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prop224: Make lspecs to extend info public
The hs circuit file had this function that takes a list of link specifiers and return a newly allocated extend info object. Make it public so the client side can also use it to be able to extend to introduction point. Signed-off-by: David Goulet <dgoulet@torproject.org>
This commit is contained in:
David Goulet
parent
8e2854372d
commit
8a552bf49b
@ -341,125 +341,6 @@ send_establish_intro(const hs_service_t *service,
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memwipe(payload, 0, sizeof(payload));
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}
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/* From a list of link specifier, an onion key and if we are requesting a
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* direct connection (ex: single onion service), return a newly allocated
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* extend_info_t object. This function checks the firewall policies and if we
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* are allowed to extend to the chosen address.
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*
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* if either IPv4 or legacy ID is missing, error.
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* if not direct_conn, IPv4 is prefered.
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* if direct_conn, IPv6 is prefered if we have one available.
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* if firewall does not allow the chosen address, error.
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*
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* Return NULL if we can't fulfill the conditions. */
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static extend_info_t *
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get_rp_extend_info(const smartlist_t *link_specifiers,
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const curve25519_public_key_t *onion_key, int direct_conn)
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{
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int have_v4 = 0, have_v6 = 0, have_legacy_id = 0, have_ed25519_id = 0;
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char legacy_id[DIGEST_LEN] = {0};
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uint16_t port_v4 = 0, port_v6 = 0, port = 0;
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tor_addr_t addr_v4, addr_v6, *addr = NULL;
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ed25519_public_key_t ed25519_pk;
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extend_info_t *info = NULL;
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tor_assert(link_specifiers);
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tor_assert(onion_key);
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SMARTLIST_FOREACH_BEGIN(link_specifiers, const link_specifier_t *, ls) {
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switch (link_specifier_get_ls_type(ls)) {
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case LS_IPV4:
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/* Skip if we already seen a v4. */
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if (have_v4) continue;
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tor_addr_from_ipv4h(&addr_v4,
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link_specifier_get_un_ipv4_addr(ls));
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port_v4 = link_specifier_get_un_ipv4_port(ls);
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have_v4 = 1;
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break;
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case LS_IPV6:
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/* Skip if we already seen a v6. */
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if (have_v6) continue;
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tor_addr_from_ipv6_bytes(&addr_v6,
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(const char *) link_specifier_getconstarray_un_ipv6_addr(ls));
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port_v6 = link_specifier_get_un_ipv6_port(ls);
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have_v6 = 1;
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break;
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case LS_LEGACY_ID:
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/* Make sure we do have enough bytes for the legacy ID. */
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if (link_specifier_getlen_un_legacy_id(ls) < sizeof(legacy_id)) {
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break;
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}
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memcpy(legacy_id, link_specifier_getconstarray_un_legacy_id(ls),
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sizeof(legacy_id));
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have_legacy_id = 1;
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break;
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case LS_ED25519_ID:
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memcpy(ed25519_pk.pubkey,
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link_specifier_getconstarray_un_ed25519_id(ls),
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ED25519_PUBKEY_LEN);
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have_ed25519_id = 1;
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break;
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default:
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/* Ignore unknown. */
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break;
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}
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} SMARTLIST_FOREACH_END(ls);
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/* IPv4, legacy ID are mandatory for rend points.
