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Merge branch 'maint-0.3.5' into maint-0.4.3
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commit
8a561fc5bf
6
changes/ticket40081
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6
changes/ticket40081
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@ -0,0 +1,6 @@
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o Minor features (security):
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- Channels using obsolete versions of the Tor link protocol are no
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longer allowed to circumvent address-canonicity checks.
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(This is only a minor issue, since such channels have no way to
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set ed25519 keys, and therefore should always be rejected.)
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Closes ticket 40081.
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@ -772,10 +772,9 @@ channel_check_for_duplicates(void)
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connections_to_relay++;
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total_relay_connections++;
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if (chan->is_canonical(chan, 0)) total_canonical++;
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if (chan->is_canonical(chan)) total_canonical++;
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if (!chan->is_canonical_to_peer && chan->is_canonical(chan, 0)
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&& chan->is_canonical(chan, 1)) {
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if (!chan->is_canonical_to_peer && chan->is_canonical(chan)) {
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total_half_canonical++;
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}
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}
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@ -2419,21 +2418,9 @@ channel_get_for_extend(const char *rsa_id_digest,
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continue;
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}
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/* Never return a non-canonical connection using a recent link protocol
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* if the address is not what we wanted.
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*
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* The channel_is_canonical_is_reliable() function asks the lower layer
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* if we should trust channel_is_canonical(). The below is from the
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* comments of the old circuit_or_get_for_extend() and applies when
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* the lower-layer transport is channel_tls_t.
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*
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* (For old link protocols, we can't rely on is_canonical getting
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* set properly if we're talking to the right address, since we might
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* have an out-of-date descriptor, and we will get no NETINFO cell to
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* tell us about the right address.)
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*/
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/* Only return canonical connections or connections where the address
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* is the address we wanted. */
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if (!channel_is_canonical(chan) &&
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channel_is_canonical_is_reliable(chan) &&
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!channel_matches_target_addr_for_extend(chan, target_addr)) {
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++n_noncanonical;
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continue;
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@ -2575,16 +2562,12 @@ channel_dump_statistics, (channel_t *chan, int severity))
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/* Handle marks */
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tor_log(severity, LD_GENERAL,
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" * Channel %"PRIu64 " has these marks: %s %s %s "
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"%s %s %s",
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" * Channel %"PRIu64 " has these marks: %s %s %s %s %s",
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(chan->global_identifier),
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channel_is_bad_for_new_circs(chan) ?
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"bad_for_new_circs" : "!bad_for_new_circs",
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channel_is_canonical(chan) ?
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"canonical" : "!canonical",
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channel_is_canonical_is_reliable(chan) ?
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"is_canonical_is_reliable" :
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"!is_canonical_is_reliable",
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channel_is_client(chan) ?
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"client" : "!client",
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channel_is_local(chan) ?
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@ -2943,22 +2926,7 @@ channel_is_canonical(channel_t *chan)
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tor_assert(chan);
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tor_assert(chan->is_canonical);
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return chan->is_canonical(chan, 0);
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}
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/**
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* Test if the canonical flag is reliable.
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*
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* This function asks if the lower layer thinks it's safe to trust the
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* result of channel_is_canonical().
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*/
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int
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channel_is_canonical_is_reliable(channel_t *chan)
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{
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tor_assert(chan);
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tor_assert(chan->is_canonical);
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return chan->is_canonical(chan, 1);
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return chan->is_canonical(chan);
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}
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/**
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@ -350,12 +350,10 @@ struct channel_t {
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/** Check if the lower layer has queued writes */
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int (*has_queued_writes)(channel_t *);
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/**
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* If the second param is zero, ask the lower layer if this is
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* 'canonical', for a transport-specific definition of canonical; if
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* it is 1, ask if the answer to the preceding query is safe to rely
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* on.
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* Ask the lower layer if this is 'canonical', for a transport-specific
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* definition of canonical.
