Merge branch 'maint-0.2.9' into maint-0.3.1

This commit is contained in:
Nick Mathewson 2018-02-11 18:09:35 -05:00
commit 8939eaf479
3 changed files with 72 additions and 4 deletions

3
changes/ticket24315 Normal file
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@ -0,0 +1,3 @@
o Major features (linux seccomp2 sandbox):
- Update the sandbox rules so that they should now work correctly with
Glibc 2.26. Closes ticket 24315.

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@ -487,6 +487,7 @@ AC_CHECK_FUNCS(
getrlimit \ getrlimit \
gettimeofday \ gettimeofday \
gmtime_r \ gmtime_r \
gnu_get_libc_version \
htonll \ htonll \
inet_aton \ inet_aton \
ioctl \ ioctl \
@ -1173,6 +1174,7 @@ AC_CHECK_HEADERS([assert.h \
arpa/inet.h \ arpa/inet.h \
crt_externs.h \ crt_externs.h \
execinfo.h \ execinfo.h \
gnu/libc-version.h \
grp.h \ grp.h \
ifaddrs.h \ ifaddrs.h \
inttypes.h \ inttypes.h \

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@ -62,6 +62,9 @@
#include <time.h> #include <time.h>
#include <poll.h> #include <poll.h>
#ifdef HAVE_GNU_LIBC_VERSION_H
#include <gnu/libc-version.h>
#endif
#ifdef HAVE_LINUX_NETFILTER_IPV4_H #ifdef HAVE_LINUX_NETFILTER_IPV4_H
#include <linux/netfilter_ipv4.h> #include <linux/netfilter_ipv4.h>
#endif #endif
@ -133,6 +136,9 @@ static int filter_nopar_gen[] = {
SCMP_SYS(clone), SCMP_SYS(clone),
SCMP_SYS(epoll_create), SCMP_SYS(epoll_create),
SCMP_SYS(epoll_wait), SCMP_SYS(epoll_wait),
#ifdef __NR_epoll_pwait
SCMP_SYS(epoll_pwait),
#endif
#ifdef HAVE_EVENTFD #ifdef HAVE_EVENTFD
SCMP_SYS(eventfd2), SCMP_SYS(eventfd2),
#endif #endif
@ -427,6 +433,52 @@ sb_mmap2(scmp_filter_ctx ctx, sandbox_cfg_t *filter)
} }
#endif #endif
#ifdef HAVE_GNU_LIBC_VERSION_H
#ifdef HAVE_GNU_GET_LIBC_VERSION
#define CHECK_LIBC_VERSION
#endif
#endif
/* Return true if we think we're running with a libc that always uses
* openat on linux. */
static int
libc_uses_openat_for_everything(void)
{
#ifdef CHECK_LIBC_VERSION
const char *version = gnu_get_libc_version();
if (version == NULL)
return 0;
int major = -1;
int minor = -1;
tor_sscanf(version, "%d.%d", &major, &minor);
if (major >= 3)
return 1;
else if (major == 2 && minor >= 26)
return 1;
else
return 0;
#else
return 0;
#endif
}
/** Allow a single file to be opened. If <b>use_openat</b> is true,
* we're using a libc that remaps all the opens into openats. */
static int
allow_file_open(scmp_filter_ctx ctx, int use_openat, const char *file)
{
if (use_openat) {
return seccomp_rule_add_2(ctx, SCMP_ACT_ALLOW, SCMP_SYS(openat),
SCMP_CMP_STR(0, SCMP_CMP_EQ, AT_FDCWD),
SCMP_CMP_STR(1, SCMP_CMP_EQ, file));
} else {
return seccomp_rule_add_1(ctx, SCMP_ACT_ALLOW, SCMP_SYS(open),
SCMP_CMP_STR(0, SCMP_CMP_EQ, file));
}
}
/** /**
* Function responsible for setting up the open syscall for * Function responsible for setting up the open syscall for
* the seccomp filter sandbox. * the seccomp filter sandbox.
@ -437,14 +489,15 @@ sb_open(scmp_filter_ctx ctx, sandbox_cfg_t *filter)
int rc; int rc;
sandbox_cfg_t *elem = NULL; sandbox_cfg_t *elem = NULL;
int use_openat = libc_uses_openat_for_everything();
// for each dynamic parameter filters // for each dynamic parameter filters
for (elem = filter; elem != NULL; elem = elem->next) { for (elem = filter; elem != NULL; elem = elem->next) {
smp_param_t *param = elem->param; smp_param_t *param = elem->param;
if (param != NULL && param->prot == 1 && param->syscall if (param != NULL && param->prot == 1 && param->syscall
== SCMP_SYS(open)) { == SCMP_SYS(open)) {
rc = seccomp_rule_add_1(ctx, SCMP_ACT_ALLOW, SCMP_SYS(open), rc = allow_file_open(ctx, use_openat, param->value);
SCMP_CMP_STR(0, SCMP_CMP_EQ, param->value));
if (rc != 0) { if (rc != 0) {
log_err(LD_BUG,"(Sandbox) failed to add open syscall, received " log_err(LD_BUG,"(Sandbox) failed to add open syscall, received "
"libseccomp error %d", rc); "libseccomp error %d", rc);
@ -462,6 +515,15 @@ sb_open(scmp_filter_ctx ctx, sandbox_cfg_t *filter)
return rc; return rc;
} }
rc = seccomp_rule_add_1(ctx, SCMP_ACT_ERRNO(EACCES), SCMP_SYS(openat),
SCMP_CMP_MASKED(2, O_CLOEXEC|O_NONBLOCK|O_NOCTTY|O_NOFOLLOW,
O_RDONLY));
if (rc != 0) {
log_err(LD_BUG,"(Sandbox) failed to add openat syscall, received "
"libseccomp error %d", rc);
return rc;
}
return 0; return 0;
} }
@ -651,7 +713,7 @@ sb_socket(scmp_filter_ctx ctx, sandbox_cfg_t *filter)
rc = seccomp_rule_add_3(ctx, SCMP_ACT_ALLOW, SCMP_SYS(socket), rc = seccomp_rule_add_3(ctx, SCMP_ACT_ALLOW, SCMP_SYS(socket),
SCMP_CMP(0, SCMP_CMP_EQ, PF_NETLINK), SCMP_CMP(0, SCMP_CMP_EQ, PF_NETLINK),
SCMP_CMP(1, SCMP_CMP_EQ, SOCK_RAW), SCMP_CMP_MASKED(1, SOCK_CLOEXEC, SOCK_RAW),
SCMP_CMP(2, SCMP_CMP_EQ, 0)); SCMP_CMP(2, SCMP_CMP_EQ, 0));
if (rc) if (rc)
return rc; return rc;
@ -1622,7 +1684,8 @@ add_param_filter(scmp_filter_ctx ctx, sandbox_cfg_t* cfg)
// function pointer // function pointer
for (i = 0; i < ARRAY_LENGTH(filter_func); i++) { for (i = 0; i < ARRAY_LENGTH(filter_func); i++) {
if ((filter_func[i])(ctx, cfg)) { rc = filter_func[i](ctx, cfg);
if (rc) {
log_err(LD_BUG,"(Sandbox) failed to add syscall %d, received libseccomp " log_err(LD_BUG,"(Sandbox) failed to add syscall %d, received libseccomp "
"error %d", i, rc); "error %d", i, rc);
return rc; return rc;