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* ed25519 keys and ipv6 are optional for rend points */
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if (!have_v4 || !have_legacy_id) {
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goto done;
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}
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/* By default, we pick IPv4 but this might change to v6 if certain
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* conditions are met. */
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addr = &addr_v4; port = port_v4;
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/* If we are NOT in a direct connection, we'll use our Guard and a 3-hop
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* circuit so we can't extend in IPv6. And at this point, we do have an IPv4
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* address available so go to validation. */
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if (!direct_conn) {
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goto validate;
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}
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/* From this point on, we have a request for a direct connection to the
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* rendezvous point so make sure we can actually connect through our
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* firewall. We'll prefer IPv6. */
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/* IPv6 test. */
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if (have_v6 &&
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fascist_firewall_allows_address_addr(&addr_v6, port_v6,
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FIREWALL_OR_CONNECTION, 1, 1)) {
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/* Direct connection and we can reach it in IPv6 so go for it. */
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addr = &addr_v6; port = port_v6;
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goto validate;
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}
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/* IPv4 test and we are sure we have a v4 because of the check above. */
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if (fascist_firewall_allows_address_addr(&addr_v4, port_v4,
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FIREWALL_OR_CONNECTION, 0, 0)) {
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/* Direct connection and we can reach it in IPv4 so go for it. */
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addr = &addr_v4; port = port_v4;
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goto validate;
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}
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validate:
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/* We'll validate now that the address we've picked isn't a private one. If
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* it is, are we allowing to extend to private address? */
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if (!extend_info_addr_is_allowed(addr)) {
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log_warn(LD_REND, "Rendezvous point address is private and it is not "
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"allowed to extend to it: %s:%u",
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fmt_addr(&addr_v4), port_v4);
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goto done;
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}
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/* We do have everything for which we think we can connect successfully. */
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info = extend_info_new(NULL, legacy_id,
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have_ed25519_id ? &ed25519_pk : NULL,
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NULL, onion_key,
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addr, port);
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done:
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return info;
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}
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/* For a given service, the ntor onion key and a rendezvous cookie, launch a
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* circuit to the rendezvous point specified by the link specifiers. On
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* success, a circuit identifier is attached to the circuit with the needed
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@ -483,7 +364,8 @@ launch_rendezvous_point_circuit(const hs_service_t *service,
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/* Get the extend info data structure for the chosen rendezvous point
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* specified by the given link specifiers. */
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info = get_rp_extend_info(data->link_specifiers, &data->onion_pk,
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info = hs_get_extend_info_from_lspecs(data->link_specifiers,
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&data->onion_pk,
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service->config.is_single_onion);
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if (info == NULL) {
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/* We are done here, we can't extend to the rendezvous point. */
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@ -14,12 +14,14 @@
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#include "or.h"
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#include "config.h"
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#include "circuitbuild.h"
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#include "networkstatus.h"
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#include "nodelist.h"
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#include "hs_cache.h"
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#include "hs_common.h"
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#include "hs_ident.h"
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#include "hs_service.h"
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#include "policies.h"
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#include "rendcommon.h"
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#include "rendservice.h"
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#include "routerset.h"
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@ -28,6 +30,9 @@
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#include "shared_random.h"
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#include "shared_random_state.h"
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/* Trunnel */
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#include "ed25519_cert.h"
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/* Ed25519 Basepoint value. Taken from section 5 of
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* https://tools.ietf.org/html/draft-josefsson-eddsa-ed25519-03 */
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static const char *str_ed25519_basepoint =
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@ -1559,6 +1564,123 @@ hs_pick_hsdir(smartlist_t *responsible_dirs, const char *req_key_str)
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return hs_dir;
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}
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/* From a list of link specifier, an onion key and if we are requesting a
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* direct connection (ex: single onion service), return a newly allocated
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* extend_info_t object. This function checks the firewall policies and if we
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* are allowed to extend to the chosen address.
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*
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* if either IPv4 or legacy ID is missing, error.
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* if not direct_conn, IPv4 is prefered.
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* if direct_conn, IPv6 is prefered if we have one available.
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* if firewall does not allow the chosen address, error.
