mirror of
https://gitlab.torproject.org/tpo/core/tor.git
synced 2024-11-10 21:23:58 +01:00
Add a bunch of new comments to explain connection_ap_rewrite{,_and_attach}
Also, do a little light refactoring to move some variable declarations around and make a few things const Also fix an obnoxious bug on checking for the DONE stream end reason. It's not a flag; it's a possible value or a variable that needs to be masked.
This commit is contained in:
Nick Mathewson
parent
54e4aaf52c
commit
758d77130c
@ -908,8 +908,9 @@ connection_ap_rewrite_and_attach_if_allowed(entry_connection_t *conn,
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return connection_ap_handshake_rewrite_and_attach(conn, circ, cpath);
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}
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/* Try to perform any map-based rewriting of the target address in <b>conn</b>,
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* filling in the fields of <b>out</b> as we go.
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/* Try to perform any map-based rewriting of the target address in
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* <b>conn</b>, filling in the fields of <b>out</b> as we go, and modifying
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* conn->socks_request.address as appropriate.
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*/
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STATIC void
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connection_ap_handshake_rewrite(entry_connection_t *conn,
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@ -919,6 +920,7 @@ connection_ap_handshake_rewrite(entry_connection_t *conn,
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const or_options_t *options = get_options();
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tor_addr_t addr_tmp;
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/* Initialize all the fields of 'out' to reasonable defaults */
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out->automap = 0;
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out->exit_source = ADDRMAPSRC_NONE;
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out->map_expires = TIME_MAX;
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@ -926,12 +928,17 @@ connection_ap_handshake_rewrite(entry_connection_t *conn,
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out->should_close = 0;
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out->orig_address[0] = 0;
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tor_strlower(socks->address); /* normalize it */
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/* We convert all incoming addresses to lowercase. */
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tor_strlower(socks->address);
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/* Remember the original address. */
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strlcpy(out->orig_address, socks->address, sizeof(out->orig_address));
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log_debug(LD_APP,"Client asked for %s:%d",
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safe_str_client(socks->address),
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socks->port);
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/* Check for whether this is a .exit address. By default, those are
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* disallowed when they're coming straight from the client, but you're
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* allowed to have them in MapAddress commands and so forth. */
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if (!strcmpend(socks->address, ".exit") && !options->AllowDotExit) {
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log_warn(LD_APP, "The \".exit\" notation is disabled in Tor due to "
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"security risks. Set AllowDotExit in your torrc to enable "
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@ -943,9 +950,18 @@ connection_ap_handshake_rewrite(entry_connection_t *conn,
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return;
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}
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if (! conn->original_dest_address)
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/* Remember the original address so we can tell the user about what
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* they actually said, not just what it turned into. */
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if (! conn->original_dest_address) {
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/* Is the 'if' necessary here? XXXX */
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conn->original_dest_address = tor_strdup(conn->socks_request->address);
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}
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/* First, apply MapAddress and MAPADDRESS mappings. We need to do
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* these only for non-reverse lookups, since they don't exist for those.
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* We need to do this before we consider automapping, since we might
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* e.g. resolve irc.oftc.net into irconionaddress.onion, at which point
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* we'd need to automap it. */
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if (socks->command != SOCKS_COMMAND_RESOLVE_PTR) {
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const unsigned rewrite_flags = AMR_FLAG_USE_MAPADDRESS;
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if (addressmap_rewrite(socks->address, sizeof(socks->address),
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@ -955,12 +971,20 @@ connection_ap_handshake_rewrite(entry_connection_t *conn,
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}
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}
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/* Now, handle automapping. Automapping happens when we're asked to
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* resolve a hostname, and AutomapHostsOnResolve is set, and
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* the hostname has a suffix listed in AutomapHostsSuffixes.
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*/
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if (socks->command == SOCKS_COMMAND_RESOLVE &&
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tor_addr_parse(&addr_tmp, socks->address)<0 &&
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options->AutomapHostsOnResolve) {
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/* Check the suffix... */
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out->automap = addressmap_address_should_automap(socks->address, options);
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if (out->automap) {
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/* If we get here, then we should apply an automapping for this. */
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const char *new_addr;
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/* We return an IPv4 address by default, or an IPv6 address if we
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* are allowed to do so. */
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int addr_type = RESOLVED_TYPE_IPV4;
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if (conn->socks_request->socks_version != 4) {
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if (!conn->ipv4_traffic_ok ||
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@ -968,6 +992,10 @@ connection_ap_handshake_rewrite(entry_connection_t *conn,
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conn->prefer_ipv6_virtaddr)
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addr_type = RESOLVED_TYPE_IPV6;
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}
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/* Okay, register the target address as automapped, and find the new
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* address we're supposed to give as a resolve answer. (Return a cached
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* value if we've looked up this address before.
