diff --git a/changes/bug2385 b/changes/bug2385
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000..5d571d910f
--- /dev/null
+++ b/changes/bug2385
@@ -0,0 +1,9 @@
+ o Minor features (security):
+ - Clear keys and key-derived material left on the stack in
+ rendservice.c and rendclient.c. This should make us more
+ forward-secure against cold-boot attacks and the like. Fix for
+ bug 2385.
+
+ - Check return value of crypto_pk_write_private_key_to_string() in
+ end_service_load_keys(). This should make us more forward-secure
+ against cold-boot attacks and the like. Fix for bug 2385.
diff --git a/src/common/util.c b/src/common/util.c
index e5b51b9a94..008e26a20c 100644
--- a/src/common/util.c
+++ b/src/common/util.c
@@ -655,6 +655,16 @@ fast_memcmpstart(const void *mem, size_t memlen,
return fast_memcmp(mem, prefix, plen);
}
+/** Given a nul-terminated string s, set every character before the nul
+ * to zero. */
+void
+tor_strclear(char *s)
+{
+ while (*s) {
+ *s++ = '\0';
+ }
+}
+
/** Return a pointer to the first char of s that is not whitespace and
* not a comment, or to the terminating NUL if no such character exists.
*/
diff --git a/src/common/util.h b/src/common/util.h
index a2ab0ccac8..4ab93164dc 100644
--- a/src/common/util.h
+++ b/src/common/util.h
@@ -188,6 +188,7 @@ int strcasecmpstart(const char *s1, const char *s2) ATTR_NONNULL((1,2));
int strcmpend(const char *s1, const char *s2) ATTR_NONNULL((1,2));
int strcasecmpend(const char *s1, const char *s2) ATTR_NONNULL((1,2));
int fast_memcmpstart(const void *mem, size_t memlen, const char *prefix);
+void tor_strclear(char *s);
void tor_strstrip(char *s, const char *strip) ATTR_NONNULL((1,2));
long tor_parse_long(const char *s, int base, long min,
diff --git a/src/or/config.c b/src/or/config.c
index d90e0fc996..042fc1aa3c 100644
--- a/src/or/config.c
+++ b/src/or/config.c
@@ -1548,7 +1548,7 @@ options_act(const or_options_t *old_options)
monitor_owning_controller_process(options->OwningControllerProcess);
/* reload keys as needed for rendezvous services. */
- if (rend_service_load_keys()<0) {
+ if (rend_service_load_all_keys()<0) {
log_warn(LD_GENERAL,"Error loading rendezvous service keys");
return -1;
}
diff --git a/src/or/rendclient.c b/src/or/rendclient.c
index 6c751be27d..5b3b92e406 100644
--- a/src/or/rendclient.c
+++ b/src/or/rendclient.c
@@ -132,6 +132,7 @@ rend_client_send_introduction(origin_circuit_t *introcirc,
crypt_path_t *cpath;
off_t dh_offset;
crypto_pk_t *intro_key = NULL;
+ int status = 0;
tor_assert(introcirc->_base.purpose == CIRCUIT_PURPOSE_C_INTRODUCING);
tor_assert(rendcirc->_base.purpose == CIRCUIT_PURPOSE_C_REND_READY);
@@ -161,7 +162,8 @@ rend_client_send_introduction(origin_circuit_t *introcirc,
}
}
- return -1;
+ status = -1;
+ goto cleanup;
}
/* first 20 bytes of payload are the hash of Bob's pk */
@@ -184,13 +186,16 @@ rend_client_send_introduction(origin_circuit_t *introcirc,
smartlist_len(entry->parsed->intro_nodes));
if (rend_client_reextend_intro_circuit(introcirc)) {
+ status = -2;
goto perm_err;
} else {
- return -1;
+ status = -1;
+ goto cleanup;
}
}
if (crypto_pk_get_digest(intro_key, payload)<0) {
log_warn(LD_BUG, "Internal error: couldn't hash public key.");
+ status = -2;
goto perm_err;
}
@@ -202,10 +207,12 @@ rend_client_send_introduction(origin_circuit_t *introcirc,
cpath->magic = CRYPT_PATH_MAGIC;
if (!(cpath->dh_handshake_state = crypto_dh_new(DH_TYPE_REND))) {
log_warn(LD_BUG, "Internal error: couldn't allocate DH.");
+ status = -2;
goto perm_err;
}
if (crypto_dh_generate_public(cpath->dh_handshake_state)<0) {
log_warn(LD_BUG, "Internal error: couldn't generate g^x.");
+ status = -2;
goto perm_err;
}
}
@@ -256,6 +263,7 @@ rend_client_send_introduction(origin_circuit_t *introcirc,
if (crypto_dh_get_public(cpath->dh_handshake_state, tmp+dh_offset,
DH_KEY_LEN)<0) {
