mirror of
https://gitlab.torproject.org/tpo/core/tor.git
synced 2024-11-10 05:03:43 +01:00
forward-port the stable releases notes
This commit is contained in:
parent
1a160ae523
commit
821f59b4df
223
ChangeLog
223
ChangeLog
@ -124,6 +124,229 @@ Changes in version 0.2.3.6-alpha - 2011-10-26
|
||||
should help prevent mistakes in the future. Fixes bug 3512.
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
Changes in version 0.2.2.34 - 2011-10-26
|
||||
Tor 0.2.2.34 fixes a critical anonymity vulnerability where an attacker
|
||||
can deanonymize Tor users. Everybody should upgrade.
|
||||
|
||||
The attack relies on four components: 1) Clients reuse their TLS cert
|
||||
when talking to different relays, so relays can recognize a user by
|
||||
the identity key in her cert. 2) An attacker who knows the client's
|
||||
identity key can probe each guard relay to see if that identity key
|
||||
is connected to that guard relay right now. 3) A variety of active
|
||||
attacks in the literature (starting from "Low-Cost Traffic Analysis
|
||||
of Tor" by Murdoch and Danezis in 2005) allow a malicious website to
|
||||
discover the guard relays that a Tor user visiting the website is using.
|
||||
4) Clients typically pick three guards at random, so the set of guards
|
||||
for a given user could well be a unique fingerprint for her. This
|
||||
release fixes components #1 and #2, which is enough to block the attack;
|
||||
the other two remain as open research problems. Special thanks to
|
||||
"frosty_un" for reporting the issue to us!
|
||||
|
||||
Clients should upgrade so they are no longer recognizable by the TLS
|
||||
certs they present. Relays should upgrade so they no longer allow a
|
||||
remote attacker to probe them to test whether unpatched clients are
|
||||
currently connected to them.
|
||||
|
||||
This release also fixes several vulnerabilities that allow an attacker
|
||||
to enumerate bridge relays. Some bridge enumeration attacks still
|
||||
remain; see for example proposal 188.
|
||||
|
||||
o Privacy/anonymity fixes (clients):
|
||||
- Clients and bridges no longer send TLS certificate chains on
|
||||
outgoing OR connections. Previously, each client or bridge
|
||||
would use the same cert chain for all outgoing OR connections
|
||||
for up to 24 hours, which allowed any relay that the client or
|
||||
bridge contacted to determine which entry guards it is using.
|
||||
Fixes CVE-2011-2768. Bugfix on 0.0.9pre5; found by "frosty_un".
|
||||
- If a relay receives a CREATE_FAST cell on a TLS connection, it
|
||||
no longer considers that connection as suitable for satisfying a
|
||||
circuit EXTEND request. Now relays can protect clients from the
|
||||
CVE-2011-2768 issue even if the clients haven't upgraded yet.
|
||||
- Directory authorities no longer assign the Guard flag to relays
|
||||
that haven't upgraded to the above "refuse EXTEND requests
|
||||
to client connections" fix. Now directory authorities can
|
||||
protect clients from the CVE-2011-2768 issue even if neither
|
||||
the clients nor the relays have upgraded yet. There's a new
|
||||
"GiveGuardFlagTo_CVE_2011_2768_VulnerableRelays" config option
|
||||
to let us transition smoothly, else tomorrow there would be no
|
||||
guard relays.
|
||||
|
||||
o Privacy/anonymity fixes (bridge enumeration):
|
||||
- Bridge relays now do their directory fetches inside Tor TLS
|
||||
connections, like all the other clients do, rather than connecting
|
||||
directly to the DirPort like public relays do. Removes another
|
||||
avenue for enumerating bridges. Fixes bug 4115; bugfix on 0.2.0.35.
|
||||
- Bridges relays now build circuits for themselves in a more similar
|
||||
way to how clients build them. Removes another avenue for
|
||||
enumerating bridges. Fixes bug 4124; bugfix on 0.2.0.3-alpha,
|
||||
when bridges were introduced.
|
||||
- Bridges now refuse CREATE or CREATE_FAST cells on OR connections
|
||||
that they initiated. Relays could distinguish incoming bridge
|
||||
connections from client connections, creating another avenue for
|
||||
enumerating bridges. Fixes CVE-2011-2769. Bugfix on 0.2.0.3-alpha.
