a changelog and doc fixes for the strictnodes work

This commit is contained in:
Roger Dingledine 2009-12-21 04:38:49 -05:00
parent 22e07b4ead
commit 937607056b
3 changed files with 35 additions and 15 deletions

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@ -1,5 +1,5 @@
Changes in version 0.2.2.7-alpha - 2009-??-?? Changes in version 0.2.2.7-alpha - 2009-??-??
o Major features: o Major features (performance):
- When choosing which cells to relay first, we can now favor circuits - When choosing which cells to relay first, we can now favor circuits
that have been quiet recently, so as to get lower latency for that have been quiet recently, so as to get lower latency for
low-volume circuits. By default, relays enable or disable this low-volume circuits. By default, relays enable or disable this
@ -9,6 +9,27 @@ Changes in version 0.2.2.7-alpha - 2009-??-??
"CircuitPriorityHalflife" config option. Design and code by Ian "CircuitPriorityHalflife" config option. Design and code by Ian
Goldberg, Can Tang, and Chris Alexander. Goldberg, Can Tang, and Chris Alexander.
o Major features (relay selection):
- Switch to a StrictNodes config option, rather than the previous
"StrictEntryNodes" / "StrictExitNodes" separation.
- If EntryNodes, ExitNodes, ExcludeNodes, or ExcludeExitNodes
change during a config reload, mark and discard all our origin
circuits. This fix should address edge cases where we change the
config options and but then choose a circuit that we created before
the change.
- If EntryNodes or ExitNodes are set, be more willing to use an
unsuitable (e.g. slow or unstable) circuit. The user asked for it,
they get it.
- Make EntryNodes config option much more aggressive even when
StrictNodes is not set. Before it would prepend your requested
entrynodes to your list of guard nodes, but feel free to use others
after that. Now it chooses only from your EntryNodes if any of
those are available, and only falls back to others if a) they're
all down and b) StrictNodes is not set.
- Now we refresh your entry guards from EntryNodes at each consensus
fetch -- rather than just at startup and then they slowly rot as
the network changes.
o Minor features: o Minor features:
- New config option "CircuitStreamTimeout" to override our internal - New config option "CircuitStreamTimeout" to override our internal
timeout schedule for how many seconds until we detach a stream from timeout schedule for how many seconds until we detach a stream from

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@ -515,26 +515,25 @@ list.
.TP .TP
\fBEntryNodes \fR\fInode\fR,\fInode\fR,\fI...\fP \fBEntryNodes \fR\fInode\fR,\fInode\fR,\fI...\fP
A list of identity fingerprints, nicknames, country codes and address patterns A list of identity fingerprints, nicknames, country codes and address patterns
of nodes to use for the first hop in the circuit. of nodes to use for the first hop in normal circuits.
These are treated only as preferences unless StrictEntryNodes (see These are treated only as preferences unless StrictNodes (see
below) is also set. below) is also set.
.LP .LP
.TP .TP
\fBExitNodes \fR\fInode\fR,\fInode\fR,\fI...\fP \fBExitNodes \fR\fInode\fR,\fInode\fR,\fI...\fP
A list of identity fingerprints, nicknames, country codes and address patterns A list of identity fingerprints, nicknames, country codes and address patterns
of nodes to use for the last hop in the circuit. of nodes to use for the last hop in normal exit circuits.
These are treated only as preferences unless StrictExitNodes (see These are treated only as preferences unless StrictNodes (see
below) is also set. below) is also set.
.LP .LP
.TP .TP
\fBStrictEntryNodes \fR\fB0\fR|\fB1\fR\fP \fBStrictNodes \fR\fB0\fR|\fB1\fR\fP
If 1, Tor will never use any nodes besides those listed in "EntryNodes" for If 1 and EntryNodes config option is set, Tor will never use any
the first hop of a circuit. nodes besides those listed in EntryNodes for the first hop of a normal
.LP circuit. If 1 and ExitNodes config option is set, Tor will never use any
.TP nodes besides those listed in ExitNodes for the last hop of a normal exit
\fBStrictExitNodes \fR\fB0\fR|\fB1\fR\fP circuit. Note that Tor might still use these nodes for non-exit circuits
If 1, Tor will never use any nodes besides those listed in "ExitNodes" for such as one-hop directory fetches or hidden service support circuits.
the last hop of a circuit.
.LP .LP
.TP .TP
\fBFascistFirewall \fR\fB0\fR|\fB1\fR\fP \fBFascistFirewall \fR\fB0\fR|\fB1\fR\fP

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@ -551,8 +551,8 @@ static config_var_description_t options_description[] = {
"to the SOCKSPort." }, "to the SOCKSPort." },
/* SocksTimeout */ /* SocksTimeout */
{ "StrictNodes", "If set, Tor will fail to operate when none of the " { "StrictNodes", "If set, Tor will fail to operate when none of the "
"configured EntryNodes, ExitNodes, ExcludeNodes, or ExcludeExitNodes " "configured EntryNodes or ExitNodes can be used (or if the usable ones "
"can be used." }, "are listed in ExcludeNodes or ExcludeExitNodes)." },
/* TestSocks */ /* TestSocks */
{ "TrackHostsExit", "Hosts and domains which should, if possible, be " { "TrackHostsExit", "Hosts and domains which should, if possible, be "
"accessed from the same exit node each time we connect to them." }, "accessed from the same exit node each time we connect to them." },