log_warn(LD_BUG, "Internal error: couldn't extract g^x.");
+ status = -2;
goto perm_err;
}
@@ -269,6 +277,7 @@ rend_client_send_introduction(origin_circuit_t *introcirc,
PK_PKCS1_OAEP_PADDING, 0);
if (r<0) {
log_warn(LD_BUG,"Internal error: hybrid pk encrypt failed.");
+ status = -2;
goto perm_err;
}
@@ -288,7 +297,8 @@ rend_client_send_introduction(origin_circuit_t *introcirc,
introcirc->cpath->prev)<0) {
/* introcirc is already marked for close. leave rendcirc alone. */
log_warn(LD_BUG, "Couldn't send INTRODUCE1 cell");
- return -2;
+ status = -2;
+ goto cleanup;
}
/* Now, we wait for an ACK or NAK on this circuit. */
@@ -299,12 +309,17 @@ rend_client_send_introduction(origin_circuit_t *introcirc,
* state. */
introcirc->_base.timestamp_dirty = time(NULL);
- return 0;
+ goto cleanup;
+
perm_err:
if (!introcirc->_base.marked_for_close)
circuit_mark_for_close(TO_CIRCUIT(introcirc), END_CIRC_REASON_INTERNAL);
circuit_mark_for_close(TO_CIRCUIT(rendcirc), END_CIRC_REASON_INTERNAL);
- return -2;
+ cleanup:
+ memset(payload, 0, sizeof(payload));
+ memset(tmp, 0, sizeof(tmp));
+
+ return status;
}
/** Called when a rendezvous circuit is open; sends a establish
@@ -659,10 +674,17 @@ rend_client_refetch_v2_renddesc(const rend_data_t *rend_query)
time(NULL), chosen_replica) < 0) {
log_warn(LD_REND, "Internal error: Computing v2 rendezvous "
"descriptor ID did not succeed.");
- return;
+ /*
+ * Hmm, can this write anything to descriptor_id and still fail?
+ * Let's clear it just to be safe.
+ *
+ * From here on, any returns should goto done which clears
+ * descriptor_id so we don't leave key-derived material on the stack.
+ */
+ goto done;
}
if (directory_get_from_hs_dir(descriptor_id, rend_query) != 0)
- return; /* either success or failure, but we're done */
+ goto done; /* either success or failure, but we're done */
}
/* If we come here, there are no hidden service directories left. */
log_info(LD_REND, "Could not pick one of the responsible hidden "
@@ -670,6 +692,10 @@ rend_client_refetch_v2_renddesc(const rend_data_t *rend_query)
"we already tried them all unsuccessfully.");
/* Close pending connections. */
rend_client_desc_trynow(rend_query->onion_address);
+
+ done:
+ memset(descriptor_id, 0, sizeof(descriptor_id));
+
return;
}
@@ -1172,11 +1198,11 @@ rend_parse_service_authorization(const or_options_t *options,
strmap_t *parsed = strmap_new();
smartlist_t *sl = smartlist_new();
rend_service_authorization_t *auth = NULL;
+ char descriptor_cookie_tmp[REND_DESC_COOKIE_LEN+2];
+ char descriptor_cookie_base64ext[REND_DESC_COOKIE_LEN_BASE64+2+1];
for (line = options->HidServAuth; line; line = line->next) {
char *onion_address, *descriptor_cookie;
- char descriptor_cookie_tmp[REND_DESC_COOKIE_LEN+2];
- char descriptor_cookie_base64ext[REND_DESC_COOKIE_LEN_BASE64+2+1];
int auth_type_val = 0;
auth = NULL;
SMARTLIST_FOREACH(sl, char *, c, tor_free(c););
@@ -1253,6 +1279,8 @@ rend_parse_service_authorization(const or_options_t *options,
} else {
strmap_free(parsed, rend_service_authorization_strmap_item_free);
}
+ memset(descriptor_cookie_tmp, 0, sizeof(descriptor_cookie_tmp));
+ memset(descriptor_cookie_base64ext, 0, sizeof(descriptor_cookie_base64ext));
return res;
}
diff --git a/src/or/rendservice.c b/src/or/rendservice.c
index 6a51874699..8acc226e3a 100644
--- a/src/or/rendservice.c
+++ b/src/or/rendservice.c
@@ -31,6 +31,10 @@ static rend_intro_point_t *find_intro_point(origin_circuit_t *circ);
static int intro_point_accepted_intro_count(rend_intro_point_t *intro);
static int intro_point_should_expire_now(rend_intro_point_t *intro,
time_t now);
+struct rend_service_t;
+static int rend_service_load_keys(struct rend_service_t *s);
+static int rend_service_load_auth_keys(struct rend_service_t *s,
+ const char *hfname);
/** Represents the mapping from a virtual port of a rendezvous service to
* a real port on some IP.