|
||||
Found by "frosty_un".
|
||||
|
||||
o Major bugfixes:
|
||||
- Fix a crash bug when changing node restrictions while a DNS lookup
|
||||
is in-progress. Fixes bug 4259; bugfix on 0.2.2.25-alpha. Bugfix
|
||||
by "Tey'".
|
||||
- Don't launch a useless circuit after failing to use one of a
|
||||
hidden service's introduction points. Previously, we would
|
||||
launch a new introduction circuit, but not set the hidden service
|
||||
which that circuit was intended to connect to, so it would never
|
||||
actually be used. A different piece of code would then create a
|
||||
new introduction circuit correctly. Bug reported by katmagic and
|
||||
found by Sebastian Hahn. Bugfix on 0.2.1.13-alpha; fixes bug 4212.
|
||||
|
||||
o Minor bugfixes:
|
||||
- Change an integer overflow check in the OpenBSD_Malloc code so
|
||||
that GCC is less likely to eliminate it as impossible. Patch
|
||||
from Mansour Moufid. Fixes bug 4059.
|
||||
- When a hidden service turns an extra service-side introduction
|
||||
circuit into a general-purpose circuit, free the rend_data and
|
||||
intro_key fields first, so we won't leak memory if the circuit
|
||||
is cannibalized for use as another service-side introduction
|
||||
circuit. Bugfix on 0.2.1.7-alpha; fixes bug 4251.
|
||||
- Bridges now skip DNS self-tests, to act a little more stealthily.
|
||||
Fixes bug 4201; bugfix on 0.2.0.3-alpha, which first introduced
|
||||
bridges. Patch by "warms0x".
|
||||
- Fix internal bug-checking logic that was supposed to catch
|
||||
failures in digest generation so that it will fail more robustly
|
||||
if we ask for a nonexistent algorithm. Found by Coverity Scan.
|
||||
Bugfix on 0.2.2.1-alpha; fixes Coverity CID 479.
|
||||
- Report any failure in init_keys() calls launched because our
|
||||
IP address has changed. Spotted by Coverity Scan. Bugfix on
|
||||
0.1.1.4-alpha; fixes CID 484.
|
||||
|
||||
o Minor bugfixes (log messages and documentation):
|
||||
- Remove a confusing dollar sign from the example fingerprint in the
|
||||
man page, and also make the example fingerprint a valid one. Fixes
|
||||
bug 4309; bugfix on 0.2.1.3-alpha.
|
||||
- The next version of Windows will be called Windows 8, and it has
|
||||
a major version of 6, minor version of 2. Correctly identify that
|
||||
version instead of calling it "Very recent version". Resolves
|
||||
ticket 4153; reported by funkstar.
|
||||
- Downgrade log messages about circuit timeout calibration from
|
||||
"notice" to "info": they don't require or suggest any human
|
||||
intervention. Patch from Tom Lowenthal. Fixes bug 4063;
|
||||
bugfix on 0.2.2.14-alpha.
|
||||
|
||||
o Minor features:
|
||||
- Turn on directory request statistics by default and include them in
|
||||
extra-info descriptors. Don't break if we have no GeoIP database.
|
||||
Backported from 0.2.3.1-alpha; implements ticket 3951.
|
||||
- Update to the October 4 2011 Maxmind GeoLite Country database.
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
Changes in version 0.2.1.31 - 2011-10-26
|
||||
Tor 0.2.1.31 backports important security and privacy fixes for
|
||||
oldstable. This release is intended only for package maintainers and
|
||||
others who cannot use the 0.2.2 stable series. All others should be
|
||||
using Tor 0.2.2.x or newer.
|
||||
|
||||
o Security fixes (also included in 0.2.2.x):
|
||||
- Replace all potentially sensitive memory comparison operations
|
||||
with versions whose runtime does not depend on the data being
|
||||
compared. This will help resist a class of attacks where an
|
||||
adversary can use variations in timing information to learn
|
||||
sensitive data. Fix for one case of bug 3122. (Safe memcmp
|
||||
implementation by Robert Ransom based partially on code by DJB.)
|
||||
- Fix an assert in parsing router descriptors containing IPv6
|
||||
addresses. This one took down the directory authorities when
|
||||
somebody tried some experimental code. Bugfix on 0.2.1.3-alpha.
