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https://gitlab.torproject.org/tpo/core/tor.git
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Merge remote-tracking branch 'public/bug2385'
This commit is contained in:
commit
888d5d08fe
9
changes/bug2385
Normal file
9
changes/bug2385
Normal file
@ -0,0 +1,9 @@
|
||||
o Minor features (security):
|
||||
- Clear keys and key-derived material left on the stack in
|
||||
rendservice.c and rendclient.c. This should make us more
|
||||
forward-secure against cold-boot attacks and the like. Fix for
|
||||
bug 2385.
|
||||
|
||||
- Check return value of crypto_pk_write_private_key_to_string() in
|
||||
end_service_load_keys(). This should make us more forward-secure
|
||||
against cold-boot attacks and the like. Fix for bug 2385.
|
@ -655,6 +655,16 @@ fast_memcmpstart(const void *mem, size_t memlen,
|
||||
return fast_memcmp(mem, prefix, plen);
|
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}
|
||||
|
||||
/** Given a nul-terminated string s, set every character before the nul
|
||||
* to zero. */
|
||||
void
|
||||
tor_strclear(char *s)
|
||||
{
|
||||
while (*s) {
|
||||
*s++ = '\0';
|
||||
}
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
/** Return a pointer to the first char of s that is not whitespace and
|
||||
* not a comment, or to the terminating NUL if no such character exists.
|
||||
*/
|
||||
|
@ -188,6 +188,7 @@ int strcasecmpstart(const char *s1, const char *s2) ATTR_NONNULL((1,2));
|
||||
int strcmpend(const char *s1, const char *s2) ATTR_NONNULL((1,2));
|
||||
int strcasecmpend(const char *s1, const char *s2) ATTR_NONNULL((1,2));
|
||||
int fast_memcmpstart(const void *mem, size_t memlen, const char *prefix);
|
||||
void tor_strclear(char *s);
|
||||
|
||||
void tor_strstrip(char *s, const char *strip) ATTR_NONNULL((1,2));
|
||||
long tor_parse_long(const char *s, int base, long min,
|
||||
|
@ -1548,7 +1548,7 @@ options_act(const or_options_t *old_options)
|
||||
monitor_owning_controller_process(options->OwningControllerProcess);
|
||||
|
||||
/* reload keys as needed for rendezvous services. */
|
||||
if (rend_service_load_keys()<0) {
|
||||
if (rend_service_load_all_keys()<0) {
|
||||
log_warn(LD_GENERAL,"Error loading rendezvous service keys");
|
||||
return -1;
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
@ -132,6 +132,7 @@ rend_client_send_introduction(origin_circuit_t *introcirc,
|
||||
crypt_path_t *cpath;
|
||||
off_t dh_offset;
|
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crypto_pk_t *intro_key = NULL;
|
||||
int status = 0;
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|
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tor_assert(introcirc->_base.purpose == CIRCUIT_PURPOSE_C_INTRODUCING);
|
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tor_assert(rendcirc->_base.purpose == CIRCUIT_PURPOSE_C_REND_READY);
|
||||
@ -161,7 +162,8 @@ rend_client_send_introduction(origin_circuit_t *introcirc,
|
||||
}
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
return -1;
|
||||
status = -1;
|
||||
goto cleanup;
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
/* first 20 bytes of payload are the hash of Bob's pk */
|
||||
@ -184,13 +186,16 @@ rend_client_send_introduction(origin_circuit_t *introcirc,
|
||||
smartlist_len(entry->parsed->intro_nodes));
|
||||
|
||||
if (rend_client_reextend_intro_circuit(introcirc)) {
|
||||
status = -2;
|
||||
goto perm_err;
|
||||
} else {
|
||||
return -1;
|
||||
status = -1;
|
||||
goto cleanup;
|
||||
}
|
||||
}
|
||||
if (crypto_pk_get_digest(intro_key, payload)<0) {
|
||||
log_warn(LD_BUG, "Internal error: couldn't hash public key.");
|
||||
status = -2;
|
||||
goto perm_err;
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
@ -202,10 +207,12 @@ rend_client_send_introduction(origin_circuit_t *introcirc,
|
||||
cpath->magic = CRYPT_PATH_MAGIC;
|
||||
if (!(cpath->dh_handshake_state = crypto_dh_new(DH_TYPE_REND))) {
|
||||
log_warn(LD_BUG, "Internal error: couldn't allocate DH.");
|
||||
status = -2;
|
||||
goto perm_err;
|
||||
}
|
||||
if (crypto_dh_generate_public(cpath->dh_handshake_state)<0) {
|
||||
log_warn(LD_BUG, "Internal error: couldn't generate g^x.");
|
||||
status = -2;
|
||||
goto perm_err;
|
||||
}
|
||||
}
|
||||
@ -256,6 +263,7 @@ rend_client_send_introduction(origin_circuit_t *introcirc,
|
||||
if (crypto_dh_get_public(cpath->dh_handshake_state, tmp+dh_offset,
|
||||
DH_KEY_LEN)<0) {
|
||||
log_warn(LD_BUG, "Internal error: couldn't extract g^x.");
|
||||
status = -2;
|
||||
goto perm_err;
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
@ -269,6 +277,7 @@ rend_client_send_introduction(origin_circuit_t *introcirc,
|
||||
PK_PKCS1_OAEP_PADDING, 0);
|
||||
if (r<0) {
|
||||
log_warn(LD_BUG,"Internal error: hybrid pk encrypt failed.");
|
||||
status = -2;
|
||||
goto perm_err;