@@ -135,7 +139,9 @@ rend_authorized_client_free(rend_authorized_client_t *client)
return;
if (client->client_key)
crypto_pk_free(client->client_key);
+ tor_strclear(client->client_name);
tor_free(client->client_name);
+ memset(client->descriptor_cookie, 0, sizeof(client->descriptor_cookie));
tor_free(client);
}
@@ -609,231 +615,273 @@ rend_service_update_descriptor(rend_service_t *service)
/** Load and/or generate private keys for all hidden services, possibly
* including keys for client authorization. Return 0 on success, -1 on
- * failure.
- */
+ * failure. */
int
-rend_service_load_keys(void)
+rend_service_load_all_keys(void)
{
- int r = 0;
- char fname[512];
- char buf[1500];
-
SMARTLIST_FOREACH_BEGIN(rend_service_list, rend_service_t *, s) {
if (s->private_key)
continue;
log_info(LD_REND, "Loading hidden-service keys from \"%s\"",
s->directory);
- /* Check/create directory */
- if (check_private_dir(s->directory, CPD_CREATE, get_options()->User) < 0)
+ if (rend_service_load_keys(s) < 0)
return -1;
-
- /* Load key */
- if (strlcpy(fname,s->directory,sizeof(fname)) >= sizeof(fname) ||
- strlcat(fname,PATH_SEPARATOR"private_key",sizeof(fname))
- >= sizeof(fname)) {
- log_warn(LD_CONFIG, "Directory name too long to store key file: \"%s\".",
- s->directory);
- return -1;
- }
- s->private_key = init_key_from_file(fname, 1, LOG_ERR);
- if (!s->private_key)
- return -1;
-
- /* Create service file */
- if (rend_get_service_id(s->private_key, s->service_id)<0) {
- log_warn(LD_BUG, "Internal error: couldn't encode service ID.");
- return -1;
- }
- if (crypto_pk_get_digest(s->private_key, s->pk_digest)<0) {
- log_warn(LD_BUG, "Couldn't compute hash of public key.");
- return -1;
- }
- if (strlcpy(fname,s->directory,sizeof(fname)) >= sizeof(fname) ||
- strlcat(fname,PATH_SEPARATOR"hostname",sizeof(fname))
- >= sizeof(fname)) {
- log_warn(LD_CONFIG, "Directory name too long to store hostname file:"
- " \"%s\".", s->directory);
- return -1;
- }
- tor_snprintf(buf, sizeof(buf),"%s.onion\n", s->service_id);
- if (write_str_to_file(fname,buf,0)<0) {
- log_warn(LD_CONFIG, "Could not write onion address to hostname file.");
- return -1;
- }
-
- /* If client authorization is configured, load or generate keys. */
- if (s->auth_type != REND_NO_AUTH) {
- char *client_keys_str = NULL;
- strmap_t *parsed_clients = strmap_new();
- char cfname[512];
- FILE *cfile, *hfile;
- open_file_t *open_cfile = NULL, *open_hfile = NULL;
-
- /* Load client keys and descriptor cookies, if available. */
- if (tor_snprintf(cfname, sizeof(cfname), "%s"PATH_SEPARATOR"client_keys",
- s->directory)<0) {
- log_warn(LD_CONFIG, "Directory name too long to store client keys "
- "file: \"%s\".", s->directory);
- goto err;
- }
- client_keys_str = read_file_to_str(cfname, RFTS_IGNORE_MISSING, NULL);
- if (client_keys_str) {
- if (rend_parse_client_keys(parsed_clients, client_keys_str) < 0) {
- log_warn(LD_CONFIG, "Previously stored client_keys file could not "
- "be parsed.");
- goto err;
- } else {
- log_info(LD_CONFIG, "Parsed %d previously stored client entries.",
- strmap_size(parsed_clients));
- tor_free(client_keys_str);
- }
- }
-
- /* Prepare client_keys and hostname files. */
- if (!(cfile = start_writing_to_stdio_file(cfname,
- OPEN_FLAGS_REPLACE | O_TEXT,
- 0600, &open_cfile))) {
- log_warn(LD_CONFIG, "Could not open client_keys file %s",
- escaped(cfname));
- goto err;
- }
- if (!(hfile = start_writing_to_stdio_file(fname,
- OPEN_FLAGS_REPLACE | O_TEXT,
- 0600, &open_hfile))) {
- log_warn(LD_CONFIG, "Could not open hostname file %s", escaped(fname));
- goto err;
- }
-
- /* Either use loaded keys for configured clients or generate new