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*/
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new_addr = addressmap_register_virtual_address(
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addr_type, tor_strdup(socks->address));
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if (! new_addr) {
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@ -984,6 +1012,8 @@ connection_ap_handshake_rewrite(entry_connection_t *conn,
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}
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}
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/* Now handle reverse lookups, if they're in the cache. This doesn't
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* happen too often, since client-side DNS caching is off by default. */
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if (socks->command == SOCKS_COMMAND_RESOLVE_PTR) {
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unsigned rewrite_flags = 0;
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if (conn->use_cached_ipv4_answers)
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@ -1007,6 +1037,10 @@ connection_ap_handshake_rewrite(entry_connection_t *conn,
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out->should_close = 1;
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return;
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}
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/* Hang on, did we find an answer saying that this is a reverse lookup for
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* an internal address? If so, we should reject it if we're condigured to
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* do so. */
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if (options->ClientDNSRejectInternalAddresses) {
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/* Don't let people try to do a reverse lookup on 10.0.0.1. */
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tor_addr_t addr;
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@ -1022,8 +1056,16 @@ connection_ap_handshake_rewrite(entry_connection_t *conn,
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return;
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}
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}
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} else if (!out->automap) {
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/* For address map controls, remap the address. */
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}
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/* If we didn't automap it before, then this is still the address
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* that came straight from the user, mapped according to any
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* MapAddress/MAPADDRESS commands. Now other mappings, including
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* previously registered Automap entries, TrackHostExits entries,
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* and client-side DNS cache entries (not recommended).
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*/
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if (!socks->command != SOCKS_COMMAND_RESOLVE_PTR &&
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!out->automap) {
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unsigned rewrite_flags = AMR_FLAG_USE_AUTOMAP | AMR_FLAG_USE_TRACKEXIT;
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addressmap_entry_source_t exit_source2;
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if (conn->use_cached_ipv4_answers)
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@ -1036,15 +1078,20 @@ connection_ap_handshake_rewrite(entry_connection_t *conn,
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REMAP_STREAM_SOURCE_CACHE);
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}
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if (out->exit_source == ADDRMAPSRC_NONE) {
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/* If it wasn't a .exit before, maybe it turned into a .exit. Remember
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* the original source of a .exit. */
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out->exit_source = exit_source2;
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}
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}
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/* Check to see whether we're about to use an address in the virtual
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* range without actually having gotten it from an Automap. */
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if (!out->automap && address_is_in_virtual_range(socks->address)) {
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/* This address was probably handed out by client_dns_get_unmapped_address,
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* but the mapping was discarded for some reason. We *don't* want to send
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* the address through Tor; that's likely to fail, and may leak
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* information.
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/* This address was probably handed out by
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* client_dns_get_unmapped_address, but the mapping was discarded for some
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* reason. Or the user typed in a virtual address range manually. We
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* *don't* want to send the address through Tor; that's likely to fail,
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* and may leak information.
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*/
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log_warn(LD_APP,"Missing mapping for virtual address '%s'. Refusing.",
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safe_str_client(socks->address));
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@ -1075,7 +1122,6 @@ connection_ap_handshake_rewrite_and_attach(entry_connection_t *conn,
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crypt_path_t *cpath)
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{
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socks_request_t *socks = conn->socks_request;
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hostname_type_t addresstype;
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const or_options_t *options = get_options();
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connection_t *base_conn = ENTRY_TO_CONN(conn);
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time_t now = time(NULL);
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@ -1085,22 +1131,27 @@ connection_ap_handshake_rewrite_and_attach(entry_connection_t *conn,
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connection_ap_handshake_rewrite(conn,&rr);
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if (rr.should_close) {
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/* connection_ap_handshake_rewrite told us to close the connection,
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* either because it sent back an answer, or because it sent back an
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* error */
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connection_mark_unattached_ap(conn, rr.end_reason);
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if (0 != (rr.end_reason & END_STREAM_REASON_DONE))
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if (END_STREAM_REASON_DONE == (rr.end_reason & END_STREAM_REASON_MASK))
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return 0;
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else
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return -1;
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}
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time_t map_expires = rr.map_expires;
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int automap = rr.automap;
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addressmap_entry_source_t exit_source = rr.exit_source;
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const time_t map_expires = rr.map_expires;
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const int automap = rr.automap;
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const addressmap_entry_source_t exit_source = rr.exit_source;
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/* Parse the address provided by SOCKS. Modify it in-place if it
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* specifies a hidden-service (.onion) or particular exit node (.exit).
