nihilist/tor
1
0
Fork 0
mirror of https://gitlab.torproject.org/tpo/core/tor.git synced 2024-11-10 13:13:44 +01:00
Code Issues Packages Projects Releases Wiki Activity

Merge branch 'maint-0.2.1'

Browse Source 
Conflicts:

	ChangeLog
This commit is contained in:
Roger Dingledine 2010-01-19 17:54:41 -05:00
commit 8d84b4bfa1
2 changed files with 47 additions and 28 deletions
Show Stats Download Patch File Download Diff File Expand all files Collapse all files

18
ChangeLog
View File

@ -1,3 +1,21 @@
Changes in version 0.2.1.23 - 2010-0?-??
o Major bugfixes (performance):
- We were selecting our guards uniformly at random, and then weighting
which of our guards we'd use uniformly at random. This imbalance
meant that Tor clients were severely limited on throughput (and
probably latency too) by the first hop in their circuit. Now we
select guards weighted by currently advertised bandwidth. We also
automatically discard guards picked using the old algorithm. Fixes
bug 1217; bugfix on 0.2.1.3-alpha. Found by Mike Perry.
o Minor features:
- Avoid a mad rush at the beginning of each month when each client
rotates half of its guards. Instead we spread the rotation out
throughout the month, but we still avoid leaving a precise timestamp
in the state file about when we first picked the guard. Improves
over the behavior introduced in 0.1.2.17.
Changes in version 0.2.2.7-alpha - 2010-01-19
o Major features (performance):
- When choosing which cells to relay first, relays can now favor

53
src/or/circuitbuild.c
View File

@ -78,7 +78,6 @@ static int count_acceptable_routers(smartlist_t *routers);
static int onion_append_hop(crypt_path_t **head_ptr, extend_info_t *choice);
static void entry_guards_changed(void);
static time_t start_of_month(time_t when);
/** Make a note that we're running unit tests (rather than running Tor
* itself), so we avoid clobbering our state file. */
@ -2555,7 +2554,7 @@ choose_good_entry_server(uint8_t purpose, cpath_build_state_t *state)
routerinfo_t *r, *choice;
smartlist_t *excluded;
or_options_t *options = get_options();
router_crn_flags_t flags = 0;
router_crn_flags_t flags = CRN_NEED_GUARD;
if (state && options->UseEntryGuards &&
(purpose != CIRCUIT_PURPOSE_TESTING || options->BridgeRelay)) {
@ -2592,7 +2591,6 @@ choose_good_entry_server(uint8_t purpose, cpath_build_state_t *state)
}
if (state) {
flags |= CRN_NEED_GUARD;
if (state->need_uptime)
flags |= CRN_NEED_UPTIME;
if (state->need_capacity)
@ -3022,7 +3020,12 @@ add_an_entry_guard(routerinfo_t *chosen, int reset_status)
log_info(LD_CIRC, "Chose '%s' as new entry guard.", router->nickname);
strlcpy(entry->nickname, router->nickname, sizeof(entry->nickname));
memcpy(entry->identity, router->cache_info.identity_digest, DIGEST_LEN);
entry->chosen_on_date = start_of_month(time(NULL));
/* Choose expiry time smudged over the past month. The goal here
* is to a) spread out when Tor clients rotate their guards, so they
* don't all select them on the same day, and b) avoid leaving a
* precise timestamp in the state file about when we first picked
* this guard. For details, see the Jan 2010 or-dev thread. */
entry->chosen_on_date = time(NULL) - crypto_rand_int(3600*24*30);
entry->chosen_by_version = tor_strdup(VERSION);
if (chosen) /* prepend */
smartlist_insert(entry_guards, 0, entry);
@ -3074,7 +3077,7 @@ static int
remove_obsolete_entry_guards(void)
{
int changed = 0, i;
time_t this_month = start_of_month(time(NULL));
time_t now = time(NULL);
for (i = 0; i < smartlist_len(entry_guards); ++i) {
entry_guard_t *entry = smartlist_get(entry_guards, i);
@ -3088,15 +3091,26 @@ remove_obsolete_entry_guards(void)
} else if (tor_version_parse(ver, &v)) {
msg = "does not seem to be from any recognized version of Tor";
version_is_bad = 1;
} else if ((tor_version_as_new_as(ver, "0.1.0.10-alpha") &&
!tor_version_as_new_as(ver, "0.1.2.16-dev")) ||
(tor_version_as_new_as(ver, "0.2.0.0-alpha") &&
!tor_version_as_new_as(ver, "0.2.0.6-alpha"))) {
} else {
size_t len = strlen(ver)+5;
char *tor_ver = tor_malloc(len);
tor_snprintf(tor_ver, len, "Tor %s", ver);
if ((tor_version_as_new_as(tor_ver, "0.1.0.10-alpha") &&
!tor_version_as_new_as(tor_ver, "0.1.2.16-dev")) ||
(tor_version_as_new_as(tor_ver, "0.2.0.0-alpha") &&
!tor_version_as_new_as(tor_ver, "0.2.0.6-alpha")) ||
/* above are bug 440; below are bug 1217 */
(tor_version_as_new_as(tor_ver, "0.2.1.3-alpha") &&
!tor_version_as_new_as(tor_ver, "0.2.1.23")) ||
(tor_version_as_new_as(tor_ver, "0.2.2.0-alpha") &&
!tor_version_as_new_as(tor_ver, "0.2.2.7-alpha"))) {
msg = "was selected without regard for guard bandwidth";
version_is_bad = 1;
} else if (entry->chosen_on_date + 3600*24*35 < this_month) {
/* It's been more than a month, and probably more like two since
* chosen_on_date is clipped to the beginning of its month. */
}
tor_free(tor_ver);
}
if (!version_is_bad && entry->chosen_on_date + 3600*24*60 < now) {
/* It's been 2 months since the date listed in our state file. */
msg = "was selected several months ago";
date_is_bad = 1;
}
@ -3594,19 +3608,6 @@ choose_random_entry(cpath_build_state_t *state)
return r;
}
/** Helper: Return the start of the month containing <b>time</b>. */
static time_t
start_of_month(time_t now)
{
struct tm tm;
tor_gmtime_r(&now, &tm);
tm.tm_sec = 0;
tm.tm_min = 0;
tm.tm_hour = 0;
tm.tm_mday = 1;
return tor_timegm(&tm);
}
/** Parse <b>state</b> and learn about the entry guards it describes.
* If <b>set</b> is true, and there are no errors, replace the global
* entry_list with what we find.
@ -3715,7 +3716,7 @@ entry_guards_parse_state(or_state_t *state, int set, char **msg)
} else {
if (state_version) {
e->chosen_by_version = tor_strdup(state_version);
e->chosen_on_date = start_of_month(time(NULL));
e->chosen_on_date = time(NULL) - crypto_rand_int(3600*24*30);
}
}
});