- * ones if a client is new. */
- SMARTLIST_FOREACH_BEGIN(s->clients, rend_authorized_client_t *, client)
- {
- char desc_cook_out[3*REND_DESC_COOKIE_LEN_BASE64+1];
- char service_id[16+1];
- rend_authorized_client_t *parsed =
- strmap_get(parsed_clients, client->client_name);
- int written;
- size_t len;
- /* Copy descriptor cookie from parsed entry or create new one. */
- if (parsed) {
- memcpy(client->descriptor_cookie, parsed->descriptor_cookie,
- REND_DESC_COOKIE_LEN);
- } else {
- crypto_rand(client->descriptor_cookie, REND_DESC_COOKIE_LEN);
- }
- if (base64_encode(desc_cook_out, 3*REND_DESC_COOKIE_LEN_BASE64+1,
- client->descriptor_cookie,
- REND_DESC_COOKIE_LEN) < 0) {
- log_warn(LD_BUG, "Could not base64-encode descriptor cookie.");
- strmap_free(parsed_clients, rend_authorized_client_strmap_item_free);
- return -1;
- }
- /* Copy client key from parsed entry or create new one if required. */
- if (parsed && parsed->client_key) {
- client->client_key = crypto_pk_dup_key(parsed->client_key);
- } else if (s->auth_type == REND_STEALTH_AUTH) {
- /* Create private key for client. */
- crypto_pk_t *prkey = NULL;
- if (!(prkey = crypto_pk_new())) {
- log_warn(LD_BUG,"Error constructing client key");
- goto err;
- }
- if (crypto_pk_generate_key(prkey)) {
- log_warn(LD_BUG,"Error generating client key");
- crypto_pk_free(prkey);
- goto err;
- }
- if (crypto_pk_check_key(prkey) <= 0) {
- log_warn(LD_BUG,"Generated client key seems invalid");
- crypto_pk_free(prkey);
- goto err;
- }
- client->client_key = prkey;
- }
- /* Add entry to client_keys file. */
- desc_cook_out[strlen(desc_cook_out)-1] = '\0'; /* Remove newline. */
- written = tor_snprintf(buf, sizeof(buf),
- "client-name %s\ndescriptor-cookie %s\n",
- client->client_name, desc_cook_out);
- if (written < 0) {
- log_warn(LD_BUG, "Could not write client entry.");
- goto err;
- }
- if (client->client_key) {
- char *client_key_out = NULL;
- crypto_pk_write_private_key_to_string(client->client_key,
- &client_key_out, &len);
- if (rend_get_service_id(client->client_key, service_id)<0) {
- log_warn(LD_BUG, "Internal error: couldn't encode service ID.");
- tor_free(client_key_out);
- goto err;
- }
- written = tor_snprintf(buf + written, sizeof(buf) - written,
- "client-key\n%s", client_key_out);
- tor_free(client_key_out);
- if (written < 0) {
- log_warn(LD_BUG, "Could not write client entry.");
- goto err;
- }
- }
-
- if (fputs(buf, cfile) < 0) {
- log_warn(LD_FS, "Could not append client entry to file: %s",
- strerror(errno));
- goto err;
- }
-
- /* Add line to hostname file. */
- if (s->auth_type == REND_BASIC_AUTH) {
- /* Remove == signs (newline has been removed above). */
- desc_cook_out[strlen(desc_cook_out)-2] = '\0';
- tor_snprintf(buf, sizeof(buf),"%s.onion %s # client: %s\n",
- s->service_id, desc_cook_out, client->client_name);
- } else {
- char extended_desc_cookie[REND_DESC_COOKIE_LEN+1];
- memcpy(extended_desc_cookie, client->descriptor_cookie,
- REND_DESC_COOKIE_LEN);
- extended_desc_cookie[REND_DESC_COOKIE_LEN] =
- ((int)s->auth_type - 1) << 4;
- if (base64_encode(desc_cook_out, 3*REND_DESC_COOKIE_LEN_BASE64+1,
- extended_desc_cookie,
- REND_DESC_COOKIE_LEN+1) < 0) {
- log_warn(LD_BUG, "Could not base64-encode descriptor cookie.");
- goto err;
- }
- desc_cook_out[strlen(desc_cook_out)-3] = '\0'; /* Remove A= and
- newline. */
- tor_snprintf(buf, sizeof(buf),"%s.onion %s # client: %s\n",
- service_id, desc_cook_out, client->client_name);
- }
-
- if (fputs(buf, hfile)<0) {
- log_warn(LD_FS, "Could not append host entry to file: %s",
- strerror(errno));
- goto err;
- }
- }
