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Move key-loading and crosscert-checking out of feature/relay

Browse Source 
This is also used by onion services, so it needs to go in another
module.
This commit is contained in:
Nick Mathewson 2018-09-25 14:19:48 -04:00
parent c82163dff4
commit 934859cf80
13 changed files with 874 additions and 811 deletions
Show Stats Download Patch File Download Diff File Expand all files Collapse all files

3
src/core/include.am
View File

@ -86,6 +86,8 @@ LIBTOR_APP_A_SOURCES = \
src/feature/hs/hs_stats.c \
src/feature/hs_common/replaycache.c \
src/feature/hs_common/shared_random_client.c \
src/feature/keymgt/loadkey.c \
src/feature/dirauth/keypin.c \
src/feature/nodelist/authcert.c \
src/feature/nodelist/dirlist.c \
src/feature/nodelist/microdesc.c \
@ -289,6 +291,7 @@ noinst_HEADERS += \
src/feature/hs/hsdir_index_st.h \
src/feature/hs_common/replaycache.h \
src/feature/hs_common/shared_random_client.h \
src/feature/keymgt/loadkey.h \
src/feature/nodelist/authcert.h \
src/feature/nodelist/authority_cert_st.h \
src/feature/nodelist/desc_store_st.h \

3
src/feature/hs/hs_service.c
View File

@ -27,7 +27,8 @@
#include "core/or/relay.h"
#include "feature/rend/rendservice.h"
#include "feature/relay/router.h"
#include "feature/relay/routerkeys.h"
#include "feature/keymgt/loadkey.h"
//#include "feature/relay/routerkeys.h"
#include "feature/nodelist/node_select.h"
#include "feature/hs_common/shared_random_client.h"
#include "app/config/statefile.h"