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
@ -288,7 +297,8 @@ rend_client_send_introduction(origin_circuit_t *introcirc,
|
||||
introcirc->cpath->prev)<0) {
|
||||
/* introcirc is already marked for close. leave rendcirc alone. */
|
||||
log_warn(LD_BUG, "Couldn't send INTRODUCE1 cell");
|
||||
return -2;
|
||||
status = -2;
|
||||
goto cleanup;
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
/* Now, we wait for an ACK or NAK on this circuit. */
|
||||
@ -299,12 +309,17 @@ rend_client_send_introduction(origin_circuit_t *introcirc,
|
||||
* state. */
|
||||
introcirc->_base.timestamp_dirty = time(NULL);
|
||||
|
||||
return 0;
|
||||
goto cleanup;
|
||||
|
||||
perm_err:
|
||||
if (!introcirc->_base.marked_for_close)
|
||||
circuit_mark_for_close(TO_CIRCUIT(introcirc), END_CIRC_REASON_INTERNAL);
|
||||
circuit_mark_for_close(TO_CIRCUIT(rendcirc), END_CIRC_REASON_INTERNAL);
|
||||
return -2;
|
||||
cleanup:
|
||||
memset(payload, 0, sizeof(payload));
|
||||
memset(tmp, 0, sizeof(tmp));
|
||||
|
||||
return status;
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
/** Called when a rendezvous circuit is open; sends a establish
|
||||
@ -659,10 +674,17 @@ rend_client_refetch_v2_renddesc(const rend_data_t *rend_query)
|
||||
time(NULL), chosen_replica) < 0) {
|
||||
log_warn(LD_REND, "Internal error: Computing v2 rendezvous "
|
||||
"descriptor ID did not succeed.");
|
||||
return;
|
||||
/*
|
||||
* Hmm, can this write anything to descriptor_id and still fail?
|
||||
* Let's clear it just to be safe.
|
||||
*
|
||||
* From here on, any returns should goto done which clears
|
||||
* descriptor_id so we don't leave key-derived material on the stack.
|
||||
*/
|
||||
goto done;
|
||||
}
|
||||
if (directory_get_from_hs_dir(descriptor_id, rend_query) != 0)
|
||||
return; /* either success or failure, but we're done */
|
||||
goto done; /* either success or failure, but we're done */
|
||||
}
|
||||
/* If we come here, there are no hidden service directories left. */
|
||||
log_info(LD_REND, "Could not pick one of the responsible hidden "
|
||||
@ -670,6 +692,10 @@ rend_client_refetch_v2_renddesc(const rend_data_t *rend_query)
|
||||
"we already tried them all unsuccessfully.");
|
||||
/* Close pending connections. */
|
||||
rend_client_desc_trynow(rend_query->onion_address);
|
||||
|
||||
done:
|
||||
memset(descriptor_id, 0, sizeof(descriptor_id));
|
||||
|
||||
return;
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
@ -1172,11 +1198,11 @@ rend_parse_service_authorization(const or_options_t *options,
|
||||
strmap_t *parsed = strmap_new();
|
||||
smartlist_t *sl = smartlist_new();
|
||||
rend_service_authorization_t *auth = NULL;
|
||||
char descriptor_cookie_tmp[REND_DESC_COOKIE_LEN+2];
|
||||
char descriptor_cookie_base64ext[REND_DESC_COOKIE_LEN_BASE64+2+1];
|
||||
|
||||
for (line = options->HidServAuth; line; line = line->next) {
|
||||
char *onion_address, *descriptor_cookie;
|
||||
char descriptor_cookie_tmp[REND_DESC_COOKIE_LEN+2];
|
||||
char descriptor_cookie_base64ext[REND_DESC_COOKIE_LEN_BASE64+2+1];
|
||||
int auth_type_val = 0;
|
||||
auth = NULL;
|
||||
SMARTLIST_FOREACH(sl, char *, c, tor_free(c););
|
||||
@ -1253,6 +1279,8 @@ rend_parse_service_authorization(const or_options_t *options,
|
||||
} else {
|
||||
strmap_free(parsed, rend_service_authorization_strmap_item_free);
|
||||
}
|
||||
memset(descriptor_cookie_tmp, 0, sizeof(descriptor_cookie_tmp));
|
||||
memset(descriptor_cookie_base64ext, 0, sizeof(descriptor_cookie_base64ext));
|
||||
return res;
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
|
@ -31,6 +31,10 @@ static rend_intro_point_t *find_intro_point(origin_circuit_t *circ);
|
||||
static int intro_point_accepted_intro_count(rend_intro_point_t *intro);
|
||||
static int intro_point_should_expire_now(rend_intro_point_t *intro,
|
||||
time_t now);
|
||||
struct rend_service_t;
|
||||
static int rend_service_load_keys(struct rend_service_t *s);
|
||||
static int rend_service_load_auth_keys(struct rend_service_t *s,
|
||||
const char *hfname);
|
||||
|
||||
/** Represents the mapping from a virtual port of a rendezvous service to
|
||||
* a real port on some IP.
|
||||
@ -135,7 +139,9 @@ rend_authorized_client_free(rend_authorized_client_t *client)
|
||||
return;
|
||||
if (client->client_key)
|
||||
crypto_pk_free(client->client_key);
|
||||
tor_strclear(client->client_name);
|
||||
tor_free(client->client_name);
|
||||
memset(client->descriptor_cookie, 0, sizeof(client->descriptor_cookie));
|
||||
tor_free(client);
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
@ -609,231 +615,273 @@ rend_service_update_descriptor(rend_service_t *service)
|
||||
|
||||
/** Load and/or generate private keys for all hidden services, possibly
|
||||
* including keys for client authorization. Return 0 on success, -1 on
|
||||
* failure.