- SMARTLIST_FOREACH_END(client);
-
- goto done;
- err:
- r = -1;
- done:
- tor_free(client_keys_str);
- strmap_free(parsed_clients, rend_authorized_client_strmap_item_free);
- if (r<0) {
- if (open_cfile)
- abort_writing_to_file(open_cfile);
- if (open_hfile)
- abort_writing_to_file(open_hfile);
- return r;
- } else {
- finish_writing_to_file(open_cfile);
- finish_writing_to_file(open_hfile);
- }
- }
} SMARTLIST_FOREACH_END(s);
+
+ return 0;
+}
+
+/** Load and/or generate private keys for the hidden service s,
+ * possibly including keys for client authorization. Return 0 on success, -1
+ * on failure. */
+static int
+rend_service_load_keys(rend_service_t *s)
+{
+ char fname[512];
+ char buf[128];
+
+ /* Check/create directory */
+ if (check_private_dir(s->directory, CPD_CREATE, get_options()->User) < 0)
+ return -1;
+
+ /* Load key */
+ if (strlcpy(fname,s->directory,sizeof(fname)) >= sizeof(fname) ||
+ strlcat(fname,PATH_SEPARATOR"private_key",sizeof(fname))
+ >= sizeof(fname)) {
+ log_warn(LD_CONFIG, "Directory name too long to store key file: \"%s\".",
+ s->directory);
+ return -1;
+ }
+ s->private_key = init_key_from_file(fname, 1, LOG_ERR);
+ if (!s->private_key)
+ return -1;
+
+ /* Create service file */
+ if (rend_get_service_id(s->private_key, s->service_id)<0) {
+ log_warn(LD_BUG, "Internal error: couldn't encode service ID.");
+ return -1;
+ }
+ if (crypto_pk_get_digest(s->private_key, s->pk_digest)<0) {
+ log_warn(LD_BUG, "Couldn't compute hash of public key.");
+ return -1;
+ }
+ if (strlcpy(fname,s->directory,sizeof(fname)) >= sizeof(fname) ||
+ strlcat(fname,PATH_SEPARATOR"hostname",sizeof(fname))
+ >= sizeof(fname)) {
+ log_warn(LD_CONFIG, "Directory name too long to store hostname file:"
+ " \"%s\".", s->directory);
+ return -1;
+ }
+
+ tor_snprintf(buf, sizeof(buf),"%s.onion\n", s->service_id);
+ if (write_str_to_file(fname,buf,0)<0) {
+ log_warn(LD_CONFIG, "Could not write onion address to hostname file.");
+ memset(buf, 0, sizeof(buf));
+ return -1;
+ }
+ memset(buf, 0, sizeof(buf));
+
+ /* If client authorization is configured, load or generate keys. */
+ if (s->auth_type != REND_NO_AUTH) {
+ if (rend_service_load_auth_keys(s, fname) < 0)
+ return -1;
+ }
+
+ return 0;
+}
+
+/** Load and/or generate client authorization keys for the hidden service
+ * s, which stores its hostname in hfname. Return 0 on success,
+ * -1 on failure. */
+static int
+rend_service_load_auth_keys(rend_service_t *s, const char *hfname)
+{
+ int r = 0;
+ char cfname[512];
+ char *client_keys_str = NULL;
+ strmap_t *parsed_clients = strmap_new();
+ FILE *cfile, *hfile;
+ open_file_t *open_cfile = NULL, *open_hfile = NULL;
+ char extended_desc_cookie[REND_DESC_COOKIE_LEN+1];
+ char desc_cook_out[3*REND_DESC_COOKIE_LEN_BASE64+1];
+ char service_id[16+1];
+ char buf[1500];
+
+ /* Load client keys and descriptor cookies, if available. */
+ if (tor_snprintf(cfname, sizeof(cfname), "%s"PATH_SEPARATOR"client_keys",
+ s->directory)<0) {
+ log_warn(LD_CONFIG, "Directory name too long to store client keys "
+ "file: \"%s\".", s->directory);
+ goto err;
+ }
+ client_keys_str = read_file_to_str(cfname, RFTS_IGNORE_MISSING, NULL);
+ if (client_keys_str) {
+ if (rend_parse_client_keys(parsed_clients, client_keys_str) < 0) {
+ log_warn(LD_CONFIG, "Previously stored client_keys file could not "
+ "be parsed.");
+ goto err;
+ } else {
+ log_info(LD_CONFIG, "Parsed %d previously stored client entries.",
+ strmap_size(parsed_clients));
+ tor_free(client_keys_str);
+ }
+ }
+
+ /* Prepare client_keys and hostname files. */
+ if (!(cfile = start_writing_to_stdio_file(cfname,
+ OPEN_FLAGS_REPLACE | O_TEXT,