755
src/feature/keymgt/loadkey.c Normal file
View File

@ -0,0 +1,755 @@
/* Copyright (c) 2001 Matej Pfajfar.
* Copyright (c) 2001-2004, Roger Dingledine.
* Copyright (c) 2004-2006, Roger Dingledine, Nick Mathewson.
* Copyright (c) 2007-2018, The Tor Project, Inc. */
/* See LICENSE for licensing information */
/**
* \file loadkey.c
* \brief Read keys from disk, creating as needed
*
* This code is shared by relays and onion services, which both need
* this functionality.
**/
#include "core/or/or.h"
#include "app/config/config.h"
#include "app/main/main.h"
#include "feature/keymgt/loadkey.h"
#include "feature/nodelist/torcert.h"
#include "lib/crypt_ops/crypto_pwbox.h"
#include "lib/crypt_ops/crypto_util.h"
#include "lib/term/getpass.h"
#include "lib/crypt_ops/crypto_format.h"
#define ENC_KEY_HEADER "Boxed Ed25519 key"
#define ENC_KEY_TAG "master"
#ifdef HAVE_UNISTD_H
#include <unistd.h>
#endif
/** Try to read an RSA key from <b>fname</b>. If <b>fname</b> doesn't exist
* and <b>generate</b> is true, create a new RSA key and save it in
* <b>fname</b>. Return the read/created key, or NULL on error. Log all
* errors at level <b>severity</b>. If <b>created_out/b> is non-NULL and a
* new key was created, set *<b>created_out</b> to true.
*/
crypto_pk_t *
init_key_from_file(const char *fname, int generate, int severity,
bool *created_out)
{
crypto_pk_t *prkey = NULL;
if (created_out) {
*created_out = false;
}
if (!(prkey = crypto_pk_new())) {
tor_log(severity, LD_GENERAL,"Error constructing key");
goto error;
}
switch (file_status(fname)) {
case FN_DIR:
case FN_ERROR:
tor_log(severity, LD_FS,"Can't read key from \"%s\"", fname);
goto error;
/* treat empty key files as if the file doesn't exist, and,
* if generate is set, replace the empty file in
* crypto_pk_write_private_key_to_filename() */
case FN_NOENT:
case FN_EMPTY:
if (generate) {
if (!have_lockfile()) {
if (try_locking(get_options(), 0)<0) {
/* Make sure that --list-fingerprint only creates new keys
* if there is no possibility for a deadlock. */
tor_log(severity, LD_FS, "Another Tor process has locked \"%s\". "
"Not writing any new keys.", fname);
/*XXXX The 'other process' might make a key in a second or two;
* maybe we should wait for it. */
goto error;
}
}
log_info(LD_GENERAL, "No key found in \"%s\"; generating fresh key.",
fname);
if (crypto_pk_generate_key(prkey)) {
tor_log(severity, LD_GENERAL,"Error generating onion key");
goto error;
}
if (! crypto_pk_is_valid_private_key(prkey)) {
tor_log(severity, LD_GENERAL,"Generated key seems invalid");
goto error;
}
log_info(LD_GENERAL, "Generated key seems valid");
if (created_out) {
*created_out = true;
}
if (crypto_pk_write_private_key_to_filename(prkey, fname)) {
tor_log(severity, LD_FS,
"Couldn't write generated key to \"%s\".", fname);
goto error;
}
} else {
tor_log(severity, LD_GENERAL, "No key found in \"%s\"", fname);
goto error;
}
return prkey;
case FN_FILE:
if (crypto_pk_read_private_key_from_filename(prkey, fname)) {
tor_log(severity, LD_GENERAL,"Error loading private key.");
goto error;
}
return prkey;
default:
tor_assert(0);
}
error:
if (prkey)
crypto_pk_free(prkey);
return NULL;
}
/* DOCDOC */
static ssize_t
do_getpass(const char *prompt, char *buf, size_t buflen,
int twice, const or_options_t *options)
{
if (options->keygen_force_passphrase == FORCE_PASSPHRASE_OFF) {
tor_assert(buflen);
buf[0] = 0;
return 0;
}
char *prompt2 = NULL;
char *buf2 = NULL;
int fd = -1;
ssize_t length = -1;
if (options->use_keygen_passphrase_fd) {
twice = 0;
fd = options->keygen_passphrase_fd;
length = read_all_from_fd(fd, buf, buflen-1);
if (length >= 0)
buf[length] = 0;
goto done_reading;
}
if (twice) {
const char msg[] = "One more time:";
size_t p2len = strlen(prompt) + 1;
if (p2len < sizeof(msg))
p2len = sizeof(msg);
prompt2 = tor_malloc(p2len);
memset(prompt2, ' ', p2len);
memcpy(prompt2 + p2len - sizeof(msg), msg, sizeof(msg));
buf2 = tor_malloc_zero(buflen);
}
while (1) {
length = tor_getpass(prompt, buf, buflen);
if (length < 0)
goto done_reading;
if (! twice)
break;
ssize_t length2 = tor_getpass(prompt2, buf2, buflen);
if (length != length2 || tor_memneq(buf, buf2, length)) {
fprintf(stderr, "That didn't match.\n");
} else {
break;
}
}
done_reading:
if (twice) {
tor_free(prompt2);
memwipe(buf2, 0, buflen);
tor_free(buf2);
}
if (options->keygen_force_passphrase == FORCE_PASSPHRASE_ON && length == 0)
return -1;
return length;
}
/* DOCDOC */
int
read_encrypted_secret_key(ed25519_secret_key_t *out,
const char *fname)
{
int r = -1;
uint8_t *secret = NULL;
size_t secret_len = 0;
char pwbuf[256];
uint8_t encrypted_key[256];
char *tag = NULL;
int saved_errno = 0;
ssize_t encrypted_len = crypto_read_tagged_contents_from_file(fname,
ENC_KEY_HEADER,
&tag,
encrypted_key,
sizeof(encrypted_key));
if (encrypted_len < 0) {
saved_errno = errno;
log_info(LD_OR, "%s is missing", fname);
r = 0;
goto done;
}
if (strcmp(tag, ENC_KEY_TAG)) {
saved_errno = EINVAL;
goto done;
}
while (1) {
ssize_t pwlen =
do_getpass("Enter passphrase for master key:", pwbuf, sizeof(pwbuf), 0,
get_options());
if (pwlen < 0) {
saved_errno = EINVAL;
goto done;
}
const int r_unbox = crypto_unpwbox(&secret, &secret_len,
encrypted_key, encrypted_len,
pwbuf, pwlen);
if (r_unbox == UNPWBOX_CORRUPTED) {
log_err(LD_OR, "%s is corrupted.", fname);
saved_errno = EINVAL;
goto done;
} else if (r_unbox == UNPWBOX_OKAY) {
break;
}
/* Otherwise, passphrase is bad, so try again till user does ctrl-c or gets
* it right. */
}
if (secret_len != ED25519_SECKEY_LEN) {
log_err(LD_OR, "%s is corrupted.", fname);
saved_errno = EINVAL;
goto done;
}
memcpy(out->seckey, secret, ED25519_SECKEY_LEN);
r = 1;
done:
memwipe(encrypted_key, 0, sizeof(encrypted_key));
memwipe(pwbuf, 0, sizeof(pwbuf));
tor_free(tag);
if (secret) {
memwipe(secret, 0, secret_len);
tor_free(secret);
}
if (saved_errno)
errno = saved_errno;
return r;
}
/* DOCDOC */
int
write_encrypted_secret_key(const ed25519_secret_key_t *key,
const char *fname)
{
int r = -1;
char pwbuf0[256];
uint8_t *encrypted_key = NULL;
size_t encrypted_len = 0;
if (do_getpass("Enter new passphrase:", pwbuf0, sizeof(pwbuf0), 1,
get_options()) < 0) {
log_warn(LD_OR, "NO/failed passphrase");
return -1;
}
if (strlen(pwbuf0) == 0) {
if (get_options()->keygen_force_passphrase == FORCE_PASSPHRASE_ON)
return -1;
else
return 0;
}
if (crypto_pwbox(&encrypted_key, &encrypted_len,
key->seckey, sizeof(key->seckey),
pwbuf0, strlen(pwbuf0), 0) < 0) {
log_warn(LD_OR, "crypto_pwbox failed!?");
goto done;
}
if (crypto_write_tagged_contents_to_file(fname,
ENC_KEY_HEADER,
ENC_KEY_TAG,
encrypted_key, encrypted_len) < 0)
goto done;
r = 1;
done:
if (encrypted_key) {
memwipe(encrypted_key, 0, encrypted_len);
tor_free(encrypted_key);
}
memwipe(pwbuf0, 0, sizeof(pwbuf0));
return r;
}
/* DOCDOC */
static int
write_secret_key(const ed25519_secret_key_t *key, int encrypted,
const char *fname,
const char *fname_tag,
const char *encrypted_fname)
{
if (encrypted) {
int r = write_encrypted_secret_key(key, encrypted_fname);
if (r == 1) {
/* Success! */
/* Try to unlink the unencrypted key, if any existed before */
if (strcmp(fname, encrypted_fname))
unlink(fname);
return r;
} else if (r != 0) {
/* Unrecoverable failure! */
return r;
}
fprintf(stderr, "Not encrypting the secret key.\n");
}
return ed25519_seckey_write_to_file(key, fname, fname_tag);
}
/**
* Read an ed25519 key and associated certificates from files beginning with
* <b>fname</b>, with certificate type <b>cert_type</b>. On failure, return
* NULL; on success return the keypair.
*
* The <b>options</b> is used to look at the change_key_passphrase value when
* writing to disk a secret key. It is safe to be NULL even in that case.
*
* If INIT_ED_KEY_CREATE is set in <b>flags</b>, then create the key (and
* certificate if requested) if it doesn't exist, and save it to disk.
*
* If INIT_ED_KEY_NEEDCERT is set in <b>flags</b>, load/create a certificate
* too and store it in *<b>cert_out</b>. Fail if the cert can't be
* found/created. To create a certificate, <b>signing_key</b> must be set to
* the key that should sign it; <b>now</b> to the current time, and
* <b>lifetime</b> to the lifetime of the key.
*
* If INIT_ED_KEY_REPLACE is set in <b>flags</b>, then create and save new key
* whether we can read the old one or not.
*
* If INIT_ED_KEY_EXTRA_STRONG is set in <b>flags</b>, set the extra_strong
* flag when creating the secret key.
*
* If INIT_ED_KEY_INCLUDE_SIGNING_KEY_IN_CERT is set in <b>flags</b>, and
* we create a new certificate, create it with the signing key embedded.
*
* If INIT_ED_KEY_SPLIT is set in <b>flags</b>, and we create a new key,
* store the public key in a separate file from the secret key.
*
* If INIT_ED_KEY_MISSING_SECRET_OK is set in <b>flags</b>, and we find a
* public key file but no secret key file, return successfully anyway.
*
* If INIT_ED_KEY_OMIT_SECRET is set in <b>flags</b>, do not try to load a
* secret key unless no public key is found. Do not return a secret key. (but
* create and save one if needed).
*
* If INIT_ED_KEY_TRY_ENCRYPTED is set, we look for an encrypted secret key
* and consider encrypting any new secret key.
*
* If INIT_ED_KEY_NO_REPAIR is set, and there is any issue loading the keys
* from disk _other than their absence_ (full or partial), we do not try to
* replace them.
*
* If INIT_ED_KEY_SUGGEST_KEYGEN is set, have log messages about failures
* refer to the --keygen option.
*
* If INIT_ED_KEY_EXPLICIT_FNAME is set, use the provided file name for the
* secret key file, encrypted or not.
*
* If INIT_ED_KEY_OFFLINE_SECRET is set, we won't try to load the master
* secret key and we log a message at <b>severity</b> that we've done so.
*/
ed25519_keypair_t *
ed_key_init_from_file(const char *fname, uint32_t flags,
int severity,
const ed25519_keypair_t *signing_key,
time_t now,
time_t lifetime,
uint8_t cert_type,
struct tor_cert_st **cert_out,
const or_options_t *options)
{
char *secret_fname = NULL;
char *encrypted_secret_fname = NULL;
char *public_fname = NULL;
char *cert_fname = NULL;
const char *loaded_secret_fname = NULL;
int created_pk = 0, created_sk = 0, created_cert = 0;
const int try_to_load = ! (flags & INIT_ED_KEY_REPLACE);
