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synced 2024-11-24 12:23:32 +01:00
Actually check for missing protocols and exit as appropriate.
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@ -1552,6 +1552,31 @@ networkstatus_set_current_consensus_from_ns(networkstatus_t *c,
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}
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#endif //TOR_UNIT_TESTS
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/** Called when we have received a networkstatus <b>c</b>. If there are
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* any _required_ protocols we are missing, log an error and exit
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* immediately. If there are any _recommended_ protocols we are missing,
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* warn. */
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static void
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handle_missing_protocol_warning(const networkstatus_t *c,
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const or_options_t *options)
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{
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char *protocol_warning = NULL;
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int should_exit = networkstatus_check_required_protocols(c,
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!server_mode(options),
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&protocol_warning);
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if (protocol_warning) {
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tor_log(should_exit ? LOG_ERR : LOG_WARN,
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LD_GENERAL,
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"%s", protocol_warning);
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}
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if (should_exit) {
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tor_assert_nonfatal(protocol_warning);
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}
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tor_free(protocol_warning);
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if (should_exit)
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exit(1);
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}
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/** Try to replace the current cached v3 networkstatus with the one in
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* <b>consensus</b>. If we don't have enough certificates to validate it,
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* store it in consensus_waiting_for_certs and launch a certificate fetch.
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@ -1595,6 +1620,7 @@ networkstatus_set_current_consensus(const char *consensus,
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time_t current_valid_after = 0;
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int free_consensus = 1; /* Free 'c' at the end of the function */
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int old_ewma_enabled;
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int checked_protocols_already = 0;
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if (flav < 0) {
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/* XXXX we don't handle unrecognized flavors yet. */
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@ -1610,6 +1636,16 @@ networkstatus_set_current_consensus(const char *consensus,
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goto done;
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}
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if (from_cache && !was_waiting_for_certs) {
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/* We previously stored this; check _now_ to make sure that version-kills
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* really work. This happens even before we check signatures: we did so
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* before when we stored this to disk. This does mean an attacker who can
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* write to the datadir can make us not start: such an attacker could
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* already harm us by replacing our guards, which would be worse. */
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checked_protocols_already = 1;
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handle_missing_protocol_warning(c, options);
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}
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if ((int)c->flavor != flav) {
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/* This wasn't the flavor we thought we were getting. */
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if (require_flavor) {
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@ -1735,6 +1771,10 @@ networkstatus_set_current_consensus(const char *consensus,
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if (!from_cache && flav == usable_consensus_flavor())
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control_event_client_status(LOG_NOTICE, "CONSENSUS_ARRIVED");
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if (!checked_protocols_already) {
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handle_missing_protocol_warning(c, options);
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}
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/* Are we missing any certificates at all? */
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if (r != 1 && dl_certs)
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authority_certs_fetch_missing(c, now, source_dir);
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