|
||||
*/
|
||||
* failure. */
|
||||
int
|
||||
rend_service_load_keys(void)
|
||||
rend_service_load_all_keys(void)
|
||||
{
|
||||
int r = 0;
|
||||
char fname[512];
|
||||
char buf[1500];
|
||||
|
||||
SMARTLIST_FOREACH_BEGIN(rend_service_list, rend_service_t *, s) {
|
||||
if (s->private_key)
|
||||
continue;
|
||||
log_info(LD_REND, "Loading hidden-service keys from \"%s\"",
|
||||
s->directory);
|
||||
|
||||
/* Check/create directory */
|
||||
if (check_private_dir(s->directory, CPD_CREATE, get_options()->User) < 0)
|
||||
if (rend_service_load_keys(s) < 0)
|
||||
return -1;
|
||||
|
||||
/* Load key */
|
||||
if (strlcpy(fname,s->directory,sizeof(fname)) >= sizeof(fname) ||
|
||||
strlcat(fname,PATH_SEPARATOR"private_key",sizeof(fname))
|
||||
>= sizeof(fname)) {
|
||||
log_warn(LD_CONFIG, "Directory name too long to store key file: \"%s\".",
|
||||
s->directory);
|
||||
return -1;
|
||||
}
|
||||
s->private_key = init_key_from_file(fname, 1, LOG_ERR);
|
||||
if (!s->private_key)
|
||||
return -1;
|
||||
|
||||
/* Create service file */
|
||||
if (rend_get_service_id(s->private_key, s->service_id)<0) {
|
||||
log_warn(LD_BUG, "Internal error: couldn't encode service ID.");
|
||||
return -1;
|
||||
}
|
||||
if (crypto_pk_get_digest(s->private_key, s->pk_digest)<0) {
|
||||
log_warn(LD_BUG, "Couldn't compute hash of public key.");
|
||||
return -1;
|
||||
}
|
||||
if (strlcpy(fname,s->directory,sizeof(fname)) >= sizeof(fname) ||
|
||||
strlcat(fname,PATH_SEPARATOR"hostname",sizeof(fname))
|
||||
>= sizeof(fname)) {
|
||||
log_warn(LD_CONFIG, "Directory name too long to store hostname file:"
|
||||
" \"%s\".", s->directory);
|
||||
return -1;
|
||||
}
|
||||
tor_snprintf(buf, sizeof(buf),"%s.onion\n", s->service_id);
|
||||
if (write_str_to_file(fname,buf,0)<0) {
|
||||
log_warn(LD_CONFIG, "Could not write onion address to hostname file.");
|
||||
return -1;
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
/* If client authorization is configured, load or generate keys. */
|
||||
if (s->auth_type != REND_NO_AUTH) {
|
||||
char *client_keys_str = NULL;
|
||||
strmap_t *parsed_clients = strmap_new();
|
||||
char cfname[512];
|
||||
FILE *cfile, *hfile;
|
||||
open_file_t *open_cfile = NULL, *open_hfile = NULL;
|
||||
|
||||
/* Load client keys and descriptor cookies, if available. */
|
||||
if (tor_snprintf(cfname, sizeof(cfname), "%s"PATH_SEPARATOR"client_keys",
|
||||
s->directory)<0) {
|
||||
log_warn(LD_CONFIG, "Directory name too long to store client keys "
|
||||
"file: \"%s\".", s->directory);
|
||||
goto err;
|
||||
}
|
||||
client_keys_str = read_file_to_str(cfname, RFTS_IGNORE_MISSING, NULL);
|
||||
if (client_keys_str) {
|
||||
if (rend_parse_client_keys(parsed_clients, client_keys_str) < 0) {
|
||||
log_warn(LD_CONFIG, "Previously stored client_keys file could not "
|
||||
"be parsed.");
|
||||
goto err;
|
||||
} else {
|
||||
log_info(LD_CONFIG, "Parsed %d previously stored client entries.",
|
||||
strmap_size(parsed_clients));
|
||||
tor_free(client_keys_str);
|
||||
}
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
/* Prepare client_keys and hostname files. */
|
||||
if (!(cfile = start_writing_to_stdio_file(cfname,
|
||||
OPEN_FLAGS_REPLACE | O_TEXT,
|
||||
0600, &open_cfile))) {
|
||||
log_warn(LD_CONFIG, "Could not open client_keys file %s",
|
||||
escaped(cfname));
|
||||
goto err;
|
||||
}
|
||||
if (!(hfile = start_writing_to_stdio_file(fname,
|
||||
OPEN_FLAGS_REPLACE | O_TEXT,
|
||||
0600, &open_hfile))) {
|
||||
log_warn(LD_CONFIG, "Could not open hostname file %s", escaped(fname));
|
||||
goto err;
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
/* Either use loaded keys for configured clients or generate new
|
||||
* ones if a client is new. */
|
||||
SMARTLIST_FOREACH_BEGIN(s->clients, rend_authorized_client_t *, client)
|
||||
{
|
||||
char desc_cook_out[3*REND_DESC_COOKIE_LEN_BASE64+1];
|
||||
char service_id[16+1];
|
||||
rend_authorized_client_t *parsed =
|
||||
strmap_get(parsed_clients, client->client_name);
|
||||
int written;
|
||||
size_t len;
|
||||
/* Copy descriptor cookie from parsed entry or create new one. */
|
||||
if (parsed) {
|
||||
memcpy(client->descriptor_cookie, parsed->descriptor_cookie,
|
||||
REND_DESC_COOKIE_LEN);
|
||||
} else {
|
||||