const int encrypt_key = !! (flags & INIT_ED_KEY_TRY_ENCRYPTED);
const int norepair = !! (flags & INIT_ED_KEY_NO_REPAIR);
const int split = !! (flags & INIT_ED_KEY_SPLIT);
const int omit_secret = !! (flags & INIT_ED_KEY_OMIT_SECRET);
const int offline_secret = !! (flags & INIT_ED_KEY_OFFLINE_SECRET);
const int explicit_fname = !! (flags & INIT_ED_KEY_EXPLICIT_FNAME);
/* we don't support setting both of these flags at once. */
tor_assert((flags & (INIT_ED_KEY_NO_REPAIR|INIT_ED_KEY_NEEDCERT)) !=
(INIT_ED_KEY_NO_REPAIR|INIT_ED_KEY_NEEDCERT));
char tag[8];
tor_snprintf(tag, sizeof(tag), "type%d", (int)cert_type);
tor_cert_t *cert = NULL;
char *got_tag = NULL;
ed25519_keypair_t *keypair = tor_malloc_zero(sizeof(ed25519_keypair_t));
if (explicit_fname) {
secret_fname = tor_strdup(fname);
encrypted_secret_fname = tor_strdup(fname);
} else {
tor_asprintf(&secret_fname, "%s_secret_key", fname);
tor_asprintf(&encrypted_secret_fname, "%s_secret_key_encrypted", fname);
}
tor_asprintf(&public_fname, "%s_public_key", fname);
tor_asprintf(&cert_fname, "%s_cert", fname);
/* Try to read the secret key. */
int have_secret = 0;
int load_secret = try_to_load &&
!offline_secret &&
(!omit_secret || file_status(public_fname)==FN_NOENT);
if (load_secret) {
int rv = ed25519_seckey_read_from_file(&keypair->seckey,
&got_tag, secret_fname);
if (rv == 0) {
have_secret = 1;
loaded_secret_fname = secret_fname;
tor_assert(got_tag);
} else {
if (errno != ENOENT && norepair) {
tor_log(severity, LD_OR, "Unable to read %s: %s", secret_fname,
strerror(errno));
goto err;
}
}
}
/* Should we try for an encrypted key? */
int have_encrypted_secret_file = 0;
if (!have_secret && try_to_load && encrypt_key) {
int r = read_encrypted_secret_key(&keypair->seckey,
encrypted_secret_fname);
if (r > 0) {
have_secret = 1;
have_encrypted_secret_file = 1;
tor_free(got_tag); /* convince coverity we aren't leaking */
got_tag = tor_strdup(tag);
loaded_secret_fname = encrypted_secret_fname;
} else if (errno != ENOENT && norepair) {
tor_log(severity, LD_OR, "Unable to read %s: %s",
encrypted_secret_fname, strerror(errno));
goto err;
}
} else {
if (try_to_load) {
/* Check if it's there anyway, so we don't replace it. */
if (file_status(encrypted_secret_fname) != FN_NOENT)
have_encrypted_secret_file = 1;
}
}
if (have_secret) {
if (strcmp(got_tag, tag)) {
tor_log(severity, LD_OR, "%s has wrong tag", loaded_secret_fname);
goto err;
}
/* Derive the public key */
if (ed25519_public_key_generate(&keypair->pubkey, &keypair->seckey)<0) {
tor_log(severity, LD_OR, "%s can't produce a public key",
loaded_secret_fname);
goto err;
}
}
/* If we do split keys here, try to read the pubkey. */
int found_public = 0;
if (try_to_load && (!have_secret || split)) {
ed25519_public_key_t pubkey_tmp;
tor_free(got_tag);
found_public = ed25519_pubkey_read_from_file(&pubkey_tmp,
&got_tag, public_fname) == 0;
if (!found_public && errno != ENOENT && norepair) {
tor_log(severity, LD_OR, "Unable to read %s: %s", public_fname,
strerror(errno));
goto err;
}
if (found_public && strcmp(got_tag, tag)) {
tor_log(severity, LD_OR, "%s has wrong tag", public_fname);
goto err;
}
if (found_public) {
if (have_secret) {
/* If we have a secret key and we're reloading the public key,
* the key must match! */
if (! ed25519_pubkey_eq(&keypair->pubkey, &pubkey_tmp)) {
tor_log(severity, LD_OR, "%s does not match %s! If you are trying "
"to restore from backup, make sure you didn't mix up the "
"key files. If you are absolutely sure that %s is the right "
"key for this relay, delete %s or move it out of the way.",
public_fname, loaded_secret_fname,
loaded_secret_fname, public_fname);
goto err;
}
} else {
/* We only have the public key; better use that. */
tor_assert(split);
memcpy(&keypair->pubkey, &pubkey_tmp, sizeof(pubkey_tmp));
}
} else {
/* We have no public key file, but we do have a secret key, make the
* public key file! */
if (have_secret) {
if (ed25519_pubkey_write_to_file(&keypair->pubkey, public_fname, tag)
< 0) {
tor_log(severity, LD_OR, "Couldn't repair %s", public_fname);
goto err;
} else {
tor_log(LOG_NOTICE, LD_OR,
"Found secret key but not %s. Regenerating.",
public_fname);
}
}
}
}
/* If the secret key is absent and it's not allowed to be, fail. */
if (!have_secret && found_public &&
!(flags & INIT_ED_KEY_MISSING_SECRET_OK)) {
if (have_encrypted_secret_file) {
tor_log(severity, LD_OR, "We needed to load a secret key from %s, "
"but it was encrypted. Try 'tor --keygen' instead, so you "
"can enter the passphrase.",
secret_fname);
} else if (offline_secret) {
tor_log(severity, LD_OR, "We wanted to load a secret key from %s, "
"but you're keeping it offline. (OfflineMasterKey is set.)",
secret_fname);
} else {
tor_log(severity, LD_OR, "We needed to load a secret key from %s, "
"but couldn't find it. %s", secret_fname,
(flags & INIT_ED_KEY_SUGGEST_KEYGEN) ?
"If you're keeping your master secret key offline, you will "
"need to run 'tor --keygen' to generate new signing keys." :
"Did you forget to copy it over when you copied the rest of the "
"signing key material?");
}
goto err;
}
/* If it's absent, and we're not supposed to make a new keypair, fail. */
if (!have_secret && !found_public && !(flags & INIT_ED_KEY_CREATE)) {
if (split) {
tor_log(severity, LD_OR, "No key found in %s or %s.",
secret_fname, public_fname);
} else {
tor_log(severity, LD_OR, "No key found in %s.", secret_fname);
}
goto err;
}
/* If the secret key is absent, but the encrypted key would be present,
* that's an error */
if (!have_secret && !found_public && have_encrypted_secret_file) {
tor_assert(!encrypt_key);
tor_log(severity, LD_OR, "Found an encrypted secret key, "
"but not public key file %s!", public_fname);
goto err;
}
/* if it's absent, make a new keypair... */
if (!have_secret && !found_public) {
tor_free(keypair);
keypair = ed_key_new(signing_key, flags, now, lifetime,
cert_type, &cert);
if (!keypair) {
tor_log(severity, LD_OR, "Couldn't create keypair");
goto err;
}
created_pk = created_sk = created_cert = 1;
}
/* Write it to disk if we're supposed to do with a new passphrase, or if
* we just created it. */
if (created_sk || (have_secret && options != NULL &&
options->change_key_passphrase)) {
if (write_secret_key(&keypair->seckey,
encrypt_key,
secret_fname, tag, encrypted_secret_fname) < 0
||
(split &&
ed25519_pubkey_write_to_file(&keypair->pubkey, public_fname, tag) < 0)
||
(cert &&
crypto_write_tagged_contents_to_file(cert_fname, "ed25519v1-cert",
tag, cert->encoded, cert->encoded_len) < 0)) {
tor_log(severity, LD_OR, "Couldn't write keys or cert to file.");
goto err;
}
goto done;
}
/* If we're not supposed to get a cert, we're done. */
if (! (flags & INIT_ED_KEY_NEEDCERT))
goto done;
/* Read a cert. */
tor_free(got_tag);
uint8_t certbuf[256];
ssize_t cert_body_len = crypto_read_tagged_contents_from_file(
cert_fname, "ed25519v1-cert",
&got_tag, certbuf, sizeof(certbuf));
if (cert_body_len >= 0 && !strcmp(got_tag, tag))
cert = tor_cert_parse(certbuf, cert_body_len);
/* If we got it, check it to the extent we can. */
int bad_cert = 0;
if (! cert) {
tor_log(severity, LD_OR, "Cert was unparseable");
bad_cert = 1;
} else if (!tor_memeq(cert->signed_key.pubkey, keypair->pubkey.pubkey,
ED25519_PUBKEY_LEN)) {
tor_log(severity, LD_OR, "Cert was for wrong key");
bad_cert = 1;
} else if (signing_key &&
tor_cert_checksig(cert, &signing_key->pubkey, now) < 0) {
tor_log(severity, LD_OR, "Can't check certificate: %s",
tor_cert_describe_signature_status(cert));
bad_cert = 1;
} else if (cert->cert_expired) {
tor_log(severity, LD_OR, "Certificate is expired");
bad_cert = 1;
} else if (signing_key && cert->signing_key_included &&
! ed25519_pubkey_eq(&signing_key->pubkey, &cert->signing_key)) {
tor_log(severity, LD_OR, "Certificate signed by unexpectd key!");
bad_cert = 1;
}
if (bad_cert) {
tor_cert_free(cert);
cert = NULL;
}
/* If we got a cert, we're done. */
if (cert)
goto done;
/* If we didn't get a cert, and we're not supposed to make one, fail. */
if (!signing_key || !(flags & INIT_ED_KEY_CREATE)) {
tor_log(severity, LD_OR, "Without signing key, can't create certificate");
goto err;
}
/* We have keys but not a certificate, so make one. */
uint32_t cert_flags = 0;
if (flags & INIT_ED_KEY_INCLUDE_SIGNING_KEY_IN_CERT)
cert_flags |= CERT_FLAG_INCLUDE_SIGNING_KEY;
cert = tor_cert_create(signing_key, cert_type,
&keypair->pubkey,
now, lifetime,
cert_flags);
if (! cert) {
tor_log(severity, LD_OR, "Couldn't create certificate");
goto err;
}
/* Write it to disk. */
created_cert = 1;
if (crypto_write_tagged_contents_to_file(cert_fname, "ed25519v1-cert",
tag, cert->encoded, cert->encoded_len) < 0) {
tor_log(severity, LD_OR, "Couldn't write cert to disk.");
goto err;
}
done:
if (cert_out)
*cert_out = cert;
else
tor_cert_free(cert);
goto cleanup;
err:
if (keypair)
memwipe(keypair, 0, sizeof(*keypair));
tor_free(keypair);
tor_cert_free(cert);
if (cert_out)
*cert_out = NULL;
if (created_sk)
unlink(secret_fname);
if (created_pk)
unlink(public_fname);
if (created_cert)
unlink(cert_fname);
cleanup:
tor_free(encrypted_secret_fname);
tor_free(secret_fname);
tor_free(public_fname);
tor_free(cert_fname);
tor_free(got_tag);
return keypair;
}
/**
* Create a new signing key and (optionally) certficiate; do not read or write
* from disk. See ed_key_init_from_file() for more information.
*/
ed25519_keypair_t *
ed_key_new(const ed25519_keypair_t *signing_key,
uint32_t flags,
time_t now,
time_t lifetime,
uint8_t cert_type,
struct tor_cert_st **cert_out)
{
if (cert_out)
*cert_out = NULL;
const int extra_strong = !! (flags & INIT_ED_KEY_EXTRA_STRONG);
ed25519_keypair_t *keypair = tor_malloc_zero(sizeof(ed25519_keypair_t));
if (ed25519_keypair_generate(keypair, extra_strong) < 0)
goto err;
if (! (flags & INIT_ED_KEY_NEEDCERT))
return keypair;
tor_assert(signing_key);
tor_assert(cert_out);
uint32_t cert_flags = 0;
if (flags & INIT_ED_KEY_INCLUDE_SIGNING_KEY_IN_CERT)
cert_flags |= CERT_FLAG_INCLUDE_SIGNING_KEY;
tor_cert_t *cert = tor_cert_create(signing_key, cert_type,
&keypair->pubkey,
now, lifetime,
cert_flags);
if (! cert)
goto err;
*cert_out = cert;
return keypair;
err:
tor_free(keypair);
return NULL;
}