|
||||
|
||||
o Privacy/anonymity fixes (also included in 0.2.2.x):
|
||||
- Clients and bridges no longer send TLS certificate chains on
|
||||
outgoing OR connections. Previously, each client or bridge
|
||||
would use the same cert chain for all outgoing OR connections
|
||||
for up to 24 hours, which allowed any relay that the client or
|
||||
bridge contacted to determine which entry guards it is using.
|
||||
Fixes CVE-2011-2768. Bugfix on 0.0.9pre5; found by frosty_un.
|
||||
- If a relay receives a CREATE_FAST cell on a TLS connection, it
|
||||
no longer considers that connection as suitable for satisfying a
|
||||
circuit EXTEND request. Now relays can protect clients from the
|
||||
CVE-2011-2768 issue even if the clients haven't upgraded yet.
|
||||
- Bridges now refuse CREATE or CREATE_FAST cells on OR connections
|
||||
that they initiated. Relays could distinguish incoming bridge
|
||||
connections from client connections, creating another avenue for
|
||||
enumerating bridges. Fixes CVE-2011-2769. Bugfix on 0.2.0.3-alpha.
|
||||
Found by "frosty_un".
|
||||
- When receiving a hidden service descriptor, check that it is for
|
||||
the hidden service we wanted. Previously, Tor would store any
|
||||
hidden service descriptors that a directory gave it, whether it
|
||||
wanted them or not. This wouldn't have let an attacker impersonate
|
||||
a hidden service, but it did let directories pre-seed a client
|
||||
with descriptors that it didn't want. Bugfix on 0.0.6.
|
||||
- Avoid linkability based on cached hidden service descriptors: forget
|
||||
all hidden service descriptors cached as a client when processing a
|
||||
SIGNAL NEWNYM command. Fixes bug 3000; bugfix on 0.0.6.
|
||||
- Make the bridge directory authority refuse to answer directory
|
||||
requests for "all" descriptors. It used to include bridge
|
||||
descriptors in its answer, which was a major information leak.
|
||||
Found by "piebeer". Bugfix on 0.2.0.3-alpha.
|
||||
- Don't attach new streams to old rendezvous circuits after SIGNAL
|
||||
NEWNYM. Previously, we would keep using an existing rendezvous
|
||||
circuit if it remained open (i.e. if it were kept open by a
|
||||
long-lived stream, or if a new stream were attached to it before
|
||||
Tor could notice that it was old and no longer in use). Bugfix on
|
||||
0.1.1.15-rc; fixes bug 3375.
|
||||
|
||||
o Minor bugfixes (also included in 0.2.2.x):
|
||||
- When we restart our relay, we might get a successful connection
|
||||
from the outside before we've started our reachability tests,
|
||||
triggering a warning: "ORPort found reachable, but I have no
|
||||
routerinfo yet. Failing to inform controller of success." This
|
||||
bug was harmless unless Tor is running under a controller
|
||||
like Vidalia, in which case the controller would never get a
|
||||
REACHABILITY_SUCCEEDED status event. Bugfix on 0.1.2.6-alpha;
|
||||
fixes bug 1172.
|
||||
- Build correctly on OSX with zlib 1.2.4 and higher with all warnings
|
||||
enabled. Fixes bug 1526.
|
||||
- Remove undocumented option "-F" from tor-resolve: it hasn't done
|
||||
anything since 0.2.1.16-rc.
|
||||
- Avoid signed/unsigned comparisons by making SIZE_T_CEILING unsigned.
|
||||
None of the cases where we did this before were wrong, but by making
|
||||
this change we avoid warnings. Fixes bug 2475; bugfix on 0.2.1.28.
|
||||
- Fix a rare crash bug that could occur when a client was configured
|
||||
with a large number of bridges. Fixes bug 2629; bugfix on
|
||||
0.2.1.2-alpha. Bugfix by trac user "shitlei".
|
||||
- Correct the warning displayed when a rendezvous descriptor exceeds
|
||||
the maximum size. Fixes bug 2750; bugfix on 0.2.1.5-alpha. Found by
|
||||
John Brooks.
|
||||
- Fix an uncommon assertion failure when running with DNSPort under
|
||||
heavy load. Fixes bug 2933; bugfix on 0.2.0.1-alpha.
|
||||
- When warning about missing zlib development packages during compile,
|
||||
give the correct package names. Bugfix on 0.2.0.1-alpha.