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*/
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int (*is_canonical)(channel_t *, int);
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int (*is_canonical)(channel_t *);
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/** Check if this channel matches a specified extend_info_t */
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int (*matches_extend_info)(channel_t *, extend_info_t *);
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/** Check if this channel matches a target address when extending */
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@ -728,7 +726,6 @@ int channel_has_queued_writes(channel_t *chan);
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int channel_is_bad_for_new_circs(channel_t *chan);
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void channel_mark_bad_for_new_circs(channel_t *chan);
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int channel_is_canonical(channel_t *chan);
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int channel_is_canonical_is_reliable(channel_t *chan);
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int channel_is_client(const channel_t *chan);
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int channel_is_local(channel_t *chan);
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int channel_is_incoming(channel_t *chan);
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@ -107,7 +107,7 @@ channel_tls_get_transport_name_method(channel_t *chan, char **transport_out);
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static const char *
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channel_tls_get_remote_descr_method(channel_t *chan, int flags);
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static int channel_tls_has_queued_writes_method(channel_t *chan);
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static int channel_tls_is_canonical_method(channel_t *chan, int req);
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static int channel_tls_is_canonical_method(channel_t *chan);
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static int
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channel_tls_matches_extend_info_method(channel_t *chan,
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extend_info_t *extend_info);
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@ -645,12 +645,11 @@ channel_tls_has_queued_writes_method(channel_t *chan)
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/**
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* Tell the upper layer if we're canonical.
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*
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* This implements the is_canonical method for channel_tls_t; if req is zero,
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* it returns whether this is a canonical channel, and if it is one it returns
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* whether that can be relied upon.
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* This implements the is_canonical method for channel_tls_t:
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* it returns whether this is a canonical channel.
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*/
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static int
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channel_tls_is_canonical_method(channel_t *chan, int req)
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channel_tls_is_canonical_method(channel_t *chan)
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{
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int answer = 0;
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channel_tls_t *tlschan = BASE_CHAN_TO_TLS(chan);
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@ -658,24 +657,13 @@ channel_tls_is_canonical_method(channel_t *chan, int req)
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tor_assert(tlschan);
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if (tlschan->conn) {
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switch (req) {
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case 0:
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answer = tlschan->conn->is_canonical;
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break;
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case 1:
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/*
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* Is the is_canonical bit reliable? In protocols version 2 and up
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* we get the canonical address from a NETINFO cell, but in older
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* versions it might be based on an obsolete descriptor.
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*/
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answer = (tlschan->conn->link_proto >= 2);
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break;
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default:
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/* This shouldn't happen; channel.c is broken if it does */
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tor_assert_nonfatal_unreached_once();
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}
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/* If this bit is set to 0, and link_proto is sufficiently old, then we
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* can't actually _rely_ on this being a non-canonical channel.
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* Nonetheless, we're going to believe that this is a non-canonical
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* channel in this case, since nobody should be using these link protocols
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* any more. */
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answer = tlschan->conn->is_canonical;
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}
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/* else return 0 for tlschan->conn == NULL */
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return answer;
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}
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@ -730,6 +730,8 @@ circuit_deliver_create_cell(circuit_t *circ, const create_cell_t *create_cell,
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goto error;
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}
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tor_assert_nonfatal_once(circ->n_chan->is_canonical);
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memset(&cell, 0, sizeof(cell_t));
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r = relayed ? create_cell_format_relayed(&cell, create_cell)
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: create_cell_format(&cell, create_cell);
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@ -44,7 +44,6 @@ static int dump_statistics_mock_matches = 0;
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static int test_close_called = 0;
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static int test_chan_should_be_canonical = 0;
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static int test_chan_should_match_target = 0;
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static int test_chan_canonical_should_be_reliable = 0;
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static int test_chan_listener_close_fn_called = 0;
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static int test_chan_listener_fn_called = 0;
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@ -337,14 +336,10 @@ scheduler_release_channel_mock(channel_t *ch)
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}
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static int
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test_chan_is_canonical(channel_t *chan, int req)
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test_chan_is_canonical(channel_t *chan)
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{
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tor_assert(chan);
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if (req && test_chan_canonical_should_be_reliable) {
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return 1;
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}
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if (test_chan_should_be_canonical) {
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return 1;
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}
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@ -1357,6 +1352,9 @@ test_channel_for_extend(void *arg)
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/* Make it older than chan1. */
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chan2->timestamp_created = chan1->timestamp_created - 1;
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/* Say it's all canonical. */
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test_chan_should_be_canonical = 1;
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/* Set channel identities and add it to the channel map. The last one to be
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* added is made the first one in the list so the lookup will always return
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* that one first. */
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@ -1451,8 +1449,8 @@ test_channel_for_extend(void *arg)
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chan2->is_bad_for_new_circs = 0;
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/* Non canonical channels. */
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test_chan_should_be_canonical = 0;
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test_chan_should_match_target = 0;
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test_chan_canonical_should_be_reliable = 1;
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ret_chan = channel_get_for_extend(digest, &ed_id, &addr, &msg, &launch);
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tt_assert(!ret_chan);
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tt_str_op(msg, OP_EQ, "Connections all too old, or too non-canonical. "
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