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Check answer_len in the remap_addr case of process_relay_cell_not_open.
Fix an edge case where a malicious exit relay could convince a controller that the client's DNS question resolves to an internal IP address. Bug found and fixed by "optimist"; bugfix on 0.1.2.8-beta.
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@ -1,4 +1,9 @@
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Changes in version 0.2.1.16-?? - 2009-??-??
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o Security fixes:
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- Fix an edge case where a malicious exit relay could convince a
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controller that the client's DNS question resolves to an internal IP
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address. Bug found and fixed by "optimist"; bugfix on 0.1.2.8-beta.
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o Major performance improvements (on 0.2.0.x):
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- Disable and refactor some debugging checks that forced a linear scan
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over the whole server-side DNS cache. These accounted for over 50%
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@ -947,7 +947,7 @@ connection_edge_process_relay_cell_not_open(
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cell->payload+RELAY_HEADER_SIZE+2, /*answer*/
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ttl,
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-1);
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if (answer_type == RESOLVED_TYPE_IPV4) {
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if (answer_type == RESOLVED_TYPE_IPV4 && answer_len >= 4) {
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uint32_t addr = ntohl(get_uint32(cell->payload+RELAY_HEADER_SIZE+2));
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remap_event_helper(conn, addr);
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}
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