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*/
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addresstype = parse_extended_hostname(socks->address);
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const hostname_type_t addresstype = parse_extended_hostname(socks->address);
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/* Now see whether the hostname is bogus. This could happen because of an
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* onion hostname whose format we don't recognize. */
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if (addresstype == BAD_HOSTNAME) {
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control_event_client_status(LOG_WARN, "SOCKS_BAD_HOSTNAME HOSTNAME=%s",
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escaped(socks->address));
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@ -1108,16 +1159,21 @@ connection_ap_handshake_rewrite_and_attach(entry_connection_t *conn,
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return -1;
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}
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/* If this is a .exit hostname, strip off the .name.exit part, and
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* see whether we're going to connect there, and otherwise handle it.
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* (The ".exit" part got stripped off by "parse_extended_hostname").
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*
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* We'll set chosen_exit_name and/or close the connection as appropriate.
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*/
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if (addresstype == EXIT_HOSTNAME) {
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/* foo.exit -- modify conn->chosen_exit_node to specify the exit
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* node, and conn->address to hold only the address portion. */
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char *s = strrchr(socks->address,'.');
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/* If StrictNodes is not set, then .exit overrides ExcludeNodes. */
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/* If StrictNodes is not set, then .exit overrides ExcludeNodes but
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* not ExcludeExitNodes. */
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routerset_t *excludeset = options->StrictNodes ?
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options->ExcludeExitNodesUnion_ : options->ExcludeExitNodes;
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const node_t *node;
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const node_t *node = NULL;
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/* If this .exit was added by an AUTOMAP, then it came straight from
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* a user. Make sure that options->AllowDotExit permits that. */
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if (exit_source == ADDRMAPSRC_AUTOMAP && !options->AllowDotExit) {
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/* Whoops; this one is stale. It must have gotten added earlier,
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* when AllowDotExit was on. */
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@ -1130,6 +1186,8 @@ connection_ap_handshake_rewrite_and_attach(entry_connection_t *conn,
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return -1;
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}
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/* Double-check to make sure there are no .exits coming from
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* impossible/weird sources. */
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if (exit_source == ADDRMAPSRC_DNS ||
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(exit_source == ADDRMAPSRC_NONE && !options->AllowDotExit)) {
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/* It shouldn't be possible to get a .exit address from any of these
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@ -1144,9 +1202,12 @@ connection_ap_handshake_rewrite_and_attach(entry_connection_t *conn,
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}
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tor_assert(!automap);
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/* Now, find the character before the .(name) part. */
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char *s = strrchr(socks->address,'.');
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if (s) {
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/* The address was of the form "(stuff).(name).exit */
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if (s[1] != '\0') {
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/* Looks like a real .exit one. */
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conn->chosen_exit_name = tor_strdup(s+1);
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node = node_get_by_nickname(conn->chosen_exit_name, 1);
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@ -1165,7 +1226,8 @@ connection_ap_handshake_rewrite_and_attach(entry_connection_t *conn,
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return -1;
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}
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} else {
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/* It looks like they just asked for "foo.exit". */
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/* It looks like they just asked for "foo.exit". That's a special
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* form that means (foo's address).foo.exit. */
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conn->chosen_exit_name = tor_strdup(socks->address);
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node = node_get_by_nickname(conn->chosen_exit_name, 1);
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@ -1174,6 +1236,7 @@ connection_ap_handshake_rewrite_and_attach(entry_connection_t *conn,
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node_get_address_string(node, socks->address, sizeof(socks->address));
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}
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}
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/* Now make sure that the chosen exit exists... */
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if (!node) {
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log_warn(LD_APP,
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@ -1195,8 +1258,12 @@ connection_ap_handshake_rewrite_and_attach(entry_connection_t *conn,
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implies no. */
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}
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/* Now, handle everything that isn't a .onion address. */
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if (addresstype != ONION_HOSTNAME) {
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/* not a hidden-service request (i.e. normal or .exit) */
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/* Not a hidden-service request. It's either a hostname or an IP,
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* possibly with a .exit that we stripped off. */
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/* Check for funny characters in the address. */
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if (address_is_invalid_destination(socks->address, 1)) {
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control_event_client_status(LOG_WARN, "SOCKS_BAD_HOSTNAME HOSTNAME=%s",
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escaped(socks->address));
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@ -1207,6 +1274,8 @@ connection_ap_handshake_rewrite_and_attach(entry_connection_t *conn,
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return -1;
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}
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/* If we're running in Tor2webMode, we don't allow anything BUT .onion
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* addresses. */
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if (options->Tor2webMode) {
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log_warn(LD_APP, "Refusing to connect to non-hidden-service hostname %s "
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"because tor2web mode is enabled.",
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@ -1215,6 +1284,9 @@ connection_ap_handshake_rewrite_and_attach(entry_connection_t *conn,
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return -1;
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}
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/* See if this is a hostname lookup that we can answer immediately.
