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Add koryk's modifications to rend-spec.

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This commit is contained in:
Karsten Loesing 2010-08-17 10:02:07 +02:00
parent 863b6c439e
commit 8e8a34eb74
1 changed files with 30 additions and 25 deletions
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55
doc/spec/rend-spec.txt
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@ -150,7 +150,7 @@
The first time the OP provides an advertised service, it generates
a public/private keypair (stored locally).
The OP choses a small number of Tor servers as introduction points.
The OP chooses a small number of Tor servers as introduction points.
The OP establishes a new introduction circuit to each introduction
point. These circuits MUST NOT be used for anything but hidden service
introduction. To establish the introduction, Bob sends a
@ -238,6 +238,9 @@
permanent-id = H(public-key)[:10]
Note: If Bob's OP has "stealth" authorization enabled (see Section 2.2),
it uses the client key in place of the public hidden service key.
"H(time-period | descriptor-cookie | replica)" is the (possibly
secret) id part that is necessary to verify that the hidden service is
the true originator of this descriptor and that is therefore contained
@ -668,8 +671,8 @@
circuit. (If the PK_ID is unrecognized, the RELAY_COMMAND_INTRODUCE1 cell is
discarded.)
After sending the RELAY_COMMAND_INTRODUCE2 cell, the OR replies to Alice
with an empty RELAY_COMMAND_INTRODUCE_ACK cell. If no
After sending the RELAY_COMMAND_INTRODUCE2 cell to Bob, the OR replies to
Alice with an empty RELAY_COMMAND_INTRODUCE_ACK cell. If no
RELAY_COMMAND_INTRODUCE2 cell can be sent, the OR replies to Alice with a
non-empty cell to indicate an error. (The semantics of the cell body may be
determined later; the current implementation sends a single '1' byte on
@ -759,11 +762,11 @@
2.1. Service with large-scale client authorization
The first client authorization protocol aims at performing access control
while consuming as few additional resources as possible. A service
provider should be able to permit access to a large number of clients
while denying access for everyone else. However, the price for
scalability is that the service won't be able to hide its activity from
unauthorized or formerly authorized clients.
while consuming as few additional resources as possible. This is the "basic"
authorization protocol. A service provider should be able to permit access
to a large number of clients while denying access for everyone else.
However, the price for scalability is that the service won't be able to hide
its activity from unauthorized or formerly authorized clients.
The main idea of this protocol is to encrypt the introduction-point part
in hidden service descriptors to authorized clients using symmetric keys.
@ -822,19 +825,19 @@
2.2. Authorization for limited number of clients
A second, more sophisticated client authorization protocol goes the extra
mile of hiding service activity from unauthorized clients. With all else
being equal to the preceding authorization protocol, the second protocol
publishes hidden service descriptors for each user separately and gets
along with encrypting the introduction-point part of descriptors to a
single client. This allows the service to stop publishing descriptors for
removed clients. As long as a removed client cannot link descriptors
issued for other clients to the service, it cannot derive service
activity any more. The downside of this approach is limited scalability.
Even though the distributed storage of descriptors (cf. proposal 114)
tackles the problem of limited scalability to a certain extent, this
protocol should not be used for services with more than 16 clients. (In
fact, Tor should refuse to advertise services for more than this number
of clients.)
mile of hiding service activity from unauthorized clients. This is the
"stealth" authorization protocol. With all else being equal to the preceding
authorization protocol, the second protocol publishes hidden service
descriptors for each user separately and gets along with encrypting the
introduction-point part of descriptors to a single client. This allows the
service to stop publishing descriptors for removed clients. As long as a
removed client cannot link descriptors issued for other clients to the
service, it cannot derive service activity any more. The downside of this
approach is limited scalability. Even though the distributed storage of
descriptors (cf. proposal 114) tackles the problem of limited scalability to
a certain extent, this protocol should not be used for services with more
than 16 clients. (In fact, Tor should refuse to advertise services for more
than this number of clients.)
A hidden service generates an asymmetric "client key" and a symmetric
"descriptor cookie" for each client. The client key is used as
@ -882,14 +885,16 @@
A hidden service that is meant to perform client authorization adds a
new option HiddenServiceAuthorizeClient to its hidden service
configuration. This option contains the authorization type which is
either "1" for the protocol described in 2.1 or "2" for the protocol in
2.2 and a comma-separated list of human-readable client names, so that
Tor can create authorization data for these clients:
either "basic" for the protocol described in 2.1 or "stealth" for the
protocol in 2.2 and a comma-separated list of human-readable client
names, so that Tor can create authorization data for these clients:
HiddenServiceAuthorizeClient auth-type client-name,client-name,...
If this option is configured, HiddenServiceVersion is automatically
reconfigured to contain only version numbers of 2 or higher.
reconfigured to contain only version numbers of 2 or higher. There is
a maximum of 512 client names for basic auth and a maximum of 16 for
stealth auth.
Tor stores all generated authorization data for the authorization
protocols described in Sections 2.1 and 2.2 in a new file using the