crypto_rand(client->descriptor_cookie, REND_DESC_COOKIE_LEN);
|
||||
}
|
||||
if (base64_encode(desc_cook_out, 3*REND_DESC_COOKIE_LEN_BASE64+1,
|
||||
client->descriptor_cookie,
|
||||
REND_DESC_COOKIE_LEN) < 0) {
|
||||
log_warn(LD_BUG, "Could not base64-encode descriptor cookie.");
|
||||
strmap_free(parsed_clients, rend_authorized_client_strmap_item_free);
|
||||
return -1;
|
||||
}
|
||||
/* Copy client key from parsed entry or create new one if required. */
|
||||
if (parsed && parsed->client_key) {
|
||||
client->client_key = crypto_pk_dup_key(parsed->client_key);
|
||||
} else if (s->auth_type == REND_STEALTH_AUTH) {
|
||||
/* Create private key for client. */
|
||||
crypto_pk_t *prkey = NULL;
|
||||
if (!(prkey = crypto_pk_new())) {
|
||||
log_warn(LD_BUG,"Error constructing client key");
|
||||
goto err;
|
||||
}
|
||||
if (crypto_pk_generate_key(prkey)) {
|
||||
log_warn(LD_BUG,"Error generating client key");
|
||||
crypto_pk_free(prkey);
|
||||
goto err;
|
||||
}
|
||||
if (crypto_pk_check_key(prkey) <= 0) {
|
||||
log_warn(LD_BUG,"Generated client key seems invalid");
|
||||
crypto_pk_free(prkey);
|
||||
goto err;
|
||||
}
|
||||
client->client_key = prkey;
|
||||
}
|
||||
/* Add entry to client_keys file. */
|
||||
desc_cook_out[strlen(desc_cook_out)-1] = '\0'; /* Remove newline. */
|
||||
written = tor_snprintf(buf, sizeof(buf),
|
||||
"client-name %s\ndescriptor-cookie %s\n",
|
||||
client->client_name, desc_cook_out);
|
||||
if (written < 0) {
|
||||
log_warn(LD_BUG, "Could not write client entry.");
|
||||
goto err;
|
||||
}
|
||||
if (client->client_key) {
|
||||
char *client_key_out = NULL;
|
||||
crypto_pk_write_private_key_to_string(client->client_key,
|
||||
&client_key_out, &len);
|
||||
if (rend_get_service_id(client->client_key, service_id)<0) {
|
||||
log_warn(LD_BUG, "Internal error: couldn't encode service ID.");
|
||||
tor_free(client_key_out);
|
||||
goto err;
|
||||
}
|
||||
written = tor_snprintf(buf + written, sizeof(buf) - written,
|
||||
"client-key\n%s", client_key_out);
|
||||
tor_free(client_key_out);
|
||||
if (written < 0) {
|
||||
log_warn(LD_BUG, "Could not write client entry.");
|
||||
goto err;
|
||||
}
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
if (fputs(buf, cfile) < 0) {
|
||||
log_warn(LD_FS, "Could not append client entry to file: %s",
|
||||
strerror(errno));
|
||||
goto err;
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
/* Add line to hostname file. */
|
||||
if (s->auth_type == REND_BASIC_AUTH) {
|
||||
/* Remove == signs (newline has been removed above). */
|
||||
desc_cook_out[strlen(desc_cook_out)-2] = '\0';
|
||||
tor_snprintf(buf, sizeof(buf),"%s.onion %s # client: %s\n",
|
||||
s->service_id, desc_cook_out, client->client_name);
|
||||
} else {
|
||||
char extended_desc_cookie[REND_DESC_COOKIE_LEN+1];
|
||||
memcpy(extended_desc_cookie, client->descriptor_cookie,
|
||||
REND_DESC_COOKIE_LEN);
|
||||
extended_desc_cookie[REND_DESC_COOKIE_LEN] =
|
||||
((int)s->auth_type - 1) << 4;
|
||||
if (base64_encode(desc_cook_out, 3*REND_DESC_COOKIE_LEN_BASE64+1,
|
||||
extended_desc_cookie,
|
||||
REND_DESC_COOKIE_LEN+1) < 0) {
|
||||
log_warn(LD_BUG, "Could not base64-encode descriptor cookie.");
|
||||
goto err;
|
||||
}
|
||||
desc_cook_out[strlen(desc_cook_out)-3] = '\0'; /* Remove A= and
|
||||
newline. */
|
||||
tor_snprintf(buf, sizeof(buf),"%s.onion %s # client: %s\n",
|
||||
service_id, desc_cook_out, client->client_name);
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
if (fputs(buf, hfile)<0) {
|
||||
log_warn(LD_FS, "Could not append host entry to file: %s",
|
||||
strerror(errno));
|
||||
goto err;
|
||||
}
|
||||
}
|
||||
SMARTLIST_FOREACH_END(client);
|
||||
|
||||
goto done;
|
||||
err:
|
||||
r = -1;
|
||||
done:
|
||||
tor_free(client_keys_str);
|
||||
strmap_free(parsed_clients, rend_authorized_client_strmap_item_free);
|
||||
if (r<0) {
|
||||
if (open_cfile)
|
||||
abort_writing_to_file(open_cfile);
|
||||
if (open_hfile)
|
||||
abort_writing_to_file(open_hfile);
|
||||
return r;
|
||||
} else {
|
||||
finish_writing_to_file(open_cfile);
|
||||
finish_writing_to_file(open_hfile);
|
||||
}
|
||||
}
|
||||
} SMARTLIST_FOREACH_END(s);
|
||||
|
||||
return 0;
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