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*
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* Return NULL if we can fulfill the conditions. */
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extend_info_t *
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hs_get_extend_info_from_lspecs(const smartlist_t *lspecs,
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const curve25519_public_key_t *onion_key,
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int direct_conn)
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{
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int have_v4 = 0, have_v6 = 0, have_legacy_id = 0, have_ed25519_id = 0;
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char legacy_id[DIGEST_LEN] = {0};
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uint16_t port_v4 = 0, port_v6 = 0, port = 0;
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tor_addr_t addr_v4, addr_v6, *addr = NULL;
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ed25519_public_key_t ed25519_pk;
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extend_info_t *info = NULL;
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tor_assert(lspecs);
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SMARTLIST_FOREACH_BEGIN(lspecs, const link_specifier_t *, ls) {
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switch (link_specifier_get_ls_type(ls)) {
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case LS_IPV4:
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/* Skip if we already seen a v4. */
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if (have_v4) continue;
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tor_addr_from_ipv4h(&addr_v4,
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link_specifier_get_un_ipv4_addr(ls));
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port_v4 = link_specifier_get_un_ipv4_port(ls);
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have_v4 = 1;
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break;
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case LS_IPV6:
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/* Skip if we already seen a v6. */
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if (have_v6) continue;
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tor_addr_from_ipv6_bytes(&addr_v6,
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(const char *) link_specifier_getconstarray_un_ipv6_addr(ls));
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port_v6 = link_specifier_get_un_ipv6_port(ls);
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have_v6 = 1;
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break;
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case LS_LEGACY_ID:
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/* Make sure we do have enough bytes for the legacy ID. */
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if (link_specifier_getlen_un_legacy_id(ls) < sizeof(legacy_id)) {
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break;
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}
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memcpy(legacy_id, link_specifier_getconstarray_un_legacy_id(ls),
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sizeof(legacy_id));
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have_legacy_id = 1;
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break;
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case LS_ED25519_ID:
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memcpy(ed25519_pk.pubkey,
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link_specifier_getconstarray_un_ed25519_id(ls),
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ED25519_PUBKEY_LEN);
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have_ed25519_id = 1;
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break;
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default:
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/* Ignore unknown. */
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break;
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}
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} SMARTLIST_FOREACH_END(ls);
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/* IPv4 and legacy ID are mandatory. */
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if (!have_v4 || !have_legacy_id) {
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goto done;
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}
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/* By default, we pick IPv4 but this might change to v6 if certain
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* conditions are met. */
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addr = &addr_v4; port = port_v4;
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/* If we are NOT in a direct connection, we'll use our Guard and a 3-hop
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* circuit so we can't extend in IPv6. And at this point, we do have an IPv4
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* address available so go to validation. */
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if (!direct_conn) {
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goto validate;
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}
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/* From this point on, we have a request for a direct connection to the
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* rendezvous point so make sure we can actually connect through our
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* firewall. We'll prefer IPv6. */
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/* IPv6 test. */
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if (have_v6 &&
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fascist_firewall_allows_address_addr(&addr_v6, port_v6,
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FIREWALL_OR_CONNECTION, 1, 1)) {
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/* Direct connection and we can reach it in IPv6 so go for it. */
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addr = &addr_v6; port = port_v6;
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goto validate;
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}
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/* IPv4 test and we are sure we have a v4 because of the check above. */
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if (fascist_firewall_allows_address_addr(&addr_v4, port_v4,
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FIREWALL_OR_CONNECTION, 0, 0)) {
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/* Direct connection and we can reach it in IPv4 so go for it. */
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addr = &addr_v4; port = port_v4;
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goto validate;
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}
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validate:
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/* We'll validate now that the address we've picked isn't a private one. If
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* it is, are we allowing to extend to private address? */
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if (!extend_info_addr_is_allowed(addr)) {
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log_warn(LD_REND, "Requested address is private and it is not "
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"allowed to extend to it: %s:%u",
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fmt_addr(&addr_v4), port_v4);
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goto done;
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}
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/* We do have everything for which we think we can connect successfully. */
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info = extend_info_new(NULL, legacy_id,
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(have_ed25519_id) ? &ed25519_pk : NULL, NULL,
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onion_key, addr, port);
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done:
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return info;
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}
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/***********************************************************************/
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/* Initialize the entire HS subsytem. This is called in tor_init() before any
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@ -237,6 +237,10 @@ int hs_set_conn_addr_port(const smartlist_t *ports, edge_connection_t *conn);
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void hs_inc_rdv_stream_counter(origin_circuit_t *circ);
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void hs_dec_rdv_stream_counter(origin_circuit_t *circ);
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extend_info_t *hs_get_extend_info_from_lspecs(const smartlist_t *lspecs,
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const curve25519_public_key_t *onion_key,
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int direct_conn);
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#ifdef HS_COMMON_PRIVATE
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STATIC void get_disaster_srv(uint64_t time_period_num, uint8_t *srv_out);
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