55
src/feature/keymgt/loadkey.h Normal file
View File

@ -0,0 +1,55 @@
/* Copyright (c) 2001 Matej Pfajfar.
* Copyright (c) 2001-2004, Roger Dingledine.
* Copyright (c) 2004-2006, Roger Dingledine, Nick Mathewson.
* Copyright (c) 2007-2018, The Tor Project, Inc. */
/* See LICENSE for licensing information */
/**
* \file loadkey.h
* \brief Header file for loadkey.c
**/
#ifndef TOR_LOADKEY_H
#define TOR_LOADKEY_H
#include "lib/crypt_ops/crypto_ed25519.h"
crypto_pk_t *init_key_from_file(const char *fname, int generate,
int severity, bool *created_out);
#define INIT_ED_KEY_CREATE (1u<<0)
#define INIT_ED_KEY_REPLACE (1u<<1)
#define INIT_ED_KEY_SPLIT (1u<<2)
#define INIT_ED_KEY_MISSING_SECRET_OK (1u<<3)
#define INIT_ED_KEY_NEEDCERT (1u<<4)
#define INIT_ED_KEY_EXTRA_STRONG (1u<<5)
#define INIT_ED_KEY_INCLUDE_SIGNING_KEY_IN_CERT (1u<<6)
#define INIT_ED_KEY_OMIT_SECRET (1u<<7)
#define INIT_ED_KEY_TRY_ENCRYPTED (1u<<8)
#define INIT_ED_KEY_NO_REPAIR (1u<<9)
#define INIT_ED_KEY_SUGGEST_KEYGEN (1u<<10)
#define INIT_ED_KEY_OFFLINE_SECRET (1u<<11)
#define INIT_ED_KEY_EXPLICIT_FNAME (1u<<12)
struct tor_cert_st;
ed25519_keypair_t *ed_key_init_from_file(const char *fname, uint32_t flags,
int severity,
const ed25519_keypair_t *signing_key,
time_t now,
time_t lifetime,
uint8_t cert_type,
struct tor_cert_st **cert_out,
const or_options_t *options);
ed25519_keypair_t *ed_key_new(const ed25519_keypair_t *signing_key,
uint32_t flags,
time_t now,
time_t lifetime,
uint8_t cert_type,
struct tor_cert_st **cert_out);
int read_encrypted_secret_key(ed25519_secret_key_t *out,
const char *fname);
int write_encrypted_secret_key(const ed25519_secret_key_t *out,
const char *fname);
#endif

37
src/feature/nodelist/torcert.c
View File

@ -638,6 +638,43 @@ or_handshake_certs_ed25519_ok(int severity,
return 1;
}
/** Check whether an RSA-TAP cross-certification is correct. Return 0 if it
* is, -1 if it isn't. */
MOCK_IMPL(int,
check_tap_onion_key_crosscert,(const uint8_t *crosscert,
int crosscert_len,
const crypto_pk_t *onion_pkey,
const ed25519_public_key_t *master_id_pkey,
const uint8_t *rsa_id_digest))
{
uint8_t *cc = tor_malloc(crypto_pk_keysize(onion_pkey));
int cc_len =
crypto_pk_public_checksig(onion_pkey,
(char*)cc,
crypto_pk_keysize(onion_pkey),
(const char*)crosscert,
crosscert_len);
if (cc_len < 0) {
goto err;
}
if (cc_len < DIGEST_LEN + ED25519_PUBKEY_LEN) {
log_warn(LD_DIR, "Short signature on cross-certification with TAP key");
goto err;
}
if (tor_memneq(cc, rsa_id_digest, DIGEST_LEN) ||
tor_memneq(cc + DIGEST_LEN, master_id_pkey->pubkey,
ED25519_PUBKEY_LEN)) {
log_warn(LD_DIR, "Incorrect cross-certification with TAP key");
goto err;
}
tor_free(cc);
return 0;
err:
tor_free(cc);
return -1;
}
/**
* Check the Ed certificates and/or the RSA certificates, as appropriate. If
* we obtained an Ed25519 identity, set *ed_id_out. If we obtained an RSA

6
src/feature/nodelist/torcert.h
View File

@ -107,4 +107,10 @@ void or_handshake_certs_check_both(int severity,
int tor_cert_encode_ed22519(const tor_cert_t *cert, char **cert_str_out);
MOCK_DECL(int, check_tap_onion_key_crosscert,(const uint8_t *crosscert,
int crosscert_len,
const crypto_pk_t *onion_pkey,
const ed25519_public_key_t *master_id_pkey,
const uint8_t *rsa_id_digest));
#endif /* !defined(TORCERT_H_INCLUDED) */