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* (For example, an attempt to look up the IP address for an IP address.)
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*/
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if (socks->command == SOCKS_COMMAND_RESOLVE) {
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tor_addr_t answer;
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/* Reply to resolves immediately if we can. */
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@ -1231,14 +1303,22 @@ connection_ap_handshake_rewrite_and_attach(entry_connection_t *conn,
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tor_assert(!automap);
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rep_hist_note_used_resolve(now); /* help predict this next time */
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} else if (socks->command == SOCKS_COMMAND_CONNECT) {
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/* Special handling for attempts to connect */
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tor_assert(!automap);
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/* Don't allow connections to port 0. */
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if (socks->port == 0) {
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log_notice(LD_APP,"Application asked to connect to port 0. Refusing.");
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connection_mark_unattached_ap(conn, END_STREAM_REASON_TORPROTOCOL);
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return -1;
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}
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/* You can't make connections to internal addresses, by default.
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* Exceptions are begindir requests (where the address is meaningless,
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* or cases where you've hand-configured a particular exit, thereby
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* making the local address meaningful. */
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if (options->ClientRejectInternalAddresses &&
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!conn->use_begindir && !conn->chosen_exit_name && !circ) {
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/* If we reach this point then we don't want to allow internal
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* addresses. Check if we got one. */
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tor_addr_t addr;
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if (tor_addr_hostname_is_local(socks->address) ||
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(tor_addr_parse(&addr, socks->address) >= 0 &&
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@ -1273,31 +1353,46 @@ connection_ap_handshake_rewrite_and_attach(entry_connection_t *conn,
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connection_mark_unattached_ap(conn, END_STREAM_REASON_PRIVATE_ADDR);
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return -1;
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}
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}
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} /* end "if we should check for internal addresses" */
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/* Okay. We're still doing a CONNECT, and it wasn't a private
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* address. Do special handling for literal IP addresses */
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{
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tor_addr_t addr;
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/* XXX Duplicate call to tor_addr_parse. */
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if (tor_addr_parse(&addr, socks->address) >= 0) {
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/* If we reach this point, it's an IPv4 or an IPv6 address. */
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sa_family_t family = tor_addr_family(&addr);
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if ((family == AF_INET && ! conn->ipv4_traffic_ok) ||
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(family == AF_INET6 && ! conn->ipv4_traffic_ok)) {
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/* You can't do an IPv4 address on a v6-only socks listener,
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* or vice versa. */
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log_warn(LD_NET, "Rejecting SOCKS request for an IP address "
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"family that this listener does not support.");
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connection_mark_unattached_ap(conn, END_STREAM_REASON_ENTRYPOLICY);
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return -1;
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} else if (family == AF_INET6 && socks->socks_version == 4) {
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/* You can't make a socks4 request to an IPv6 address. Socks4
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* doesn't support that. */
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log_warn(LD_NET, "Rejecting SOCKS4 request for an IPv6 address.");
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connection_mark_unattached_ap(conn, END_STREAM_REASON_ENTRYPOLICY);
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return -1;
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} else if (socks->socks_version == 4 && !conn->ipv4_traffic_ok) {
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/* You can't do any kind of Socks4 request when IPv4 is forbidden.
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*
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* XXX raise this check outside the enclosing block? */
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log_warn(LD_NET, "Rejecting SOCKS4 request on a listener with "
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"no IPv4 traffic supported.");
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connection_mark_unattached_ap(conn, END_STREAM_REASON_ENTRYPOLICY);
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return -1;
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} else if (family == AF_INET6) {
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/* Tell the exit: we won't accept any ipv4 connection to an IPv6
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* address. */
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conn->ipv4_traffic_ok = 0;
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} else if (family == AF_INET) {
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/* Tell the exit: we won't accept any ipv6 connection to an IPv4
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* address. */
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conn->ipv6_traffic_ok = 0;
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}
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}
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@ -1306,6 +1401,9 @@ connection_ap_handshake_rewrite_and_attach(entry_connection_t *conn,
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if (socks->socks_version == 4)
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conn->ipv6_traffic_ok = 0;
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/* Still handling CONNECT. Now, check for exit enclaves. (Which we
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* don't do on BEGINDIR, or there is a chosen exit.)