+ 0600, &open_cfile))) {
+ log_warn(LD_CONFIG, "Could not open client_keys file %s",
+ escaped(cfname));
+ goto err;
+ }
+
+ if (!(hfile = start_writing_to_stdio_file(hfname,
+ OPEN_FLAGS_REPLACE | O_TEXT,
+ 0600, &open_hfile))) {
+ log_warn(LD_CONFIG, "Could not open hostname file %s", escaped(hfname));
+ goto err;
+ }
+
+ /* Either use loaded keys for configured clients or generate new
+ * ones if a client is new. */
+ SMARTLIST_FOREACH_BEGIN(s->clients, rend_authorized_client_t *, client) {
+ rend_authorized_client_t *parsed =
+ strmap_get(parsed_clients, client->client_name);
+ int written;
+ size_t len;
+ /* Copy descriptor cookie from parsed entry or create new one. */
+ if (parsed) {
+ memcpy(client->descriptor_cookie, parsed->descriptor_cookie,
+ REND_DESC_COOKIE_LEN);
+ } else {
+ crypto_rand(client->descriptor_cookie, REND_DESC_COOKIE_LEN);
+ }
+ if (base64_encode(desc_cook_out, 3*REND_DESC_COOKIE_LEN_BASE64+1,
+ client->descriptor_cookie,
+ REND_DESC_COOKIE_LEN) < 0) {
+ log_warn(LD_BUG, "Could not base64-encode descriptor cookie.");
+ goto err;
+ }
+ /* Copy client key from parsed entry or create new one if required. */
+ if (parsed && parsed->client_key) {
+ client->client_key = crypto_pk_dup_key(parsed->client_key);
+ } else if (s->auth_type == REND_STEALTH_AUTH) {
+ /* Create private key for client. */
+ crypto_pk_t *prkey = NULL;
+ if (!(prkey = crypto_pk_new())) {
+ log_warn(LD_BUG,"Error constructing client key");
+ goto err;
+ }
+ if (crypto_pk_generate_key(prkey)) {
+ log_warn(LD_BUG,"Error generating client key");
+ crypto_pk_free(prkey);
+ goto err;
+ }
+ if (crypto_pk_check_key(prkey) <= 0) {
+ log_warn(LD_BUG,"Generated client key seems invalid");
+ crypto_pk_free(prkey);
+ goto err;
+ }
+ client->client_key = prkey;
+ }
+ /* Add entry to client_keys file. */
+ desc_cook_out[strlen(desc_cook_out)-1] = '\0'; /* Remove newline. */
+ written = tor_snprintf(buf, sizeof(buf),
+ "client-name %s\ndescriptor-cookie %s\n",
+ client->client_name, desc_cook_out);
+ if (written < 0) {
+ log_warn(LD_BUG, "Could not write client entry.");
+ goto err;
+ }
+ if (client->client_key) {
+ char *client_key_out = NULL;
+ if (crypto_pk_write_private_key_to_string(client->client_key,
+ &client_key_out, &len) != 0) {
+ log_warn(LD_BUG, "Internal error: "
+ "crypto_pk_write_private_key_to_string() failed.");
+ goto err;
+ }
+ if (rend_get_service_id(client->client_key, service_id)<0) {
+ log_warn(LD_BUG, "Internal error: couldn't encode service ID.");
+ /*
+ * len is string length, not buffer length, but last byte is NUL
+ * anyway.
+ */
+ memset(client_key_out, 0, len);
+ tor_free(client_key_out);
+ goto err;
+ }
+ written = tor_snprintf(buf + written, sizeof(buf) - written,
+ "client-key\n%s", client_key_out);
+ memset(client_key_out, 0, len);
+ tor_free(client_key_out);
+ if (written < 0) {
+ log_warn(LD_BUG, "Could not write client entry.");
+ goto err;
+ }
+ }
+
+ if (fputs(buf, cfile) < 0) {
+ log_warn(LD_FS, "Could not append client entry to file: %s",
+ strerror(errno));
+ goto err;
+ }
+
+ /* Add line to hostname file. */
+ if (s->auth_type == REND_BASIC_AUTH) {
+ /* Remove == signs (newline has been removed above). */
+ desc_cook_out[strlen(desc_cook_out)-2] = '\0';
+ tor_snprintf(buf, sizeof(buf),"%s.onion %s # client: %s\n",
+ s->service_id, desc_cook_out, client->client_name);
+ } else {
+ memcpy(extended_desc_cookie, client->descriptor_cookie,
+ REND_DESC_COOKIE_LEN);
+ extended_desc_cookie[REND_DESC_COOKIE_LEN] =
+ ((int)s->auth_type - 1) << 4;
+ if (base64_encode(desc_cook_out, 3*REND_DESC_COOKIE_LEN_BASE64+1,
+ extended_desc_cookie,
+ REND_DESC_COOKIE_LEN+1) < 0) {
