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some cleanups. more probably remain, but hey, it's an alpha.
time to put out the bugfix release. svn:r9309
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ChangeLog
43
ChangeLog
@ -1,5 +1,21 @@
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Changes in version 0.1.2.6-alpha - 2007-??-??
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o Minor features (controller):
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Changes in version 0.1.2.6-alpha - 2007-01-09
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o Major bugfixes:
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- Fix an assert error introduced in 0.1.2.5-alpha: if a single TLS
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connection handles more than 4 gigs in either direction, we assert.
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- Fix an assert error introduced in 0.1.2.5-alpha: if you're an
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advertised exit node, somebody might try to exit from you when
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you're bootstrapping and before you've built your descriptor yet.
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o Minor bugfixes:
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- Warn if we (as a server) find that we've resolved an address that we
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weren't planning to resolve.
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- Warn that using select() on any libevent version before 1.1 will be
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unnecessarily slow (even for select()).
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- Flush ERR-level controller status events just like we currently
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flush ERR-level log events, so that a Tor shutdown doesn't prevent
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the controller from learning about current events.
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o Minor features (more controller status events):
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- Implement EXTERNAL_ADDRESS server status event so controllers can
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learn when our address changes.
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- Implement BAD_SERVER_DESCRIPTOR server status event so controllers
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@ -27,27 +43,8 @@ Changes in version 0.1.2.6-alpha - 2007-??-??
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about changes to DNS server status.
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o Minor features (directory):
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- Authorities do not recommend exits as guards if this would shift
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excess load to the exit nodes.
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o Major bugfixes:
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- Fix an assert error introduced in 0.1.2.5-alpha: if a single TLS
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connection handles more than 4 gigs in either direction, we assert.
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- Fix an assert error introduced in 0.1.2.5-alpha: if you're an
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advertised exit node, somebody might try to exit from you when
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you're bootstrapping and before you've built your descriptor yet.
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o Minor bugfixes:
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- Restore a warning message if we accidentally resolve an address that
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we weren't planning to resolve.
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- Prevent an (unlikely) bug on 32-bit architectures that could make
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directories send 503s incorrectly when BandwidthBurst plus 2 times
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BandwidthRate was over to 2 GB.
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- Warn that using select() on any libevent version before 1.1 will be
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unnecessarily slow (even for select()).
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- Flush ERR-level status events just like we currently flush ERR-level
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log events, so that a Tor shutdown doesn't prevent the controller from
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learning about current events.
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- Authorities no longer recommend exits as guards if this would shift
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too much load to the exit nodes.
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Changes in version 0.1.2.5-alpha - 2007-01-06
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@ -1089,11 +1089,12 @@ do for each. -RD]
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Actions for STATUS_CLIENT severity WARN events can be as follows:
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DANGEROUS_SOCKS
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"PROTOCOL=SOCKS4/SOCKS4a/SOCKS5"
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"PROTOCOL=SOCKS4/SOCKS5"
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"ADDRESS=IP:port"
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A connection was made to Tor's SOCKS port that used a raw IP
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address. If the client application got this address from
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gethostbyname(), it's leaking target addresses via DNS.
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A connection was made to Tor's SOCKS port using one of the SOCKS
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approaches that doesn't support hostnames -- only raw IP addresses.
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If the client application got this address from gethostbyname(),
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it may be leaking target addresses via DNS.
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SOCKS_UNKNOWN_PROTOCOL
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"DATA=string"
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@ -1102,7 +1103,13 @@ do for each. -RD]
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using Tor as an HTTP proxy? The DATA is the first few characters
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sent to Tor on the SOCKS port.
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BAD_HOSTNAME
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SOCKS_BAD_HOSTNAME
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[unimplemented]
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// Some application gave us a funny-looking hostname. Perhaps
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// it is broken? In any case it won't work with Tor and the user
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// should know.
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UNRECOGNIZED_ROUTER
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[unimplemented]
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// a nickname we asked for is unavailable. no need for this
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// quite yet, since no end-user controllers let you configure that.
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@ -1118,7 +1125,7 @@ do for each. -RD]
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"HOSTNAME=NAME"
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"METHOD=CONFIGURED/DIRSERV/RESOLVED/INTERFACE/GETHOSTNAME"
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Our best idea for our externally visible IP has changed to 'IP'.
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If 'NAME' is present, we got the new IP by resolving 'NAME'. If the
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If 'HOSTNAME' is present, we got the new IP by resolving 'NAME'. If the
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method is 'CONFIGURED', the IP was given verbatim as a configuration
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option. If the method is 'RESOLVED', we resolved the Address
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configuration option to get the IP. If the method is 'GETHOSTNAME',
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@ -1163,6 +1170,7 @@ do for each. -RD]
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"STATUS=" "UP" / "DOWN"
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"ERR=" message
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One of our nameservers has changed status.
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// actually notice
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NAMESERVER_ALL_DOWN
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All of our nameservers have gone down.
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@ -1185,6 +1193,7 @@ do for each. -RD]
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ACCEPTED_SERVER_DESCRIPTOR
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"DIRAUTH=addr:port"
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A single directory authority accepted our descriptor.
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// actually notice
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Actions for STATUS_SERVER severity ERR events can be as follows:
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@ -186,7 +186,7 @@ evdns_log_cb(int warn, const char *msg)
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* nameservers have failed' if we're completely out of nameservers;
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* otherwise, the situation is tolerable. */
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warn = 0;
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control_event_server_status(LOG_WARN,
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control_event_server_status(LOG_NOTICE,
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"NAMESERVER_STATUS NS=%s STATUS=DOWN ERR=%s",
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ns, escaped(err));
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tor_free(ns);
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