|
||||
- Require that introduction point keys and onion keys have public
|
||||
exponent 65537. Bugfix on 0.2.0.10-alpha.
|
||||
- Do not crash when our configuration file becomes unreadable, for
|
||||
example due to a permissions change, between when we start up
|
||||
and when a controller calls SAVECONF. Fixes bug 3135; bugfix
|
||||
on 0.0.9pre6.
|
||||
- Fix warnings from GCC 4.6's "-Wunused-but-set-variable" option.
|
||||
Fixes bug 3208.
|
||||
- Always NUL-terminate the sun_path field of a sockaddr_un before
|
||||
passing it to the kernel. (Not a security issue: kernels are
|
||||
smart enough to reject bad sockaddr_uns.) Found by Coverity;
|
||||
CID #428. Bugfix on Tor 0.2.0.3-alpha.
|
||||
- Don't stack-allocate the list of supplementary GIDs when we're
|
||||
about to log them. Stack-allocating NGROUPS_MAX gid_t elements
|
||||
could take up to 256K, which is way too much stack. Found by
|
||||
Coverity; CID #450. Bugfix on 0.2.1.7-alpha.
|
||||
|
||||
o Minor bugfixes (only in 0.2.1.x):
|
||||
- Resume using micro-version numbers in 0.2.1.x: our Debian packages
|
||||
rely on them. Bugfix on 0.2.1.30.
|
||||
- Use git revisions instead of svn revisions when generating our
|
||||
micro-version numbers. Bugfix on 0.2.1.15-rc; fixes bug 2402.
|
||||
|
||||
o Minor features (also included in 0.2.2.x):
|
||||
- Adjust the expiration time on our SSL session certificates to
|
||||
better match SSL certs seen in the wild. Resolves ticket 4014.
|
||||
- Allow nameservers with IPv6 address. Resolves bug 2574.
|
||||
- Update to the October 4 2011 Maxmind GeoLite Country database.
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
Changes in version 0.2.3.5-alpha - 2011-09-28
|
||||
Tor 0.2.3.5-alpha fixes two bugs that make it possible to enumerate
|
||||
bridge relays; fixes an assertion error that many users started hitting
|
||||
|
223
ReleaseNotes
223
ReleaseNotes
@ -3,6 +3,229 @@ This document summarizes new features and bugfixes in each stable release
|
||||
of Tor. If you want to see more detailed descriptions of the changes in
|
||||
each development snapshot, see the ChangeLog file.
|
||||
|
||||
Changes in version 0.2.2.34 - 2011-10-26
|
||||
Tor 0.2.2.34 fixes a critical anonymity vulnerability where an attacker
|
||||
can deanonymize Tor users. Everybody should upgrade.
|
||||
|
||||
The attack relies on four components: 1) Clients reuse their TLS cert
|
||||
when talking to different relays, so relays can recognize a user by
|
||||
the identity key in her cert. 2) An attacker who knows the client's
|
||||
identity key can probe each guard relay to see if that identity key
|
||||
is connected to that guard relay right now. 3) A variety of active
|
||||
attacks in the literature (starting from "Low-Cost Traffic Analysis
|
||||
of Tor" by Murdoch and Danezis in 2005) allow a malicious website to
|
||||
discover the guard relays that a Tor user visiting the website is using.
|
||||
4) Clients typically pick three guards at random, so the set of guards
|
||||
for a given user could well be a unique fingerprint for her. This
|
||||
release fixes components #1 and #2, which is enough to block the attack;
|
||||
the other two remain as open research problems. Special thanks to
|
||||
"frosty_un" for reporting the issue to us!
|
||||
|
||||
Clients should upgrade so they are no longer recognizable by the TLS
|
||||
certs they present. Relays should upgrade so they no longer allow a
|
||||
remote attacker to probe them to test whether unpatched clients are
|
||||
currently connected to them.
|
||||
|
||||
This release also fixes several vulnerabilities that allow an attacker
|
||||
to enumerate bridge relays. Some bridge enumeration attacks still
|
||||
remain; see for example proposal 188.
|
||||
|
||||
o Privacy/anonymity fixes (clients):
|
||||
- Clients and bridges no longer send TLS certificate chains on
|
||||
outgoing OR connections. Previously, each client or bridge
|
||||
would use the same cert chain for all outgoing OR connections
|
||||
for up to 24 hours, which allowed any relay that the client or
|
||||
bridge contacted to determine which entry guards it is using.