+ log_warn(LD_BUG, "Could not base64-encode descriptor cookie.");
+ goto err;
+ }
+ desc_cook_out[strlen(desc_cook_out)-3] = '\0'; /* Remove A= and
+ newline. */
+ tor_snprintf(buf, sizeof(buf),"%s.onion %s # client: %s\n",
+ service_id, desc_cook_out, client->client_name);
+ }
+
+ if (fputs(buf, hfile)<0) {
+ log_warn(LD_FS, "Could not append host entry to file: %s",
+ strerror(errno));
+ goto err;
+ }
+ } SMARTLIST_FOREACH_END(client);
+
+ finish_writing_to_file(open_cfile);
+ finish_writing_to_file(open_hfile);
+
+ goto done;
+ err:
+ r = -1;
+ if (open_cfile)
+ abort_writing_to_file(open_cfile);
+ if (open_hfile)
+ abort_writing_to_file(open_hfile);
+ done:
+ tor_strclear(client_keys_str);
+ tor_free(client_keys_str);
+ strmap_free(parsed_clients, rend_authorized_client_strmap_item_free);
+
+ memset(cfname, 0, sizeof(cfname));
+
+ /* Clear stack buffers that held key-derived material. */
+ memset(buf, 0, sizeof(buf));
+ memset(desc_cook_out, 0, sizeof(desc_cook_out));
+ memset(service_id, 0, sizeof(service_id));
+ memset(extended_desc_cookie, 0, sizeof(extended_desc_cookie));
+
return r;
}
@@ -1038,6 +1086,7 @@ int
rend_service_introduce(origin_circuit_t *circuit, const uint8_t *request,
size_t request_len)
{
+ int status = 0;
char *ptr, *r_cookie;
extend_info_t *extend_info = NULL;
char buf[RELAY_PAYLOAD_SIZE];
@@ -1068,7 +1117,7 @@ rend_service_introduce(origin_circuit_t *circuit, const uint8_t *request,
log_warn(LD_PROTOCOL,
"Got an INTRODUCE2 over a non-introduction circuit %d.",
circuit->_base.n_circ_id);
- return -1;
+ goto err;
}
#ifndef NON_ANONYMOUS_MODE_ENABLED
@@ -1086,7 +1135,7 @@ rend_service_introduce(origin_circuit_t *circuit, const uint8_t *request,
DH_KEY_LEN+42) {
log_warn(LD_PROTOCOL, "Got a truncated INTRODUCE2 cell on circ %d.",
circuit->_base.n_circ_id);
- return -1;
+ goto err;
}
/* look up service depending on circuit. */
@@ -1096,7 +1145,7 @@ rend_service_introduce(origin_circuit_t *circuit, const uint8_t *request,
log_warn(LD_BUG, "Internal error: Got an INTRODUCE2 cell on an intro "
"circ for an unrecognized service %s.",
escaped(serviceid));
- return -1;
+ goto err;
}
/* use intro key instead of service key. */
@@ -1109,14 +1158,14 @@ rend_service_introduce(origin_circuit_t *circuit, const uint8_t *request,
(char*)request, REND_SERVICE_ID_LEN);
log_warn(LD_REND, "Got an INTRODUCE2 cell for the wrong service (%s).",
escaped(serviceid));
- return -1;
+ goto err;
}
keylen = crypto_pk_keysize(intro_key);
if (request_len < keylen+DIGEST_LEN) {
log_warn(LD_PROTOCOL,
"PK-encrypted portion of INTRODUCE2 cell was truncated.");
- return -1;
+ goto err;
}
intro_point = find_intro_point(circuit);
@@ -1124,7 +1173,7 @@ rend_service_introduce(origin_circuit_t *circuit, const uint8_t *request,
log_warn(LD_BUG, "Internal error: Got an INTRODUCE2 cell on an intro circ "
"(for service %s) with no corresponding rend_intro_point_t.",
escaped(serviceid));
- return -1;
+ goto err;
}
if (!service->accepted_intro_dh_parts)
@@ -1143,7 +1192,7 @@ rend_service_introduce(origin_circuit_t *circuit, const uint8_t *request,
log_warn(LD_REND, "Possible replay detected! We received an "
"INTRODUCE2 cell with same PK-encrypted part %d seconds ago. "
"Dropping cell.", (int)(now-*access_time));
- return -1;
+ goto err;
}
access_time = tor_malloc(sizeof(time_t));
*access_time = now;
@@ -1159,7 +1208,7 @@ rend_service_introduce(origin_circuit_t *circuit, const uint8_t *request,
PK_PKCS1_OAEP_PADDING,1);
if (r<0) {
log_warn(LD_PROTOCOL, "Couldn't decrypt INTRODUCE2 cell.");
- return -1;
+ goto err;
}
len = r;
if (*buf == 3) {
