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Log more loudly on a bad cert from an authority.

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Clock skew made this situation way too frequent so we demoted it to
"protocol_warn", but when there's an authority, it should really just
be warn.
This commit is contained in:
Nick Mathewson 2011-11-03 13:01:59 -04:00
parent f2f156f0e8
commit 7992eb43c5
2 changed files with 15 additions and 2 deletions
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4
changes/bug4370 Normal file
View File

@ -0,0 +1,4 @@
o Minor bugfixes:
- Log less loudly when we get an invalid certificate from a source other
than a directory authority: it's not unusual to see invalid certs
because of clock skew. Fixes bug 4370; bugfix on 0.2.3.6-alpha.

13
src/or/command.c
View File

@ -985,15 +985,24 @@ command_process_cert_cell(var_cell_t *cell, or_connection_t *conn)
}
if (conn->handshake_state->started_here) {
int severity;
if (! (id_cert && link_cert))
ERR("The certs we wanted were missing");
/* Okay. We should be able to check the certificates now. */
if (! tor_tls_cert_matches_key(conn->tls, link_cert)) {
ERR("The link certificate didn't match the TLS public key");
}
if (! tor_tls_cert_is_valid(LOG_PROTOCOL_WARN, link_cert, id_cert, 0))
/* Note that this warns more loudly about time and validity if we were
* _trying_ to connect to an authority, not necessarily if we _did_ connect
* to one. */
if (router_digest_is_trusted_dir(conn->identity_digest))
severity = LOG_WARN;
else
severity = LOG_PROTOCOL_WARN;
if (! tor_tls_cert_is_valid(severity, link_cert, id_cert, 0))
ERR("The link certificate was not valid");
if (! tor_tls_cert_is_valid(LOG_PROTOCOL_WARN, id_cert, id_cert, 1))
if (! tor_tls_cert_is_valid(severity, id_cert, id_cert, 1))
ERR("The ID certificate was not valid");
conn->handshake_state->authenticated = 1;