91
src/feature/relay/router.c
View File

@ -30,6 +30,7 @@
#include "core/or/policies.h"
#include "core/or/protover.h"
#include "core/or/relay.h"
#include "feature/keymgt/loadkey.h"
#include "feature/stats/rephist.h"
#include "feature/relay/router.h"
#include "feature/relay/routerkeys.h"
@ -540,85 +541,6 @@ log_new_relay_greeting(void)
already_logged = 1;
}
/** Try to read an RSA key from <b>fname</b>. If <b>fname</b> doesn't exist
* and <b>generate</b> is true, create a new RSA key and save it in
* <b>fname</b>. Return the read/created key, or NULL on error. Log all
* errors at level <b>severity</b>. If <b>log_greeting</b> is non-zero and a
* new key was created, log_new_relay_greeting() is called.
*/
crypto_pk_t *
init_key_from_file(const char *fname, int generate, int severity,
int log_greeting)
{
crypto_pk_t *prkey = NULL;
if (!(prkey = crypto_pk_new())) {
tor_log(severity, LD_GENERAL,"Error constructing key");
goto error;
}
switch (file_status(fname)) {
case FN_DIR:
case FN_ERROR:
tor_log(severity, LD_FS,"Can't read key from \"%s\"", fname);
goto error;
/* treat empty key files as if the file doesn't exist, and,
* if generate is set, replace the empty file in
* crypto_pk_write_private_key_to_filename() */
case FN_NOENT:
case FN_EMPTY:
if (generate) {
if (!have_lockfile()) {
if (try_locking(get_options(), 0)<0) {
/* Make sure that --list-fingerprint only creates new keys
* if there is no possibility for a deadlock. */
tor_log(severity, LD_FS, "Another Tor process has locked \"%s\". "
"Not writing any new keys.", fname);
/*XXXX The 'other process' might make a key in a second or two;
* maybe we should wait for it. */
goto error;
}
}
log_info(LD_GENERAL, "No key found in \"%s\"; generating fresh key.",
fname);
if (crypto_pk_generate_key(prkey)) {
tor_log(severity, LD_GENERAL,"Error generating onion key");
goto error;
}
if (! crypto_pk_is_valid_private_key(prkey)) {
tor_log(severity, LD_GENERAL,"Generated key seems invalid");
goto error;
}
log_info(LD_GENERAL, "Generated key seems valid");
if (log_greeting) {
log_new_relay_greeting();
}
if (crypto_pk_write_private_key_to_filename(prkey, fname)) {
tor_log(severity, LD_FS,
"Couldn't write generated key to \"%s\".", fname);
goto error;
}
} else {
tor_log(severity, LD_GENERAL, "No key found in \"%s\"", fname);
goto error;
}
return prkey;
case FN_FILE:
if (crypto_pk_read_private_key_from_filename(prkey, fname)) {
tor_log(severity, LD_GENERAL,"Error loading private key.");
goto error;
}
return prkey;
default:
tor_assert(0);
}
error:
if (prkey)
crypto_pk_free(prkey);
return NULL;
}
/** Load a curve25519 keypair from the file <b>fname</b>, writing it into
* <b>keys_out</b>. If the file isn't found, or is empty, and <b>generate</b>
* is true, create a new keypair and write it into the file. If there are
@ -708,7 +630,7 @@ load_authority_keyset(int legacy, crypto_pk_t **key_out,
fname = get_keydir_fname(
legacy ? "legacy_signing_key" : "authority_signing_key");
signing_key = init_key_from_file(fname, 0, LOG_ERR, 0);
signing_key = init_key_from_file(fname, 0, LOG_ERR, NULL);
if (!signing_key) {
log_warn(LD_DIR, "No version 3 directory key found in %s", fname);
goto done;
@ -1042,9 +964,12 @@ init_keys(void)
/* 1b. Read identity key. Make it if none is found. */
keydir = get_keydir_fname("secret_id_key");
log_info(LD_GENERAL,"Reading/making identity key \"%s\"...",keydir);
prkey = init_key_from_file(keydir, 1, LOG_ERR, 1);
bool created = false;
prkey = init_key_from_file(keydir, 1, LOG_ERR, &created);
tor_free(keydir);
if (!prkey) return -1;
if (created)
log_new_relay_greeting();
set_server_identity_key(prkey);
/* 1c. If we are configured as a bridge, generate a client key;
@ -1070,7 +995,9 @@ init_keys(void)
/* 2. Read onion key. Make it if none is found. */
keydir = get_keydir_fname("secret_onion_key");
log_info(LD_GENERAL,"Reading/making onion key \"%s\"...",keydir);
prkey = init_key_from_file(keydir, 1, LOG_ERR, 1);
prkey = init_key_from_file(keydir, 1, LOG_ERR, &created);
if (created)
log_new_relay_greeting();
tor_free(keydir);
if (!prkey) return -1;
set_onion_key(prkey);

2
src/feature/relay/router.h
View File

@ -39,8 +39,6 @@ crypto_pk_t *get_my_v3_legacy_signing_key(void);
void dup_onion_keys(crypto_pk_t **key, crypto_pk_t **last);
void expire_old_onion_keys(void);
void rotate_onion_key(void);
crypto_pk_t *init_key_from_file(const char *fname, int generate,
int severity, int log_greeting);
void v3_authority_check_key_expiry(void);
int get_onion_key_lifetime(void);
int get_onion_key_grace_period(void);

