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bugfix: make onion proxies actually obey their requested bandwidth
svn:r229
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parent
c2fa6f5c7d
commit
833f165d68
@ -349,6 +349,7 @@ int connection_read_to_buf(connection_t *conn) {
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&conn->inbuf_datalen, &conn->inbuf_reached_eof);
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// log(LOG_DEBUG,"connection_read_to_buf(): read_to_buf returned %d.",read_result);
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if(read_result >= 0 && connection_speaks_cells(conn)) {
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// log(LOG_DEBUG,"connection_read_to_buf(): Read %d, bucket now %d.",read_result,conn->receiver_bucket);
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conn->receiver_bucket -= read_result;
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if(conn->receiver_bucket <= 0) {
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@ -477,12 +478,13 @@ int connection_receiver_bucket_should_increase(connection_t *conn) {
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return 1;
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}
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void connection_increment_receiver_bucket (connection_t *conn) {
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void connection_increment_receiver_bucket(connection_t *conn) {
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assert(conn);
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if(connection_receiver_bucket_should_increase(conn)) {
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/* yes, the receiver_bucket can become overfull here. But not by much. */
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conn->receiver_bucket += conn->bandwidth*1.1;
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// log(LOG_DEBUG,"connection_increment_receiver_bucket(): Bucket now %d.",conn->receiver_bucket);
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if(connection_state_is_open(conn)) {
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/* if we're in state 'open', then start reading again */
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connection_start_reading(conn);
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@ -64,6 +64,7 @@ int op_handshake_process_keys(connection_t *conn) {
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log(LOG_DEBUG,"Successfully decrypted keys from new OP.");
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conn->bandwidth = ntohl(*((uint32_t *)auth_plain));
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log(LOG_DEBUG,"op_handshake_process_keys(): Bandwidth %d requested.",conn->bandwidth);
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crypto_cipher_set_key(conn->b_crypto, auth_plain+4);
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crypto_cipher_set_key(conn->f_crypto, auth_plain+20);
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@ -266,14 +266,14 @@ connection_t *connection_or_connect_as_op(routerinfo_t *router) {
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}
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int or_handshake_op_send_keys(connection_t *conn) {
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//int x;
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uint32_t bandwidth = DEFAULT_BANDWIDTH_OP;
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unsigned char message[36]; /* bandwidth(32bits), forward key(128bits), backward key(128bits) */
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unsigned char cipher[128];
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int retval;
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assert(conn && conn->type == CONN_TYPE_OR);
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conn->bandwidth = DEFAULT_BANDWIDTH_OP;
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/* generate random keys */
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if(crypto_cipher_generate_key(conn->f_crypto) ||
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crypto_cipher_generate_key(conn->b_crypto)) {
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@ -282,7 +282,7 @@ int or_handshake_op_send_keys(connection_t *conn) {
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}
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log(LOG_DEBUG,"or_handshake_op_send_keys() : Generated 3DES keys.");
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/* compose the message */
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*(uint32_t *)message = htonl(bandwidth);
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*(uint32_t *)message = htonl(conn->bandwidth);
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memcpy((void *)(message + 4), (void *)conn->f_crypto->key, 16);
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memcpy((void *)(message + 20), (void *)conn->b_crypto->key, 16);
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