/** Load and/or generate private keys for the hidden service <b>s</b>,
|
||||
* possibly including keys for client authorization. Return 0 on success, -1
|
||||
* on failure. */
|
||||
static int
|
||||
rend_service_load_keys(rend_service_t *s)
|
||||
{
|
||||
char fname[512];
|
||||
char buf[128];
|
||||
|
||||
/* Check/create directory */
|
||||
if (check_private_dir(s->directory, CPD_CREATE, get_options()->User) < 0)
|
||||
return -1;
|
||||
|
||||
/* Load key */
|
||||
if (strlcpy(fname,s->directory,sizeof(fname)) >= sizeof(fname) ||
|
||||
strlcat(fname,PATH_SEPARATOR"private_key",sizeof(fname))
|
||||
>= sizeof(fname)) {
|
||||
log_warn(LD_CONFIG, "Directory name too long to store key file: \"%s\".",
|
||||
s->directory);
|
||||
return -1;
|
||||
}
|
||||
s->private_key = init_key_from_file(fname, 1, LOG_ERR);
|
||||
if (!s->private_key)
|
||||
return -1;
|
||||
|
||||
/* Create service file */
|
||||
if (rend_get_service_id(s->private_key, s->service_id)<0) {
|
||||
log_warn(LD_BUG, "Internal error: couldn't encode service ID.");
|
||||
return -1;
|
||||
}
|
||||
if (crypto_pk_get_digest(s->private_key, s->pk_digest)<0) {
|
||||
log_warn(LD_BUG, "Couldn't compute hash of public key.");
|
||||
return -1;
|
||||
}
|
||||
if (strlcpy(fname,s->directory,sizeof(fname)) >= sizeof(fname) ||
|
||||
strlcat(fname,PATH_SEPARATOR"hostname",sizeof(fname))
|
||||
>= sizeof(fname)) {
|
||||
log_warn(LD_CONFIG, "Directory name too long to store hostname file:"
|
||||
" \"%s\".", s->directory);
|
||||
return -1;
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
tor_snprintf(buf, sizeof(buf),"%s.onion\n", s->service_id);
|
||||
if (write_str_to_file(fname,buf,0)<0) {
|
||||
log_warn(LD_CONFIG, "Could not write onion address to hostname file.");
|
||||
memset(buf, 0, sizeof(buf));
|
||||
return -1;
|
||||
}
|
||||
memset(buf, 0, sizeof(buf));
|
||||
|
||||
/* If client authorization is configured, load or generate keys. */
|
||||
if (s->auth_type != REND_NO_AUTH) {
|
||||
if (rend_service_load_auth_keys(s, fname) < 0)
|
||||
return -1;
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
return 0;
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
/** Load and/or generate client authorization keys for the hidden service
|
||||
* <b>s</b>, which stores its hostname in <b>hfname</b>. Return 0 on success,
|
||||
* -1 on failure. */
|
||||
static int
|
||||
rend_service_load_auth_keys(rend_service_t *s, const char *hfname)
|
||||
{
|
||||
int r = 0;
|
||||
char cfname[512];
|
||||
char *client_keys_str = NULL;
|
||||
strmap_t *parsed_clients = strmap_new();
|
||||
FILE *cfile, *hfile;
|
||||
open_file_t *open_cfile = NULL, *open_hfile = NULL;
|
||||
char extended_desc_cookie[REND_DESC_COOKIE_LEN+1];
|
||||
char desc_cook_out[3*REND_DESC_COOKIE_LEN_BASE64+1];
|
||||
char service_id[16+1];
|
||||
char buf[1500];
|
||||
|
||||
/* Load client keys and descriptor cookies, if available. */
|
||||
if (tor_snprintf(cfname, sizeof(cfname), "%s"PATH_SEPARATOR"client_keys",
|
||||
s->directory)<0) {
|
||||
log_warn(LD_CONFIG, "Directory name too long to store client keys "
|
||||
"file: \"%s\".", s->directory);
|
||||
goto err;
|
||||
}
|
||||
client_keys_str = read_file_to_str(cfname, RFTS_IGNORE_MISSING, NULL);
|
||||
if (client_keys_str) {
|
||||
if (rend_parse_client_keys(parsed_clients, client_keys_str) < 0) {
|
||||
log_warn(LD_CONFIG, "Previously stored client_keys file could not "
|
||||
"be parsed.");
|
||||
goto err;
|
||||
} else {
|
||||
log_info(LD_CONFIG, "Parsed %d previously stored client entries.",
|
||||
strmap_size(parsed_clients));
|
||||
tor_free(client_keys_str);
|
||||
}
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
/* Prepare client_keys and hostname files. */
|
||||
if (!(cfile = start_writing_to_stdio_file(cfname,
|
||||
OPEN_FLAGS_REPLACE | O_TEXT,
|
||||
0600, &open_cfile))) {
|
||||
log_warn(LD_CONFIG, "Could not open client_keys file %s",
|
||||
escaped(cfname));
|
||||
goto err;
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
if (!(hfile = start_writing_to_stdio_file(hfname,
|
||||
OPEN_FLAGS_REPLACE | O_TEXT,
|
||||
0600, &open_hfile))) {
|
||||
log_warn(LD_CONFIG, "Could not open hostname file %s", escaped(hfname));
|
||||
goto err;
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