@@ -1174,7 +1223,7 @@ rend_service_introduce(origin_circuit_t *circuit, const uint8_t *request,
if (auth_len != REND_DESC_COOKIE_LEN) {
log_info(LD_REND, "Wrong auth data size %d, should be %d.",
(int)auth_len, REND_DESC_COOKIE_LEN);
- return -1;
+ goto err;
}
memcpy(auth_data, buf+4, sizeof(auth_data));
v3_shift += 2+REND_DESC_COOKIE_LEN;
@@ -1235,12 +1284,12 @@ rend_service_introduce(origin_circuit_t *circuit, const uint8_t *request,
if (!ptr || ptr == rp_nickname) {
log_warn(LD_PROTOCOL,
"Couldn't find a nul-padded nickname in INTRODUCE2 cell.");
- return -1;
+ goto err;
}
if ((version == 0 && !is_legal_nickname(rp_nickname)) ||
(version == 1 && !is_legal_nickname_or_hexdigest(rp_nickname))) {
log_warn(LD_PROTOCOL, "Bad nickname in INTRODUCE2 cell.");
- return -1;
+ goto err;
}
/* Okay, now we know that a nickname is at the start of the buffer. */
ptr = rp_nickname+nickname_field_len;
@@ -1404,15 +1453,24 @@ rend_service_introduce(origin_circuit_t *circuit, const uint8_t *request,
memcpy(cpath->handshake_digest, keys, DIGEST_LEN);
if (extend_info) extend_info_free(extend_info);
- memset(keys, 0, sizeof(keys));
- return 0;
+ goto done;
+
err:
- memset(keys, 0, sizeof(keys));
+ status = -1;
if (dh) crypto_dh_free(dh);
if (launched)
circuit_mark_for_close(TO_CIRCUIT(launched), reason);
if (extend_info) extend_info_free(extend_info);
- return -1;
+ done:
+ memset(keys, 0, sizeof(keys));
+ memset(buf, 0, sizeof(buf));
+ memset(serviceid, 0, sizeof(serviceid));
+ memset(hexcookie, 0, sizeof(hexcookie));
+ memset(intro_key_digest, 0, sizeof(intro_key_digest));
+ memset(auth_data, 0, sizeof(auth_data));
+ memset(diffie_hellman_hash, 0, sizeof(diffie_hellman_hash));
+
+ return status;
}
/** Called when we fail building a rendezvous circuit at some point other
@@ -1600,8 +1658,8 @@ rend_service_intro_has_opened(origin_circuit_t *circuit)
this case, we might as well close the thing. */
log_info(LD_CIRC|LD_REND, "We have just finished an introduction "
"circuit, but we already have enough. Closing it.");
- circuit_mark_for_close(TO_CIRCUIT(circuit), END_CIRC_REASON_NONE);
- return;
+ reason = END_CIRC_REASON_NONE;
+ goto err;
} else {
tor_assert(circuit->build_state->is_internal);
log_info(LD_CIRC|LD_REND, "We have just finished an introduction "
@@ -1622,7 +1680,7 @@ rend_service_intro_has_opened(origin_circuit_t *circuit)
}
circuit_has_opened(circuit);
- return;
+ goto done;
}
}
@@ -1668,9 +1726,16 @@ rend_service_intro_has_opened(origin_circuit_t *circuit)
goto err;
}
- return;
+ goto done;
+
err:
circuit_mark_for_close(TO_CIRCUIT(circuit), reason);
+ done:
+ memset(buf, 0, sizeof(buf));
+ memset(auth, 0, sizeof(auth));
+ memset(serviceid, 0, sizeof(serviceid));
+
+ return;
}
/** Called when we get an INTRO_ESTABLISHED cell; mark the circuit as a
@@ -1813,9 +1878,16 @@ rend_service_rendezvous_has_opened(origin_circuit_t *circuit)
/* Change the circuit purpose. */
circuit_change_purpose(TO_CIRCUIT(circuit), CIRCUIT_PURPOSE_S_REND_JOINED);
- return;
+ goto done;
+
err:
circuit_mark_for_close(TO_CIRCUIT(circuit), reason);
+ done:
+ memset(buf, 0, sizeof(buf));
+ memset(serviceid, 0, sizeof(serviceid));
+ memset(hexcookie, 0, sizeof(hexcookie));
+
+ return;
}
/*
diff --git a/src/or/rendservice.h b/src/or/rendservice.h
index e5848785a8..baf8d5fb43 100644
--- a/src/or/rendservice.h
+++ b/src/or/rendservice.h
@@ -14,7 +14,7 @@
int num_rend_services(void);
int rend_config_services(const or_options_t *options, int validate_only);
-int rend_service_load_keys(void);
+int rend_service_load_all_keys(void);
void rend_services_introduce(void);
void rend_consider_services_upload(time_t now);
void rend_hsdir_routers_changed(void);