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Merge branch 'bug22805_v2_squashed'
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91467e04b1
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changes/bug22805
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changes/bug22805
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o Minor features (relay):
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- When choosing which circuits can be expired as unused, consider
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circuits from clients even if those clients used regular CREATE
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cells to make them; and do not consider circuits from relays even if
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they were made with CREATE_FAST. Part of ticket 22805.
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o Code simplification and refactoring:
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- Remove various ways of testing circuits and connections for
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"clientness"; instead, favor channel_is_client().
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Part of ticket 22805.
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@ -4090,7 +4090,7 @@ channel_mark_bad_for_new_circs(channel_t *chan)
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*/
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int
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channel_is_client(channel_t *chan)
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channel_is_client(const channel_t *chan)
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{
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tor_assert(chan);
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@ -4111,6 +4111,20 @@ channel_mark_client(channel_t *chan)
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chan->is_client = 1;
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}
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/**
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* Clear the client flag
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*
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* Mark a channel as being _not_ from a client
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*/
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void
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channel_clear_client(channel_t *chan)
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{
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tor_assert(chan);
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chan->is_client = 0;
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}
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/**
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* Get the canonical flag for a channel
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*
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@ -666,11 +666,12 @@ int channel_is_bad_for_new_circs(channel_t *chan);
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void channel_mark_bad_for_new_circs(channel_t *chan);
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int channel_is_canonical(channel_t *chan);
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int channel_is_canonical_is_reliable(channel_t *chan);
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int channel_is_client(channel_t *chan);
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int channel_is_client(const channel_t *chan);
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int channel_is_local(channel_t *chan);
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int channel_is_incoming(channel_t *chan);
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int channel_is_outgoing(channel_t *chan);
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void channel_mark_client(channel_t *chan);
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void channel_clear_client(channel_t *chan);
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int channel_matches_extend_info(channel_t *chan, extend_info_t *extend_info);
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int channel_matches_target_addr_for_extend(channel_t *chan,
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const tor_addr_t *target);
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@ -71,7 +71,7 @@ static int consensus_nf_pad_single_onion;
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* its a client, use that. Then finally verify in the consensus).
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*/
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#define CHANNEL_IS_CLIENT(chan, options) \
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(!public_server_mode((options)) || (chan)->is_client || \
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(!public_server_mode((options)) || channel_is_client(chan) || \
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!connection_or_digest_is_known_relay((chan)->identity_digest))
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/**
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@ -1612,12 +1612,12 @@ onionskin_answer(or_circuit_t *circ,
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memcpy(circ->rend_circ_nonce, rend_circ_nonce, DIGEST_LEN);
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circ->is_first_hop = (created_cell->cell_type == CELL_CREATED_FAST);
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int used_create_fast = (created_cell->cell_type == CELL_CREATED_FAST);
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append_cell_to_circuit_queue(TO_CIRCUIT(circ),
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circ->p_chan, &cell, CELL_DIRECTION_IN, 0);
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log_debug(LD_CIRC,"Finished sending '%s' cell.",
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circ->is_first_hop ? "created_fast" : "created");
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used_create_fast ? "created_fast" : "created");
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/* Ignore the local bit when ExtendAllowPrivateAddresses is set:
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* it violates the assumption that private addresses are local.
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@ -1514,7 +1514,7 @@ circuit_expire_old_circuits_clientside(void)
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#define IDLE_ONE_HOP_CIRC_TIMEOUT 60
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/** Find each non-origin circuit that has been unused for too long,
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* has no streams on it, used a create_fast, and ends here: mark it
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* has no streams on it, came from a client, and ends here: mark it
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* for close.
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*/
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void
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@ -1530,9 +1530,9 @@ circuit_expire_old_circuits_serverside(time_t now)
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/* If the circuit has been idle for too long, and there are no streams
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* on it, and it ends here, and it used a create_fast, mark it for close.
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*/
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if (or_circ->is_first_hop && !circ->n_chan &&
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if (or_circ->p_chan && channel_is_client(or_circ->p_chan) &&
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!circ->n_chan &&
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!or_circ->n_streams && !or_circ->resolving_streams &&
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or_circ->p_chan &&
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channel_when_last_xmit(or_circ->p_chan) <= cutoff) {
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log_info(LD_CIRC, "Closing circ_id %u (empty %d secs ago)",
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(unsigned)or_circ->p_circ_id,
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@ -331,7 +331,7 @@ command_process_create_cell(cell_t *cell, channel_t *chan)
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// Needed for chutney: Sometimes relays aren't in the consensus yet, and
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// get marked as clients. This resets their channels once they appear.
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// Probably useful for normal operation wrt relay flapping, too.
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chan->is_client = 0;
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channel_clear_client(chan);
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} else {
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channel_mark_client(chan);
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}
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@ -353,16 +353,6 @@ command_process_create_cell(cell_t *cell, channel_t *chan)
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int len;
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created_cell_t created_cell;
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/* If the client used CREATE_FAST, it's probably a tor client or bridge
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* relay, and we must not use it for EXTEND requests (in most cases, we
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* won't have an authenticated peer ID for the extend).
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* Public relays on 0.2.9 and later will use CREATE_FAST if they have no
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* ntor onion key for this relay, but that should be a rare occurrence.
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* Clients on 0.3.1 and later avoid using CREATE_FAST as much as they can,
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* even during bootstrap, so the CREATE_FAST check is most accurate for
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* earlier tor client versions. */
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channel_mark_client(chan);
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memset(&created_cell, 0, sizeof(created_cell));
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len = onion_skin_server_handshake(ONION_HANDSHAKE_TYPE_FAST,
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create_cell->onionskin,
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@ -3434,7 +3434,8 @@ connection_exit_begin_conn(cell_t *cell, circuit_t *circ)
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port = bcell.port;
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if (or_circ && or_circ->p_chan) {
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if ((or_circ->is_first_hop ||
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const int client_chan = channel_is_client(or_circ->p_chan);
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if ((client_chan ||
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(!connection_or_digest_is_known_relay(
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or_circ->p_chan->identity_digest) &&
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should_refuse_unknown_exits(options)))) {
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@ -3444,10 +3445,10 @@ connection_exit_begin_conn(cell_t *cell, circuit_t *circ)
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log_fn(LOG_PROTOCOL_WARN, LD_PROTOCOL,
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"Attempt by %s to open a stream %s. Closing.",
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safe_str(channel_get_canonical_remote_descr(or_circ->p_chan)),
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or_circ->is_first_hop ? "on first hop of circuit" :
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"from unknown relay");
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client_chan ? "on first hop of circuit" :
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"from unknown relay");
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relay_send_end_cell_from_edge(rh.stream_id, circ,
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or_circ->is_first_hop ?
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client_chan ?
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END_STREAM_REASON_TORPROTOCOL :
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END_STREAM_REASON_MISC,
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NULL);
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@ -3473,9 +3473,6 @@ typedef struct or_circuit_t {
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/* We have already received an INTRODUCE1 cell on this circuit. */
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unsigned int already_received_introduce1 : 1;
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/** True iff this circuit was made with a CREATE_FAST cell. */
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unsigned int is_first_hop : 1;
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/** If set, this circuit carries HS traffic. Consider it in any HS
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* statistics. */
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unsigned int circuit_carries_hs_traffic_stats : 1;
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