/* Either use loaded keys for configured clients or generate new
|
||||
* ones if a client is new. */
|
||||
SMARTLIST_FOREACH_BEGIN(s->clients, rend_authorized_client_t *, client) {
|
||||
rend_authorized_client_t *parsed =
|
||||
strmap_get(parsed_clients, client->client_name);
|
||||
int written;
|
||||
size_t len;
|
||||
/* Copy descriptor cookie from parsed entry or create new one. */
|
||||
if (parsed) {
|
||||
memcpy(client->descriptor_cookie, parsed->descriptor_cookie,
|
||||
REND_DESC_COOKIE_LEN);
|
||||
} else {
|
||||
crypto_rand(client->descriptor_cookie, REND_DESC_COOKIE_LEN);
|
||||
}
|
||||
if (base64_encode(desc_cook_out, 3*REND_DESC_COOKIE_LEN_BASE64+1,
|
||||
client->descriptor_cookie,
|
||||
REND_DESC_COOKIE_LEN) < 0) {
|
||||
log_warn(LD_BUG, "Could not base64-encode descriptor cookie.");
|
||||
goto err;
|
||||
}
|
||||
/* Copy client key from parsed entry or create new one if required. */
|
||||
if (parsed && parsed->client_key) {
|
||||
client->client_key = crypto_pk_dup_key(parsed->client_key);
|
||||
} else if (s->auth_type == REND_STEALTH_AUTH) {
|
||||
/* Create private key for client. */
|
||||
crypto_pk_t *prkey = NULL;
|
||||
if (!(prkey = crypto_pk_new())) {
|
||||
log_warn(LD_BUG,"Error constructing client key");
|
||||
goto err;
|
||||
}
|
||||
if (crypto_pk_generate_key(prkey)) {
|
||||
log_warn(LD_BUG,"Error generating client key");
|
||||
crypto_pk_free(prkey);
|
||||
goto err;
|
||||
}
|
||||
if (crypto_pk_check_key(prkey) <= 0) {
|
||||
log_warn(LD_BUG,"Generated client key seems invalid");
|
||||
crypto_pk_free(prkey);
|
||||
goto err;
|
||||
}
|
||||
client->client_key = prkey;
|
||||
}
|
||||
/* Add entry to client_keys file. */
|
||||
desc_cook_out[strlen(desc_cook_out)-1] = '\0'; /* Remove newline. */
|
||||
written = tor_snprintf(buf, sizeof(buf),
|
||||
"client-name %s\ndescriptor-cookie %s\n",
|
||||
client->client_name, desc_cook_out);
|
||||
if (written < 0) {
|
||||
log_warn(LD_BUG, "Could not write client entry.");
|
||||
goto err;
|
||||
}
|
||||
if (client->client_key) {
|
||||
char *client_key_out = NULL;
|
||||
if (crypto_pk_write_private_key_to_string(client->client_key,
|
||||
&client_key_out, &len) != 0) {
|
||||
log_warn(LD_BUG, "Internal error: "
|
||||
"crypto_pk_write_private_key_to_string() failed.");
|
||||
goto err;
|
||||
}
|
||||
if (rend_get_service_id(client->client_key, service_id)<0) {
|
||||
log_warn(LD_BUG, "Internal error: couldn't encode service ID.");
|
||||
/*
|
||||
* len is string length, not buffer length, but last byte is NUL
|
||||
* anyway.
|
||||
*/
|
||||
memset(client_key_out, 0, len);
|
||||
tor_free(client_key_out);
|
||||
goto err;
|
||||
}
|
||||
written = tor_snprintf(buf + written, sizeof(buf) - written,
|
||||
"client-key\n%s", client_key_out);
|
||||
memset(client_key_out, 0, len);
|
||||
tor_free(client_key_out);
|
||||
if (written < 0) {
|
||||
log_warn(LD_BUG, "Could not write client entry.");
|
||||
goto err;
|
||||
}
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
if (fputs(buf, cfile) < 0) {
|
||||
log_warn(LD_FS, "Could not append client entry to file: %s",
|
||||
strerror(errno));
|
||||
goto err;
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
/* Add line to hostname file. */
|
||||
if (s->auth_type == REND_BASIC_AUTH) {
|
||||
/* Remove == signs (newline has been removed above). */
|
||||
desc_cook_out[strlen(desc_cook_out)-2] = '\0';
|
||||
tor_snprintf(buf, sizeof(buf),"%s.onion %s # client: %s\n",
|
||||
s->service_id, desc_cook_out, client->client_name);
|
||||
} else {
|
||||
memcpy(extended_desc_cookie, client->descriptor_cookie,
|
||||
REND_DESC_COOKIE_LEN);
|
||||
extended_desc_cookie[REND_DESC_COOKIE_LEN] =
|
||||
((int)s->auth_type - 1) << 4;
|
||||
if (base64_encode(desc_cook_out, 3*REND_DESC_COOKIE_LEN_BASE64+1,
|
||||
extended_desc_cookie,
|
||||
REND_DESC_COOKIE_LEN+1) < 0) {
|
||||
log_warn(LD_BUG, "Could not base64-encode descriptor cookie.");
|
||||
goto err;
|
||||
}
|
||||
desc_cook_out[strlen(desc_cook_out)-3] = '\0'; /* Remove A= and
|
||||
newline. */
|
||||
tor_snprintf(buf, sizeof(buf),"%s.onion %s # client: %s\n",
|
||||
service_id, desc_cook_out, client->client_name);
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
if (fputs(buf, hfile)<0) {
|
||||
log_warn(LD_FS, "Could not append host entry to file: %s",