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*/
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||||
if (!conn->use_begindir && !conn->chosen_exit_name && !circ) {
|
||||
/* see if we can find a suitable enclave exit */
|
||||
const node_t *r =
|
||||
@ -1322,11 +1420,13 @@ connection_ap_handshake_rewrite_and_attach(entry_connection_t *conn,
|
||||
}
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
/* warn or reject if it's using a dangerous port */
|
||||
/* Still handling CONNECT: warn or reject if it's using a dangerous
|
||||
* port. */
|
||||
if (!conn->use_begindir && !conn->chosen_exit_name && !circ)
|
||||
if (consider_plaintext_ports(conn, socks->port) < 0)
|
||||
return -1;
|
||||
|
||||
/* Remember the port so that we do predicted requests there. */
|
||||
if (!conn->use_begindir) {
|
||||
/* help predict this next time */
|
||||
rep_hist_note_used_port(now, socks->port);
|
||||
@ -1335,25 +1435,41 @@ connection_ap_handshake_rewrite_and_attach(entry_connection_t *conn,
|
||||
rep_hist_note_used_resolve(now); /* help predict this next time */
|
||||
/* no extra processing needed */
|
||||
} else {
|
||||
/* We should only be doing CONNECT or RESOLVE! */
|
||||
tor_fragile_assert();
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
/* Okay. At this point we've set chosen_exit_name if needed, rewritten the
|
||||
* address, and decided not to reject it for any number of reasons. Now
|
||||
* mark the connection as waiting for a circuit, and try to attach it!
|
||||
*/
|
||||
base_conn->state = AP_CONN_STATE_CIRCUIT_WAIT;
|
||||
if ((circ && connection_ap_handshake_attach_chosen_circuit(
|
||||
conn, circ, cpath) < 0) ||
|
||||
(!circ &&
|
||||
connection_ap_handshake_attach_circuit(conn) < 0)) {
|
||||
|
||||
/* If we were given a circuit to attach to, try to attach. Otherwise,
|
||||
* try to find a good one and attach to that. */
|
||||
int rv;
|
||||
if (circ)
|
||||
rv = connection_ap_handshake_attach_chosen_circuit(conn, circ, cpath);
|
||||
else
|
||||
rv = connection_ap_handshake_attach_circuit(conn);
|
||||
|
||||
/* If the above function returned 0 then we're waiting for a circuit.
|
||||
* if it returned 1, we're attached. Both are okay. But if it returned
|
||||
* -1, there was an error, so make sure the connection is marked, and
|
||||
* return -1. */
|
||||
if (rv < 0) {
|
||||
if (!base_conn->marked_for_close)
|
||||
connection_mark_unattached_ap(conn, END_STREAM_REASON_CANT_ATTACH);
|
||||
return -1;
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
return 0;
|
||||
} else {
|
||||
/* it's a hidden-service request */
|
||||
rend_cache_entry_t *entry;
|
||||
int r;
|
||||
rend_service_authorization_t *client_auth;
|
||||
rend_data_t *rend_data;
|
||||
/* If we get here, it's a request for a .onion address! */
|
||||
tor_assert(!automap);
|
||||
|
||||
/* Check whether it's RESOLVE or RESOLVE_PTR. We don't handle those
|
||||
* for hidden service addresses. */
|
||||
if (SOCKS_COMMAND_IS_RESOLVE(socks->command)) {
|
||||
/* if it's a resolve request, fail it right now, rather than
|
||||
* building all the circuits and then realizing it won't work. */
|
||||
@ -1367,6 +1483,8 @@ connection_ap_handshake_rewrite_and_attach(entry_connection_t *conn,
|
||||
return -1;
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
/* If we were passed a circuit, then we need to fail. .onion addresses
|
||||
* only work when we launch our own circuits for now. */
|
||||
if (circ) {
|
||||
log_warn(LD_CONTROL, "Attachstream to a circuit is not "
|
||||
"supported for .onion addresses currently. Failing.");
|
||||
@ -1374,15 +1492,22 @@ connection_ap_handshake_rewrite_and_attach(entry_connection_t *conn,
|
||||
return -1;
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