682
src/feature/relay/routerkeys.c
View File

@ -18,14 +18,12 @@
#include "app/config/config.h"
#include "feature/relay/router.h"
#include "feature/relay/routerkeys.h"
#include "feature/keymgt/loadkey.h"
#include "feature/nodelist/torcert.h"
#include "lib/crypt_ops/crypto_pwbox.h"
#include "lib/crypt_ops/crypto_util.h"
#include "lib/term/getpass.h"
#include "lib/tls/tortls.h"
#include "lib/tls/x509.h"
#include "lib/crypt_ops/crypto_format.h"
#define ENC_KEY_HEADER "Boxed Ed25519 key"
#define ENC_KEY_TAG "master"
@ -34,647 +32,6 @@
#include <unistd.h>
#endif
/* DOCDOC */
static ssize_t
do_getpass(const char *prompt, char *buf, size_t buflen,
int twice, const or_options_t *options)
{
if (options->keygen_force_passphrase == FORCE_PASSPHRASE_OFF) {
tor_assert(buflen);
buf[0] = 0;
return 0;
}
char *prompt2 = NULL;
char *buf2 = NULL;
int fd = -1;
ssize_t length = -1;
if (options->use_keygen_passphrase_fd) {
twice = 0;
fd = options->keygen_passphrase_fd;
length = read_all_from_fd(fd, buf, buflen-1);
if (length >= 0)
buf[length] = 0;
goto done_reading;
}
if (twice) {
const char msg[] = "One more time:";
size_t p2len = strlen(prompt) + 1;
if (p2len < sizeof(msg))
p2len = sizeof(msg);
prompt2 = tor_malloc(p2len);
memset(prompt2, ' ', p2len);
memcpy(prompt2 + p2len - sizeof(msg), msg, sizeof(msg));
buf2 = tor_malloc_zero(buflen);
}
while (1) {
length = tor_getpass(prompt, buf, buflen);
if (length < 0)
goto done_reading;
if (! twice)
break;
ssize_t length2 = tor_getpass(prompt2, buf2, buflen);
if (length != length2 || tor_memneq(buf, buf2, length)) {
fprintf(stderr, "That didn't match.\n");
} else {
break;
}
}
done_reading:
if (twice) {
tor_free(prompt2);
memwipe(buf2, 0, buflen);
tor_free(buf2);
}
if (options->keygen_force_passphrase == FORCE_PASSPHRASE_ON && length == 0)
return -1;
return length;
}
/* DOCDOC */
int
read_encrypted_secret_key(ed25519_secret_key_t *out,
const char *fname)
{
int r = -1;
uint8_t *secret = NULL;
size_t secret_len = 0;
char pwbuf[256];
uint8_t encrypted_key[256];
char *tag = NULL;
int saved_errno = 0;
ssize_t encrypted_len = crypto_read_tagged_contents_from_file(fname,
ENC_KEY_HEADER,
&tag,
encrypted_key,
sizeof(encrypted_key));
if (encrypted_len < 0) {
saved_errno = errno;
log_info(LD_OR, "%s is missing", fname);
r = 0;
goto done;
}
if (strcmp(tag, ENC_KEY_TAG)) {
saved_errno = EINVAL;
goto done;
}
while (1) {
ssize_t pwlen =
do_getpass("Enter passphrase for master key:", pwbuf, sizeof(pwbuf), 0,
get_options());
if (pwlen < 0) {
saved_errno = EINVAL;
goto done;
}
const int r_unbox = crypto_unpwbox(&secret, &secret_len,
encrypted_key, encrypted_len,
pwbuf, pwlen);
if (r_unbox == UNPWBOX_CORRUPTED) {
log_err(LD_OR, "%s is corrupted.", fname);
saved_errno = EINVAL;
goto done;
} else if (r_unbox == UNPWBOX_OKAY) {
break;
}
/* Otherwise, passphrase is bad, so try again till user does ctrl-c or gets
* it right. */
}
if (secret_len != ED25519_SECKEY_LEN) {
log_err(LD_OR, "%s is corrupted.", fname);
saved_errno = EINVAL;
goto done;
}
memcpy(out->seckey, secret, ED25519_SECKEY_LEN);
r = 1;
done:
memwipe(encrypted_key, 0, sizeof(encrypted_key));
memwipe(pwbuf, 0, sizeof(pwbuf));
tor_free(tag);
if (secret) {
memwipe(secret, 0, secret_len);
tor_free(secret);
}
if (saved_errno)
errno = saved_errno;
return r;
}
/* DOCDOC */
int
write_encrypted_secret_key(const ed25519_secret_key_t *key,
const char *fname)
{
int r = -1;
char pwbuf0[256];
uint8_t *encrypted_key = NULL;
size_t encrypted_len = 0;
if (do_getpass("Enter new passphrase:", pwbuf0, sizeof(pwbuf0), 1,
get_options()) < 0) {
log_warn(LD_OR, "NO/failed passphrase");
return -1;
}
if (strlen(pwbuf0) == 0) {
if (get_options()->keygen_force_passphrase == FORCE_PASSPHRASE_ON)
return -1;
else
return 0;
}
if (crypto_pwbox(&encrypted_key, &encrypted_len,
key->seckey, sizeof(key->seckey),
pwbuf0, strlen(pwbuf0), 0) < 0) {
log_warn(LD_OR, "crypto_pwbox failed!?");
goto done;
}
if (crypto_write_tagged_contents_to_file(fname,
ENC_KEY_HEADER,
ENC_KEY_TAG,
encrypted_key, encrypted_len) < 0)
goto done;
r = 1;
done:
if (encrypted_key) {
memwipe(encrypted_key, 0, encrypted_len);
tor_free(encrypted_key);
}
memwipe(pwbuf0, 0, sizeof(pwbuf0));
return r;
}
/* DOCDOC */
static int
write_secret_key(const ed25519_secret_key_t *key, int encrypted,
const char *fname,
const char *fname_tag,
const char *encrypted_fname)
{
if (encrypted) {
int r = write_encrypted_secret_key(key, encrypted_fname);
if (r == 1) {
/* Success! */
/* Try to unlink the unencrypted key, if any existed before */
if (strcmp(fname, encrypted_fname))
unlink(fname);
return r;
} else if (r != 0) {
/* Unrecoverable failure! */
return r;
}
fprintf(stderr, "Not encrypting the secret key.\n");
}
return ed25519_seckey_write_to_file(key, fname, fname_tag);
}
/**
* Read an ed25519 key and associated certificates from files beginning with
* <b>fname</b>, with certificate type <b>cert_type</b>. On failure, return
* NULL; on success return the keypair.
*
* The <b>options</b> is used to look at the change_key_passphrase value when
* writing to disk a secret key. It is safe to be NULL even in that case.
*
* If INIT_ED_KEY_CREATE is set in <b>flags</b>, then create the key (and
* certificate if requested) if it doesn't exist, and save it to disk.
*
* If INIT_ED_KEY_NEEDCERT is set in <b>flags</b>, load/create a certificate
* too and store it in *<b>cert_out</b>. Fail if the cert can't be
* found/created. To create a certificate, <b>signing_key</b> must be set to
* the key that should sign it; <b>now</b> to the current time, and
* <b>lifetime</b> to the lifetime of the key.
*
* If INIT_ED_KEY_REPLACE is set in <b>flags</b>, then create and save new key
* whether we can read the old one or not.
*
* If INIT_ED_KEY_EXTRA_STRONG is set in <b>flags</b>, set the extra_strong
* flag when creating the secret key.
*
* If INIT_ED_KEY_INCLUDE_SIGNING_KEY_IN_CERT is set in <b>flags</b>, and
* we create a new certificate, create it with the signing key embedded.
*
* If INIT_ED_KEY_SPLIT is set in <b>flags</b>, and we create a new key,
* store the public key in a separate file from the secret key.
*
* If INIT_ED_KEY_MISSING_SECRET_OK is set in <b>flags</b>, and we find a
* public key file but no secret key file, return successfully anyway.
*
* If INIT_ED_KEY_OMIT_SECRET is set in <b>flags</b>, do not try to load a
* secret key unless no public key is found. Do not return a secret key. (but
* create and save one if needed).
*
* If INIT_ED_KEY_TRY_ENCRYPTED is set, we look for an encrypted secret key
* and consider encrypting any new secret key.
*
* If INIT_ED_KEY_NO_REPAIR is set, and there is any issue loading the keys
* from disk _other than their absence_ (full or partial), we do not try to
* replace them.
*
* If INIT_ED_KEY_SUGGEST_KEYGEN is set, have log messages about failures
* refer to the --keygen option.
*
* If INIT_ED_KEY_EXPLICIT_FNAME is set, use the provided file name for the
* secret key file, encrypted or not.
*
* If INIT_ED_KEY_OFFLINE_SECRET is set, we won't try to load the master
* secret key and we log a message at <b>severity</b> that we've done so.
*/
ed25519_keypair_t *
ed_key_init_from_file(const char *fname, uint32_t flags,
int severity,
const ed25519_keypair_t *signing_key,
time_t now,
time_t lifetime,
uint8_t cert_type,
struct tor_cert_st **cert_out,
const or_options_t *options)
{
char *secret_fname = NULL;
char *encrypted_secret_fname = NULL;
char *public_fname = NULL;
char *cert_fname = NULL;
const char *loaded_secret_fname = NULL;
int created_pk = 0, created_sk = 0, created_cert = 0;
const int try_to_load = ! (flags & INIT_ED_KEY_REPLACE);
const int encrypt_key = !! (flags & INIT_ED_KEY_TRY_ENCRYPTED);
const int norepair = !! (flags & INIT_ED_KEY_NO_REPAIR);
const int split = !! (flags & INIT_ED_KEY_SPLIT);
const int omit_secret = !! (flags & INIT_ED_KEY_OMIT_SECRET);
const int offline_secret = !! (flags & INIT_ED_KEY_OFFLINE_SECRET);
const int explicit_fname = !! (flags & INIT_ED_KEY_EXPLICIT_FNAME);
/* we don't support setting both of these flags at once. */
tor_assert((flags & (INIT_ED_KEY_NO_REPAIR|INIT_ED_KEY_NEEDCERT)) !=
(INIT_ED_KEY_NO_REPAIR|INIT_ED_KEY_NEEDCERT));
char tag[8];
tor_snprintf(tag, sizeof(tag), "type%d", (int)cert_type);
tor_cert_t *cert = NULL;
char *got_tag = NULL;
ed25519_keypair_t *keypair = tor_malloc_zero(sizeof(ed25519_keypair_t));
if (explicit_fname) {
secret_fname = tor_strdup(fname);
encrypted_secret_fname = tor_strdup(fname);
} else {
tor_asprintf(&secret_fname, "%s_secret_key", fname);
tor_asprintf(&encrypted_secret_fname, "%s_secret_key_encrypted", fname);
}
tor_asprintf(&public_fname, "%s_public_key", fname);
tor_asprintf(&cert_fname, "%s_cert", fname);
/* Try to read the secret key. */
int have_secret = 0;
int load_secret = try_to_load &&
!offline_secret &&
(!omit_secret || file_status(public_fname)==FN_NOENT);
if (load_secret) {
int rv = ed25519_seckey_read_from_file(&keypair->seckey,
&got_tag, secret_fname);
if (rv == 0) {
have_secret = 1;
loaded_secret_fname = secret_fname;
tor_assert(got_tag);
} else {
if (errno != ENOENT && norepair) {
tor_log(severity, LD_OR, "Unable to read %s: %s", secret_fname,
strerror(errno));
goto err;
}
}
}
/* Should we try for an encrypted key? */
int have_encrypted_secret_file = 0;
if (!have_secret && try_to_load && encrypt_key) {
int r = read_encrypted_secret_key(&keypair->seckey,
encrypted_secret_fname);
if (r > 0) {
have_secret = 1;
have_encrypted_secret_file = 1;
tor_free(got_tag); /* convince coverity we aren't leaking */