|
||||
strerror(errno));
|
||||
goto err;
|
||||
}
|
||||
} SMARTLIST_FOREACH_END(client);
|
||||
|
||||
finish_writing_to_file(open_cfile);
|
||||
finish_writing_to_file(open_hfile);
|
||||
|
||||
goto done;
|
||||
err:
|
||||
r = -1;
|
||||
if (open_cfile)
|
||||
abort_writing_to_file(open_cfile);
|
||||
if (open_hfile)
|
||||
abort_writing_to_file(open_hfile);
|
||||
done:
|
||||
tor_strclear(client_keys_str);
|
||||
tor_free(client_keys_str);
|
||||
strmap_free(parsed_clients, rend_authorized_client_strmap_item_free);
|
||||
|
||||
memset(cfname, 0, sizeof(cfname));
|
||||
|
||||
/* Clear stack buffers that held key-derived material. */
|
||||
memset(buf, 0, sizeof(buf));
|
||||
memset(desc_cook_out, 0, sizeof(desc_cook_out));
|
||||
memset(service_id, 0, sizeof(service_id));
|
||||
memset(extended_desc_cookie, 0, sizeof(extended_desc_cookie));
|
||||
|
||||
return r;
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
@ -1038,6 +1086,7 @@ int
|
||||
rend_service_introduce(origin_circuit_t *circuit, const uint8_t *request,
|
||||
size_t request_len)
|
||||
{
|
||||
int status = 0;
|
||||
char *ptr, *r_cookie;
|
||||
extend_info_t *extend_info = NULL;
|
||||
char buf[RELAY_PAYLOAD_SIZE];
|
||||
@ -1068,7 +1117,7 @@ rend_service_introduce(origin_circuit_t *circuit, const uint8_t *request,
|
||||
log_warn(LD_PROTOCOL,
|
||||
"Got an INTRODUCE2 over a non-introduction circuit %d.",
|
||||
circuit->_base.n_circ_id);
|
||||
return -1;
|
||||
goto err;
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
#ifndef NON_ANONYMOUS_MODE_ENABLED
|
||||
@ -1086,7 +1135,7 @@ rend_service_introduce(origin_circuit_t *circuit, const uint8_t *request,
|
||||
DH_KEY_LEN+42) {
|
||||
log_warn(LD_PROTOCOL, "Got a truncated INTRODUCE2 cell on circ %d.",
|
||||
circuit->_base.n_circ_id);
|
||||
return -1;
|
||||
goto err;
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
/* look up service depending on circuit. */
|
||||
@ -1096,7 +1145,7 @@ rend_service_introduce(origin_circuit_t *circuit, const uint8_t *request,
|
||||
log_warn(LD_BUG, "Internal error: Got an INTRODUCE2 cell on an intro "
|
||||
"circ for an unrecognized service %s.",
|
||||
escaped(serviceid));
|
||||
return -1;
|
||||
goto err;
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
/* use intro key instead of service key. */
|
||||
@ -1109,14 +1158,14 @@ rend_service_introduce(origin_circuit_t *circuit, const uint8_t *request,
|
||||
(char*)request, REND_SERVICE_ID_LEN);
|
||||
log_warn(LD_REND, "Got an INTRODUCE2 cell for the wrong service (%s).",
|
||||
escaped(serviceid));
|
||||
return -1;
|
||||
goto err;
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
keylen = crypto_pk_keysize(intro_key);
|
||||
if (request_len < keylen+DIGEST_LEN) {
|
||||
log_warn(LD_PROTOCOL,
|
||||
"PK-encrypted portion of INTRODUCE2 cell was truncated.");
|
||||
return -1;
|
||||
goto err;
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
intro_point = find_intro_point(circuit);
|
||||
@ -1124,7 +1173,7 @@ rend_service_introduce(origin_circuit_t *circuit, const uint8_t *request,
|
||||
log_warn(LD_BUG, "Internal error: Got an INTRODUCE2 cell on an intro circ "
|
||||
"(for service %s) with no corresponding rend_intro_point_t.",
|
||||
escaped(serviceid));
|
||||
return -1;
|
||||
goto err;
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
if (!service->accepted_intro_dh_parts)
|
||||
@ -1143,7 +1192,7 @@ rend_service_introduce(origin_circuit_t *circuit, const uint8_t *request,
|
||||
log_warn(LD_REND, "Possible replay detected! We received an "
|
||||
"INTRODUCE2 cell with same PK-encrypted part %d seconds ago. "
|
||||
"Dropping cell.", (int)(now-*access_time));
|
||||
return -1;
|
||||
goto err;
|
||||
}
|
||||
access_time = tor_malloc(sizeof(time_t));
|
||||
*access_time = now;
|
||||
@ -1159,7 +1208,7 @@ rend_service_introduce(origin_circuit_t *circuit, const uint8_t *request,
|
||||
PK_PKCS1_OAEP_PADDING,1);
|
||||
if (r<0) {
|
||||
log_warn(LD_PROTOCOL, "Couldn't decrypt INTRODUCE2 cell.");
|
||||
return -1;
|
||||
goto err;
|
||||
}
|
||||
len = r;
|
||||
if (*buf == 3) {
|
||||
@ -1174,7 +1223,7 @@ rend_service_introduce(origin_circuit_t *circuit, const uint8_t *request,
|
||||
if (auth_len != REND_DESC_COOKIE_LEN) {
|
||||
log_info(LD_REND, "Wrong auth data size %d, should be %d.",