|
||||
Fixes CVE-2011-2768. Bugfix on 0.0.9pre5; found by "frosty_un".
|
||||
- If a relay receives a CREATE_FAST cell on a TLS connection, it
|
||||
no longer considers that connection as suitable for satisfying a
|
||||
circuit EXTEND request. Now relays can protect clients from the
|
||||
CVE-2011-2768 issue even if the clients haven't upgraded yet.
|
||||
- Directory authorities no longer assign the Guard flag to relays
|
||||
that haven't upgraded to the above "refuse EXTEND requests
|
||||
to client connections" fix. Now directory authorities can
|
||||
protect clients from the CVE-2011-2768 issue even if neither
|
||||
the clients nor the relays have upgraded yet. There's a new
|
||||
"GiveGuardFlagTo_CVE_2011_2768_VulnerableRelays" config option
|
||||
to let us transition smoothly, else tomorrow there would be no
|
||||
guard relays.
|
||||
|
||||
o Privacy/anonymity fixes (bridge enumeration):
|
||||
- Bridge relays now do their directory fetches inside Tor TLS
|
||||
connections, like all the other clients do, rather than connecting
|
||||
directly to the DirPort like public relays do. Removes another
|
||||
avenue for enumerating bridges. Fixes bug 4115; bugfix on 0.2.0.35.
|
||||
- Bridges relays now build circuits for themselves in a more similar
|
||||
way to how clients build them. Removes another avenue for
|
||||
enumerating bridges. Fixes bug 4124; bugfix on 0.2.0.3-alpha,
|
||||
when bridges were introduced.
|
||||
- Bridges now refuse CREATE or CREATE_FAST cells on OR connections
|
||||
that they initiated. Relays could distinguish incoming bridge
|
||||
connections from client connections, creating another avenue for
|
||||
enumerating bridges. Fixes CVE-2011-2769. Bugfix on 0.2.0.3-alpha.
|
||||
Found by "frosty_un".
|
||||
|
||||
o Major bugfixes:
|
||||
- Fix a crash bug when changing node restrictions while a DNS lookup
|
||||
is in-progress. Fixes bug 4259; bugfix on 0.2.2.25-alpha. Bugfix
|
||||
by "Tey'".
|
||||
- Don't launch a useless circuit after failing to use one of a
|
||||
hidden service's introduction points. Previously, we would
|
||||
launch a new introduction circuit, but not set the hidden service
|
||||
which that circuit was intended to connect to, so it would never
|
||||
actually be used. A different piece of code would then create a
|
||||
new introduction circuit correctly. Bug reported by katmagic and
|
||||
found by Sebastian Hahn. Bugfix on 0.2.1.13-alpha; fixes bug 4212.
|
||||
|
||||
o Minor bugfixes:
|
||||
- Change an integer overflow check in the OpenBSD_Malloc code so
|
||||
that GCC is less likely to eliminate it as impossible. Patch
|
||||
from Mansour Moufid. Fixes bug 4059.
|
||||
- When a hidden service turns an extra service-side introduction
|
||||
circuit into a general-purpose circuit, free the rend_data and
|
||||
intro_key fields first, so we won't leak memory if the circuit
|
||||
is cannibalized for use as another service-side introduction
|
||||
circuit. Bugfix on 0.2.1.7-alpha; fixes bug 4251.
|
||||
- Bridges now skip DNS self-tests, to act a little more stealthily.
|
||||
Fixes bug 4201; bugfix on 0.2.0.3-alpha, which first introduced
|
||||
bridges. Patch by "warms0x".
|
||||
- Fix internal bug-checking logic that was supposed to catch
|
||||
failures in digest generation so that it will fail more robustly
|
||||
if we ask for a nonexistent algorithm. Found by Coverity Scan.
|
||||
Bugfix on 0.2.2.1-alpha; fixes Coverity CID 479.
|
||||
- Report any failure in init_keys() calls launched because our
|
||||
IP address has changed. Spotted by Coverity Scan. Bugfix on
|
||||
0.1.1.4-alpha; fixes CID 484.