got_tag = tor_strdup(tag);
loaded_secret_fname = encrypted_secret_fname;
} else if (errno != ENOENT && norepair) {
tor_log(severity, LD_OR, "Unable to read %s: %s",
encrypted_secret_fname, strerror(errno));
goto err;
}
} else {
if (try_to_load) {
/* Check if it's there anyway, so we don't replace it. */
if (file_status(encrypted_secret_fname) != FN_NOENT)
have_encrypted_secret_file = 1;
}
}
if (have_secret) {
if (strcmp(got_tag, tag)) {
tor_log(severity, LD_OR, "%s has wrong tag", loaded_secret_fname);
goto err;
}
/* Derive the public key */
if (ed25519_public_key_generate(&keypair->pubkey, &keypair->seckey)<0) {
tor_log(severity, LD_OR, "%s can't produce a public key",
loaded_secret_fname);
goto err;
}
}
/* If we do split keys here, try to read the pubkey. */
int found_public = 0;
if (try_to_load && (!have_secret || split)) {
ed25519_public_key_t pubkey_tmp;
tor_free(got_tag);
found_public = ed25519_pubkey_read_from_file(&pubkey_tmp,
&got_tag, public_fname) == 0;
if (!found_public && errno != ENOENT && norepair) {
tor_log(severity, LD_OR, "Unable to read %s: %s", public_fname,
strerror(errno));
goto err;
}
if (found_public && strcmp(got_tag, tag)) {
tor_log(severity, LD_OR, "%s has wrong tag", public_fname);
goto err;
}
if (found_public) {
if (have_secret) {
/* If we have a secret key and we're reloading the public key,
* the key must match! */
if (! ed25519_pubkey_eq(&keypair->pubkey, &pubkey_tmp)) {
tor_log(severity, LD_OR, "%s does not match %s! If you are trying "
"to restore from backup, make sure you didn't mix up the "
"key files. If you are absolutely sure that %s is the right "
"key for this relay, delete %s or move it out of the way.",
public_fname, loaded_secret_fname,
loaded_secret_fname, public_fname);
goto err;
}
} else {
/* We only have the public key; better use that. */
tor_assert(split);
memcpy(&keypair->pubkey, &pubkey_tmp, sizeof(pubkey_tmp));
}
} else {
/* We have no public key file, but we do have a secret key, make the
* public key file! */
if (have_secret) {
if (ed25519_pubkey_write_to_file(&keypair->pubkey, public_fname, tag)
< 0) {
tor_log(severity, LD_OR, "Couldn't repair %s", public_fname);
goto err;
} else {
tor_log(LOG_NOTICE, LD_OR,
"Found secret key but not %s. Regenerating.",
public_fname);
}
}
}
}
/* If the secret key is absent and it's not allowed to be, fail. */
if (!have_secret && found_public &&
!(flags & INIT_ED_KEY_MISSING_SECRET_OK)) {
if (have_encrypted_secret_file) {
tor_log(severity, LD_OR, "We needed to load a secret key from %s, "
"but it was encrypted. Try 'tor --keygen' instead, so you "
"can enter the passphrase.",
secret_fname);
} else if (offline_secret) {
tor_log(severity, LD_OR, "We wanted to load a secret key from %s, "
"but you're keeping it offline. (OfflineMasterKey is set.)",
secret_fname);
} else {
tor_log(severity, LD_OR, "We needed to load a secret key from %s, "
"but couldn't find it. %s", secret_fname,
(flags & INIT_ED_KEY_SUGGEST_KEYGEN) ?
"If you're keeping your master secret key offline, you will "
"need to run 'tor --keygen' to generate new signing keys." :
"Did you forget to copy it over when you copied the rest of the "
"signing key material?");
}
goto err;
}
/* If it's absent, and we're not supposed to make a new keypair, fail. */
if (!have_secret && !found_public && !(flags & INIT_ED_KEY_CREATE)) {
if (split) {
tor_log(severity, LD_OR, "No key found in %s or %s.",
secret_fname, public_fname);
} else {
tor_log(severity, LD_OR, "No key found in %s.", secret_fname);
}
goto err;
}
/* If the secret key is absent, but the encrypted key would be present,
* that's an error */
if (!have_secret && !found_public && have_encrypted_secret_file) {
tor_assert(!encrypt_key);
tor_log(severity, LD_OR, "Found an encrypted secret key, "
"but not public key file %s!", public_fname);
goto err;
}
/* if it's absent, make a new keypair... */
if (!have_secret && !found_public) {
tor_free(keypair);
keypair = ed_key_new(signing_key, flags, now, lifetime,
cert_type, &cert);
if (!keypair) {
tor_log(severity, LD_OR, "Couldn't create keypair");
goto err;
}
created_pk = created_sk = created_cert = 1;
}
/* Write it to disk if we're supposed to do with a new passphrase, or if
* we just created it. */
if (created_sk || (have_secret && options != NULL &&
options->change_key_passphrase)) {
if (write_secret_key(&keypair->seckey,
encrypt_key,
secret_fname, tag, encrypted_secret_fname) < 0
||
(split &&
ed25519_pubkey_write_to_file(&keypair->pubkey, public_fname, tag) < 0)
||
(cert &&
crypto_write_tagged_contents_to_file(cert_fname, "ed25519v1-cert",
tag, cert->encoded, cert->encoded_len) < 0)) {
tor_log(severity, LD_OR, "Couldn't write keys or cert to file.");
goto err;
}
goto done;
}
/* If we're not supposed to get a cert, we're done. */
if (! (flags & INIT_ED_KEY_NEEDCERT))
goto done;
/* Read a cert. */
tor_free(got_tag);
uint8_t certbuf[256];
ssize_t cert_body_len = crypto_read_tagged_contents_from_file(
cert_fname, "ed25519v1-cert",
&got_tag, certbuf, sizeof(certbuf));
if (cert_body_len >= 0 && !strcmp(got_tag, tag))
cert = tor_cert_parse(certbuf, cert_body_len);
/* If we got it, check it to the extent we can. */
int bad_cert = 0;
if (! cert) {
tor_log(severity, LD_OR, "Cert was unparseable");
bad_cert = 1;
} else if (!tor_memeq(cert->signed_key.pubkey, keypair->pubkey.pubkey,
ED25519_PUBKEY_LEN)) {
tor_log(severity, LD_OR, "Cert was for wrong key");
bad_cert = 1;
} else if (signing_key &&
tor_cert_checksig(cert, &signing_key->pubkey, now) < 0) {
tor_log(severity, LD_OR, "Can't check certificate: %s",
tor_cert_describe_signature_status(cert));
bad_cert = 1;
} else if (cert->cert_expired) {
tor_log(severity, LD_OR, "Certificate is expired");
bad_cert = 1;
} else if (signing_key && cert->signing_key_included &&
! ed25519_pubkey_eq(&signing_key->pubkey, &cert->signing_key)) {
tor_log(severity, LD_OR, "Certificate signed by unexpectd key!");
bad_cert = 1;
}
if (bad_cert) {
tor_cert_free(cert);
cert = NULL;
}
/* If we got a cert, we're done. */
if (cert)
goto done;
/* If we didn't get a cert, and we're not supposed to make one, fail. */
if (!signing_key || !(flags & INIT_ED_KEY_CREATE)) {
tor_log(severity, LD_OR, "Without signing key, can't create certificate");
goto err;
}
/* We have keys but not a certificate, so make one. */
uint32_t cert_flags = 0;
if (flags & INIT_ED_KEY_INCLUDE_SIGNING_KEY_IN_CERT)
cert_flags |= CERT_FLAG_INCLUDE_SIGNING_KEY;
cert = tor_cert_create(signing_key, cert_type,
&keypair->pubkey,
now, lifetime,
cert_flags);
if (! cert) {
tor_log(severity, LD_OR, "Couldn't create certificate");
goto err;
}
/* Write it to disk. */
created_cert = 1;
if (crypto_write_tagged_contents_to_file(cert_fname, "ed25519v1-cert",
tag, cert->encoded, cert->encoded_len) < 0) {
tor_log(severity, LD_OR, "Couldn't write cert to disk.");
goto err;
}
done:
if (cert_out)
*cert_out = cert;
else
tor_cert_free(cert);
goto cleanup;
err:
if (keypair)
memwipe(keypair, 0, sizeof(*keypair));
tor_free(keypair);
tor_cert_free(cert);
if (cert_out)
*cert_out = NULL;
if (created_sk)
unlink(secret_fname);
if (created_pk)
unlink(public_fname);
if (created_cert)
unlink(cert_fname);
cleanup:
tor_free(encrypted_secret_fname);
tor_free(secret_fname);
tor_free(public_fname);
tor_free(cert_fname);
tor_free(got_tag);
return keypair;
}
/**
* Create a new signing key and (optionally) certficiate; do not read or write
* from disk. See ed_key_init_from_file() for more information.
*/
ed25519_keypair_t *
ed_key_new(const ed25519_keypair_t *signing_key,
uint32_t flags,
time_t now,
time_t lifetime,
uint8_t cert_type,
struct tor_cert_st **cert_out)
{
if (cert_out)
*cert_out = NULL;
const int extra_strong = !! (flags & INIT_ED_KEY_EXTRA_STRONG);
ed25519_keypair_t *keypair = tor_malloc_zero(sizeof(ed25519_keypair_t));
if (ed25519_keypair_generate(keypair, extra_strong) < 0)
goto err;
if (! (flags & INIT_ED_KEY_NEEDCERT))
return keypair;
tor_assert(signing_key);
tor_assert(cert_out);
uint32_t cert_flags = 0;
if (flags & INIT_ED_KEY_INCLUDE_SIGNING_KEY_IN_CERT)
cert_flags |= CERT_FLAG_INCLUDE_SIGNING_KEY;
tor_cert_t *cert = tor_cert_create(signing_key, cert_type,
&keypair->pubkey,
now, lifetime,
cert_flags);
if (! cert)
goto err;
*cert_out = cert;
return keypair;
err:
tor_free(keypair);
return NULL;
}
static ed25519_keypair_t *master_identity_key = NULL;
static ed25519_keypair_t *master_signing_key = NULL;
static ed25519_keypair_t *current_auth_key = NULL;
@ -1363,43 +720,6 @@ make_tap_onion_key_crosscert(const crypto_pk_t *onion_key,
return tor_memdup(signature, r);
}
/** Check whether an RSA-TAP cross-certification is correct. Return 0 if it
* is, -1 if it isn't. */
MOCK_IMPL(int,
check_tap_onion_key_crosscert,(const uint8_t *crosscert,
int crosscert_len,
const crypto_pk_t *onion_pkey,
const ed25519_public_key_t *master_id_pkey,
const uint8_t *rsa_id_digest))
{
uint8_t *cc = tor_malloc(crypto_pk_keysize(onion_pkey));
int cc_len =
crypto_pk_public_checksig(onion_pkey,
(char*)cc,
crypto_pk_keysize(onion_pkey),
(const char*)crosscert,
crosscert_len);
if (cc_len < 0) {
goto err;
}
if (cc_len < DIGEST_LEN + ED25519_PUBKEY_LEN) {
log_warn(LD_DIR, "Short signature on cross-certification with TAP key");
goto err;
}
if (tor_memneq(cc, rsa_id_digest, DIGEST_LEN) ||
tor_memneq(cc + DIGEST_LEN, master_id_pkey->pubkey,
ED25519_PUBKEY_LEN)) {
log_warn(LD_DIR, "Incorrect cross-certification with TAP key");
goto err;
}
tor_free(cc);
return 0;
err:
tor_free(cc);
return -1;
}
void
routerkeys_free_all(void)
{