|
||||
(int)auth_len, REND_DESC_COOKIE_LEN);
|
||||
return -1;
|
||||
goto err;
|
||||
}
|
||||
memcpy(auth_data, buf+4, sizeof(auth_data));
|
||||
v3_shift += 2+REND_DESC_COOKIE_LEN;
|
||||
@ -1235,12 +1284,12 @@ rend_service_introduce(origin_circuit_t *circuit, const uint8_t *request,
|
||||
if (!ptr || ptr == rp_nickname) {
|
||||
log_warn(LD_PROTOCOL,
|
||||
"Couldn't find a nul-padded nickname in INTRODUCE2 cell.");
|
||||
return -1;
|
||||
goto err;
|
||||
}
|
||||
if ((version == 0 && !is_legal_nickname(rp_nickname)) ||
|
||||
(version == 1 && !is_legal_nickname_or_hexdigest(rp_nickname))) {
|
||||
log_warn(LD_PROTOCOL, "Bad nickname in INTRODUCE2 cell.");
|
||||
return -1;
|
||||
goto err;
|
||||
}
|
||||
/* Okay, now we know that a nickname is at the start of the buffer. */
|
||||
ptr = rp_nickname+nickname_field_len;
|
||||
@ -1404,15 +1453,24 @@ rend_service_introduce(origin_circuit_t *circuit, const uint8_t *request,
|
||||
memcpy(cpath->handshake_digest, keys, DIGEST_LEN);
|
||||
if (extend_info) extend_info_free(extend_info);
|
||||
|
||||
memset(keys, 0, sizeof(keys));
|
||||
return 0;
|
||||
goto done;
|
||||
|
||||
err:
|
||||
memset(keys, 0, sizeof(keys));
|
||||
status = -1;
|
||||
if (dh) crypto_dh_free(dh);
|
||||
if (launched)
|
||||
circuit_mark_for_close(TO_CIRCUIT(launched), reason);
|
||||
if (extend_info) extend_info_free(extend_info);
|
||||
return -1;
|
||||
done:
|
||||
memset(keys, 0, sizeof(keys));
|
||||
memset(buf, 0, sizeof(buf));
|
||||
memset(serviceid, 0, sizeof(serviceid));
|
||||
memset(hexcookie, 0, sizeof(hexcookie));
|
||||
memset(intro_key_digest, 0, sizeof(intro_key_digest));
|
||||
memset(auth_data, 0, sizeof(auth_data));
|
||||
memset(diffie_hellman_hash, 0, sizeof(diffie_hellman_hash));
|
||||
|
||||
return status;
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
/** Called when we fail building a rendezvous circuit at some point other
|
||||
@ -1600,8 +1658,8 @@ rend_service_intro_has_opened(origin_circuit_t *circuit)
|
||||
this case, we might as well close the thing. */
|
||||
log_info(LD_CIRC|LD_REND, "We have just finished an introduction "
|
||||
"circuit, but we already have enough. Closing it.");
|
||||
circuit_mark_for_close(TO_CIRCUIT(circuit), END_CIRC_REASON_NONE);
|
||||
return;
|
||||
reason = END_CIRC_REASON_NONE;
|
||||
goto err;
|
||||
} else {
|
||||
tor_assert(circuit->build_state->is_internal);
|
||||
log_info(LD_CIRC|LD_REND, "We have just finished an introduction "
|
||||
@ -1622,7 +1680,7 @@ rend_service_intro_has_opened(origin_circuit_t *circuit)
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
circuit_has_opened(circuit);
|
||||
return;
|
||||
goto done;
|
||||
}
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
@ -1668,9 +1726,16 @@ rend_service_intro_has_opened(origin_circuit_t *circuit)
|
||||
goto err;
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
return;
|
||||
goto done;
|
||||
|
||||
err:
|
||||
circuit_mark_for_close(TO_CIRCUIT(circuit), reason);
|
||||
done:
|
||||
memset(buf, 0, sizeof(buf));
|
||||
memset(auth, 0, sizeof(auth));
|
||||
memset(serviceid, 0, sizeof(serviceid));
|
||||
|
||||
return;
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
/** Called when we get an INTRO_ESTABLISHED cell; mark the circuit as a
|
||||
@ -1813,9 +1878,16 @@ rend_service_rendezvous_has_opened(origin_circuit_t *circuit)
|
||||
/* Change the circuit purpose. */
|
||||
circuit_change_purpose(TO_CIRCUIT(circuit), CIRCUIT_PURPOSE_S_REND_JOINED);
|
||||
|
||||
return;
|
||||
goto done;
|
||||
|
||||
err:
|
||||
circuit_mark_for_close(TO_CIRCUIT(circuit), reason);
|
||||
done:
|
||||
memset(buf, 0, sizeof(buf));
|
||||
memset(serviceid, 0, sizeof(serviceid));
|
||||
memset(hexcookie, 0, sizeof(hexcookie));
|
||||
|
||||
return;
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
/*
|
||||
|
@ -14,7 +14,7 @@
|
||||
|
||||
int num_rend_services(void);
|
||||
int rend_config_services(const or_options_t *options, int validate_only);
|
||||
int rend_service_load_keys(void);
|
||||
int rend_service_load_all_keys(void);
|
||||
void rend_services_introduce(void);
|
||||
void rend_consider_services_upload(time_t now);
|
||||
void rend_hsdir_routers_changed(void);
|
||||
|
Loading…
Reference in New Issue
Block a user