ENTRY_TO_EDGE_CONN(conn)->rend_data = rend_data =
|
||||
/* Fill in the rend_data field so we can start doing a connection to
|
||||
* a hidden service. */
|
||||
rend_data_t *rend_data = ENTRY_TO_EDGE_CONN(conn)->rend_data =
|
||||
tor_malloc_zero(sizeof(rend_data_t));
|
||||
strlcpy(rend_data->onion_address, socks->address,
|
||||
sizeof(rend_data->onion_address));
|
||||
log_info(LD_REND,"Got a hidden service request for ID '%s'",
|
||||
safe_str_client(rend_data->onion_address));
|
||||
/* see if we already have it cached */
|
||||
r = rend_cache_lookup_entry(rend_data->onion_address, -1, &entry);
|
||||
if (r<0) {
|
||||
|
||||
/* see if we already have a hidden service descriptor cached for this
|
||||
* address. */
|
||||
rend_cache_entry_t *entry = NULL;
|
||||
const int rend_cache_lookup_result =
|
||||
rend_cache_lookup_entry(rend_data->onion_address, -1, &entry);
|
||||
if (rend_cache_lookup_result < 0) {
|
||||
/* We should already have rejected this address! */
|
||||
log_warn(LD_BUG,"Invalid service name '%s'",
|
||||
safe_str_client(rend_data->onion_address));
|
||||
connection_mark_unattached_ap(conn, END_STREAM_REASON_TORPROTOCOL);
|
||||
@ -1393,8 +1518,10 @@ connection_ap_handshake_rewrite_and_attach(entry_connection_t *conn,
|
||||
* a stable circuit yet, but we know we'll need *something*. */
|
||||
rep_hist_note_used_internal(now, 0, 1);
|
||||
|
||||
/* Look up if we have client authorization for it. */
|
||||
client_auth = rend_client_lookup_service_authorization(
|
||||
/* Look up if we have client authorization configured for this hidden
|
||||
* service. If we do, associate it with the rend_data. */
|
||||
rend_service_authorization_t *client_auth =
|
||||
rend_client_lookup_service_authorization(
|
||||
rend_data->onion_address);
|
||||
if (client_auth) {
|
||||
log_info(LD_REND, "Using previously configured client authorization "
|
||||
@ -1403,12 +1530,16 @@ connection_ap_handshake_rewrite_and_attach(entry_connection_t *conn,
|
||||
client_auth->descriptor_cookie, REND_DESC_COOKIE_LEN);
|
||||
rend_data->auth_type = client_auth->auth_type;
|
||||
}
|
||||
if (r==0) {
|
||||
|
||||
/* Now, we either launch an attempt to connect to the hidden service,
|
||||
* or we launch an attempt to look up its descriptor, depending on
|
||||
* whether we had the descriptor. */
|
||||
if (rend_cache_lookup_result == 0) {
|
||||
base_conn->state = AP_CONN_STATE_RENDDESC_WAIT;
|
||||
log_info(LD_REND, "Unknown descriptor %s. Fetching.",
|
||||
safe_str_client(rend_data->onion_address));
|
||||
rend_client_refetch_v2_renddesc(rend_data);
|
||||
} else { /* r > 0 */
|
||||
} else { /* rend_cache_lookup_result > 0 */
|
||||
base_conn->state = AP_CONN_STATE_CIRCUIT_WAIT;
|
||||
log_info(LD_REND, "Descriptor is here. Great.");
|
||||
if (connection_ap_handshake_attach_circuit(conn) < 0) {
|
||||
@ -1419,6 +1550,7 @@ connection_ap_handshake_rewrite_and_attach(entry_connection_t *conn,
|
||||
}
|
||||
return 0;
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
return 0; /* unreached but keeps the compiler happy */
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
@ -151,8 +151,8 @@ typedef struct {
|
||||
*/
|
||||
char orig_address[MAX_SOCKS_ADDR_LEN];
|
||||
/** True iff the address has been automatically remapped to a local
|
||||
* address in VirtualAddrNetwork. (Only set true the first time we
|
||||
* do the mapping.) */
|
||||
* address in VirtualAddrNetwork. (Only set true when we do a resolve
|
||||
* and get a virtual address; not when we connect to the address.) */
|
||||
int automap;
|
||||
/** If this connection has a .exit address, who put it there? */
|
||||
addressmap_entry_source_t exit_source;
|
||||
|
||||
Loading…
Reference in New Issue
Block a user