|
||||
|
||||
o Minor bugfixes (log messages and documentation):
|
||||
- Remove a confusing dollar sign from the example fingerprint in the
|
||||
man page, and also make the example fingerprint a valid one. Fixes
|
||||
bug 4309; bugfix on 0.2.1.3-alpha.
|
||||
- The next version of Windows will be called Windows 8, and it has
|
||||
a major version of 6, minor version of 2. Correctly identify that
|
||||
version instead of calling it "Very recent version". Resolves
|
||||
ticket 4153; reported by funkstar.
|
||||
- Downgrade log messages about circuit timeout calibration from
|
||||
"notice" to "info": they don't require or suggest any human
|
||||
intervention. Patch from Tom Lowenthal. Fixes bug 4063;
|
||||
bugfix on 0.2.2.14-alpha.
|
||||
|
||||
o Minor features:
|
||||
- Turn on directory request statistics by default and include them in
|
||||
extra-info descriptors. Don't break if we have no GeoIP database.
|
||||
Backported from 0.2.3.1-alpha; implements ticket 3951.
|
||||
- Update to the October 4 2011 Maxmind GeoLite Country database.
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
Changes in version 0.2.1.31 - 2011-10-26
|
||||
Tor 0.2.1.31 backports important security and privacy fixes for
|
||||
oldstable. This release is intended only for package maintainers and
|
||||
others who cannot use the 0.2.2 stable series. All others should be
|
||||
using Tor 0.2.2.x or newer.
|
||||
|
||||
o Security fixes (also included in 0.2.2.x):
|
||||
- Replace all potentially sensitive memory comparison operations
|
||||
with versions whose runtime does not depend on the data being
|
||||
compared. This will help resist a class of attacks where an
|
||||
adversary can use variations in timing information to learn
|
||||
sensitive data. Fix for one case of bug 3122. (Safe memcmp
|
||||
implementation by Robert Ransom based partially on code by DJB.)
|
||||
- Fix an assert in parsing router descriptors containing IPv6
|
||||
addresses. This one took down the directory authorities when
|
||||
somebody tried some experimental code. Bugfix on 0.2.1.3-alpha.
|
||||
|
||||
o Privacy/anonymity fixes (also included in 0.2.2.x):
|
||||
- Clients and bridges no longer send TLS certificate chains on
|
||||
outgoing OR connections. Previously, each client or bridge
|
||||
would use the same cert chain for all outgoing OR connections
|
||||
for up to 24 hours, which allowed any relay that the client or
|
||||
bridge contacted to determine which entry guards it is using.
|
||||
Fixes CVE-2011-2768. Bugfix on 0.0.9pre5; found by frosty_un.
|
||||
- If a relay receives a CREATE_FAST cell on a TLS connection, it
|
||||
no longer considers that connection as suitable for satisfying a
|
||||
circuit EXTEND request. Now relays can protect clients from the
|
||||
CVE-2011-2768 issue even if the clients haven't upgraded yet.
|
||||
- Bridges now refuse CREATE or CREATE_FAST cells on OR connections
|
||||
that they initiated. Relays could distinguish incoming bridge
|
||||
connections from client connections, creating another avenue for
|
||||
enumerating bridges. Fixes CVE-2011-2769. Bugfix on 0.2.0.3-alpha.
|
||||
Found by "frosty_un".
|
||||
- When receiving a hidden service descriptor, check that it is for
|
||||
the hidden service we wanted. Previously, Tor would store any
|
||||
hidden service descriptors that a directory gave it, whether it
|
||||
wanted them or not. This wouldn't have let an attacker impersonate
|
||||
a hidden service, but it did let directories pre-seed a client
|
||||
with descriptors that it didn't want. Bugfix on 0.0.6.
|
||||
- Avoid linkability based on cached hidden service descriptors: forget
|
||||
all hidden service descriptors cached as a client when processing a
|
||||
SIGNAL NEWNYM command. Fixes bug 3000; bugfix on 0.0.6.
|
||||
- Make the bridge directory authority refuse to answer directory
|
||||
requests for "all" descriptors. It used to include bridge
|
||||
descriptors in its answer, which was a major information leak.
|
||||
Found by "piebeer". Bugfix on 0.2.0.3-alpha.
