_t *handshake_state;
|
||||
|
||||
uint32_t addr;
|
||||
@ -391,7 +394,8 @@ struct crypt_path_t {
|
||||
};
|
||||
|
||||
#define DH_KEY_LEN CRYPTO_DH_SIZE
|
||||
#define DH_ONIONSKIN_LEN DH_KEY_LEN+16
|
||||
#define ONIONSKIN_CHALLENGE_LEN (16+DH_KEY_LEN+6+8+16)
|
||||
#define ONIONSKIN_REPLY_LEN (DH_KEY_LEN+20)
|
||||
|
||||
typedef struct crypt_path_t crypt_path_t;
|
||||
|
||||
@ -417,10 +421,13 @@ struct circuit_t {
|
||||
crypto_cipher_env_t *p_crypto; /* used only for intermediate hops */
|
||||
crypto_cipher_env_t *n_crypto;
|
||||
|
||||
crypto_digest_env_t *p_digest; /* for integrity checking, */
|
||||
crypto_digest_env_t *n_digest; /* intermediate hops only */
|
||||
|
||||
cpath_build_state_t *build_state;
|
||||
crypt_path_t *cpath;
|
||||
|
||||
char onionskin[DH_ONIONSKIN_LEN]; /* for storage while onionskin pending */
|
||||
char onionskin[ONIONSKIN_CHALLENGE_LEN]; /* for storage while onionskin pending */
|
||||
time_t timestamp_created;
|
||||
time_t timestamp_dirty; /* when the circuit was first used, or 0 if clean */
|
||||
|
||||
@ -709,16 +716,16 @@ int onion_extend_cpath(crypt_path_t **head_ptr, cpath_build_state_t *state,
|
||||
|
||||
int onion_skin_create(crypto_pk_env_t *router_key,
|
||||
crypto_dh_env_t **handshake_state_out,
|
||||
char *onion_skin_out); /* Must be DH_ONIONSKIN_LEN bytes long */
|
||||
char *onion_skin_out);
|
||||
|
||||
int onion_skin_server_handshake(char *onion_skin, /* DH_ONIONSKIN_LEN bytes long */
|
||||
int onion_skin_server_handshake(char *onion_skin,
|
||||
crypto_pk_env_t *private_key,
|
||||
char *handshake_reply_out, /* DH_KEY_LEN bytes long */
|
||||
char *handshake_reply_out,
|
||||
char *key_out,
|
||||
int key_out_len);
|
||||
|
||||
int onion_skin_client_handshake(crypto_dh_env_t *handshake_state,
|
||||
char *handshake_reply,/* Must be DH_KEY_LEN bytes long*/
|
||||
char *handshake_reply,
|
||||
char *key_out,
|
||||
int key_out_len);
|
||||
|
||||
|
@ -485,11 +485,11 @@ void
|
||||
test_onion_handshake() {
|
||||
/* client-side */
|
||||
crypto_dh_env_t *c_dh = NULL;
|
||||
char c_buf[DH_ONIONSKIN_LEN];
|
||||
char c_buf[ONIONSKIN_CHALLENGE_LEN];
|
||||
char c_keys[40];
|
||||
|
||||
/* server-side */
|
||||
char s_buf[DH_KEY_LEN];
|
||||
char s_buf[ONIONSKIN_REPLY_LEN];
|
||||
char s_keys[40];
|
||||
|
||||
/* shared */
|
||||
@ -499,11 +499,11 @@ test_onion_handshake() {
|
||||
test_assert(! crypto_pk_generate_key(pk));
|
||||
|
||||
/* client handshake 1. */
|
||||
memset(c_buf, 0, DH_ONIONSKIN_LEN);
|
||||
memset(c_buf, 0, ONIONSKIN_CHALLENGE_LEN);
|
||||
test_assert(! onion_skin_create(pk, &c_dh, c_buf));
|
||||
|
||||
/* server handshake */
|
||||
memset(s_buf, 0, DH_KEY_LEN);
|
||||
memset(s_buf, 0, ONIONSKIN_REPLY_LEN);
|
||||
memset(s_keys, 0, 40);
|
||||
test_assert(! onion_skin_server_handshake(c_buf, pk, s_buf, s_keys, 40));
|
||||
|
||||
|
Loading…
Reference in New Issue
Block a user