41
src/feature/relay/routerkeys.h
View File

@ -6,35 +6,6 @@
#include "lib/crypt_ops/crypto_ed25519.h"
#define INIT_ED_KEY_CREATE (1u<<0)
#define INIT_ED_KEY_REPLACE (1u<<1)
#define INIT_ED_KEY_SPLIT (1u<<2)
#define INIT_ED_KEY_MISSING_SECRET_OK (1u<<3)
#define INIT_ED_KEY_NEEDCERT (1u<<4)
#define INIT_ED_KEY_EXTRA_STRONG (1u<<5)
#define INIT_ED_KEY_INCLUDE_SIGNING_KEY_IN_CERT (1u<<6)
#define INIT_ED_KEY_OMIT_SECRET (1u<<7)
#define INIT_ED_KEY_TRY_ENCRYPTED (1u<<8)
#define INIT_ED_KEY_NO_REPAIR (1u<<9)
#define INIT_ED_KEY_SUGGEST_KEYGEN (1u<<10)
#define INIT_ED_KEY_OFFLINE_SECRET (1u<<11)
#define INIT_ED_KEY_EXPLICIT_FNAME (1u<<12)
struct tor_cert_st;
ed25519_keypair_t *ed_key_init_from_file(const char *fname, uint32_t flags,
int severity,
const ed25519_keypair_t *signing_key,
time_t now,
time_t lifetime,
uint8_t cert_type,
struct tor_cert_st **cert_out,
const or_options_t *options);
ed25519_keypair_t *ed_key_new(const ed25519_keypair_t *signing_key,
uint32_t flags,
time_t now,
time_t lifetime,
uint8_t cert_type,
struct tor_cert_st **cert_out);
const ed25519_public_key_t *get_master_identity_key(void);
const ed25519_keypair_t *get_master_signing_keypair(void);
const struct tor_cert_st *get_master_signing_key_cert(void);
@ -58,23 +29,12 @@ uint8_t *make_tap_onion_key_crosscert(const crypto_pk_t *onion_key,
const crypto_pk_t *rsa_id_key,
int *len_out);
MOCK_DECL(int, check_tap_onion_key_crosscert,(const uint8_t *crosscert,
int crosscert_len,
const crypto_pk_t *onion_pkey,
const ed25519_public_key_t *master_id_pkey,
const uint8_t *rsa_id_digest));
int log_cert_expiration(void);
int load_ed_keys(const or_options_t *options, time_t now);
int should_make_new_ed_keys(const or_options_t *options, const time_t now);
int generate_ed_link_cert(const or_options_t *options, time_t now, int force);
int read_encrypted_secret_key(ed25519_secret_key_t *out,
const char *fname);
int write_encrypted_secret_key(const ed25519_secret_key_t *out,
const char *fname);
void routerkeys_free_all(void);
#ifdef TOR_UNIT_TESTS
@ -83,4 +43,3 @@ void init_mock_ed_keys(const crypto_pk_t *rsa_identity_key);
#endif
#endif /* !defined(TOR_ROUTERKEYS_H) */

5
src/feature/rend/rendservice.c
View File

@ -31,6 +31,7 @@
#include "feature/rend/rendcommon.h"
#include "feature/rend/rendservice.h"
#include "feature/relay/router.h"
#include "feature/keymgt/loadkey.h"
#include "core/or/relay.h"
#include "feature/stats/rephist.h"
#include "feature/hs_common/replaycache.h"
@ -1363,7 +1364,7 @@ rend_service_key_on_disk(const char *directory_path)
/* Load key */
fname = hs_path_from_filename(directory_path, private_key_fname);
pk = init_key_from_file(fname, 0, LOG_DEBUG, 0);
pk = init_key_from_file(fname, 0, LOG_DEBUG, NULL);
if (pk) {
ret = 1;
}
@ -1535,7 +1536,7 @@ rend_service_load_keys(rend_service_t *s)
/* Load key */
fname = rend_service_path(s, private_key_fname);
s->private_key = init_key_from_file(fname, 1, LOG_ERR, 0);
s->private_key = init_key_from_file(fname, 1, LOG_ERR, NULL);
if (!s->private_key)
goto err;

4
src/test/fuzz/fuzz_descriptor.c
View File

@ -4,7 +4,8 @@
#include "core/or/or.h"
#include "feature/nodelist/routerparse.h"
#include "feature/nodelist/routerlist.h"
#include "feature/relay/routerkeys.h"
#include "feature/nodelist/torcert.h"
#include "feature/keymgt/loadkey.h"
#include "test/fuzz/fuzzing.h"
static int
@ -76,4 +77,3 @@ fuzz_main(const uint8_t *data, size_t sz)
}
return 0;
}

1
src/test/test_routerkeys.c
View File

@ -11,6 +11,7 @@
#include "feature/relay/routerkeys.h"
#include "lib/crypt_ops/crypto_cipher.h"
#include "lib/crypt_ops/crypto_format.h"
#include "feature/keymgt/loadkey.h"
#include "feature/nodelist/torcert.h"
#include "test/test.h"