|
||||
- Don't attach new streams to old rendezvous circuits after SIGNAL
|
||||
NEWNYM. Previously, we would keep using an existing rendezvous
|
||||
circuit if it remained open (i.e. if it were kept open by a
|
||||
long-lived stream, or if a new stream were attached to it before
|
||||
Tor could notice that it was old and no longer in use). Bugfix on
|
||||
0.1.1.15-rc; fixes bug 3375.
|
||||
|
||||
o Minor bugfixes (also included in 0.2.2.x):
|
||||
- When we restart our relay, we might get a successful connection
|
||||
from the outside before we've started our reachability tests,
|
||||
triggering a warning: "ORPort found reachable, but I have no
|
||||
routerinfo yet. Failing to inform controller of success." This
|
||||
bug was harmless unless Tor is running under a controller
|
||||
like Vidalia, in which case the controller would never get a
|
||||
REACHABILITY_SUCCEEDED status event. Bugfix on 0.1.2.6-alpha;
|
||||
fixes bug 1172.
|
||||
- Build correctly on OSX with zlib 1.2.4 and higher with all warnings
|
||||
enabled. Fixes bug 1526.
|
||||
- Remove undocumented option "-F" from tor-resolve: it hasn't done
|
||||
anything since 0.2.1.16-rc.
|
||||
- Avoid signed/unsigned comparisons by making SIZE_T_CEILING unsigned.
|
||||
None of the cases where we did this before were wrong, but by making
|
||||
this change we avoid warnings. Fixes bug 2475; bugfix on 0.2.1.28.
|
||||
- Fix a rare crash bug that could occur when a client was configured
|
||||
with a large number of bridges. Fixes bug 2629; bugfix on
|
||||
0.2.1.2-alpha. Bugfix by trac user "shitlei".
|
||||
- Correct the warning displayed when a rendezvous descriptor exceeds
|
||||
the maximum size. Fixes bug 2750; bugfix on 0.2.1.5-alpha. Found by
|
||||
John Brooks.
|
||||
- Fix an uncommon assertion failure when running with DNSPort under
|
||||
heavy load. Fixes bug 2933; bugfix on 0.2.0.1-alpha.
|
||||
- When warning about missing zlib development packages during compile,
|
||||
give the correct package names. Bugfix on 0.2.0.1-alpha.
|
||||
- Require that introduction point keys and onion keys have public
|
||||
exponent 65537. Bugfix on 0.2.0.10-alpha.
|
||||
- Do not crash when our configuration file becomes unreadable, for
|
||||
example due to a permissions change, between when we start up
|
||||
and when a controller calls SAVECONF. Fixes bug 3135; bugfix
|
||||
on 0.0.9pre6.
|
||||
- Fix warnings from GCC 4.6's "-Wunused-but-set-variable" option.
|
||||
Fixes bug 3208.
|
||||
- Always NUL-terminate the sun_path field of a sockaddr_un before
|
||||
passing it to the kernel. (Not a security issue: kernels are
|
||||
smart enough to reject bad sockaddr_uns.) Found by Coverity;
|
||||
CID #428. Bugfix on Tor 0.2.0.3-alpha.
|
||||
- Don't stack-allocate the list of supplementary GIDs when we're
|
||||
about to log them. Stack-allocating NGROUPS_MAX gid_t elements
|
||||
could take up to 256K, which is way too much stack. Found by
|
||||
Coverity; CID #450. Bugfix on 0.2.1.7-alpha.
|
||||
|
||||
o Minor bugfixes (only in 0.2.1.x):
|
||||
- Resume using micro-version numbers in 0.2.1.x: our Debian packages
|
||||
rely on them. Bugfix on 0.2.1.30.
|
||||
- Use git revisions instead of svn revisions when generating our
|
||||
micro-version numbers. Bugfix on 0.2.1.15-rc; fixes bug 2402.
|
||||
|
||||
o Minor features (also included in 0.2.2.x):
|
||||
- Adjust the expiration time on our SSL session certificates to
|
||||
better match SSL certs seen in the wild. Resolves ticket 4014.
|
||||
- Allow nameservers with IPv6 address. Resolves bug 2574.
|
||||
- Update to the October 4 2011 Maxmind GeoLite Country database.
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
Changes in version 0.2.2.33 - 2011-09-13
|
||||
Tor 0.2.2.33 fixes several bugs, and includes a slight tweak to Tor's
|
||||
TLS handshake that makes relays and bridges that run this new version
|
||||
|
Loading…
Reference in New Issue
Block a user