Resolve some XXXs

svn:r1889

src/common/tortls.c

@@ -375,7 +375,10 @@ tor_tls_context_new(crypto_pk_env_t *identity,
     SSL_CTX_free(result->ctx);
   if (result)
     free(result);
-  /* leak certs XXXX ? */
+  if (cert)
+    X509_free(cert);
+  if (idcert)
+    X509_free(cert);
   return -1;
 }
 
@@ -641,7 +644,8 @@ tor_tls_verify(tor_tls *tls, crypto_pk_env_t *identity_key)
   if (id_pkey)
     EVP_PKEY_free(id_pkey);
 
-  /* XXXX This should never get invoked, but let's make sure for now. */
+  /* This should never get invoked, but let's make sure in case OpenSSL
+   * acts unexpectedly. */
   tls_log_errors(LOG_WARN, "finishing tor_tls_verify");
 
   return r;

src/common/util.c

@@ -1323,7 +1323,28 @@ write_str_to_file(const char *fname, const char *str)
     return -1;
   }
   fclose(file);
-  /* XXXX This won't work on windows: you can't use rename to replace a file.*/
+
+#ifdef MS_WINDOWS
+  /* On Windows, rename doesn't replace.  We could call ReplaceFile, but
+   * that's hard, and we can probably sneak by without atomicity. */
+  switch (file_status(fname)) {
+    case FN_ERROR:
+      log(LOG_WARN, "Error replacing %s: %s", fname, strerror(errno));
+      return -1;
+    case FN_DIR:
+      log(LOG_WARN, "Error replacing %s: is directory", fname);
+      return -1;
+    case FN_FILE:
+      if (unlink(fname)) {
+        log(LOG_WARN, "Error replacing %s while removing old copy: %s",
+            fname, strerror(errno));
+        return -1;
+      }
+      break;
+    case FN_NOENT:
+      ;
+  }
+#endif
   if (rename(tempname, fname)) {
     log(LOG_WARN, "Error replacing %s: %s", fname, strerror(errno));
     return -1;

src/common/util.h

@@ -77,10 +77,12 @@
 #define tor_close_socket(s) close(s)
 #endif
 
-
-/* XXXX This isn't so on windows. */
 /** Legal characters in a filename */
-#define CONFIG_LEGAL_FILENAME_CHARACTERS "abcdefghijklmnopqrstuvwxyzABCDEFGHIJKLMNOPQRSTUVWXYZ0123456789.-_/"
+#ifdef MS_WINDOWS
+#define CONFIG_LEGAL_FILENAME_CHARACTERS "abcdefghijklmnopqrstuvwxyzABCDEFGHIJKLMNOPQRSTUVWXYZ0123456789.-_/\\ "
+#else
+#define CONFIG_LEGAL_FILENAME_CHARACTERS "abcdefghijklmnopqrstuvwxyzABCDEFGHIJKLMNOPQRSTUVWXYZ0123456789.-_/ "
+#endif
 
 size_t strlcat(char *dst, const char *src, size_t siz);
 size_t strlcpy(char *dst, const char *src, size_t siz);

src/or/buffers.c

@@ -91,29 +91,13 @@ static INLINE void buf_remove_from_front(buf_t *buf, size_t n) {
   buf_shrink_if_underfull(buf);
 }
 
-/** Find the first instance of the str_len byte string <b>str</b> on the
- * buf_len byte string <b>bufstr</b>.  Strings are not necessary
- * NUL-terminated. If none exists, return -1.  Otherwise, return index
- * of the first character in bufstr _after_ the first instance of str.
- */
-/* XXXX The way this function is used, we could always get away with
- * XXXX assuming that str is NUL terminated, and use strstr instead. */
-static int find_mem_in_mem(const char *str, int str_len,
-                           const char *bufstr, int buf_len)
+/** Make sure that the memory in buf ends with a zero byte. */
+static INLINE int buf_nul_terminate(buf_t *buf)
 {
-  const char *location;
-  const char *last_possible = bufstr + buf_len - str_len;
-
-  tor_assert(str && str_len > 0 && bufstr);
-
-  if(buf_len < str_len)
-    return -1;
-
-  for(location = bufstr; location <= last_possible; location++)
-    if((*location == *str) && !memcmp(location+1, str+1, str_len-1))
-      return location-bufstr+str_len;
-
+  if (buf_ensure_capacity(buf,buf->len+1)<0)
     return -1;
+  buf->mem[buf->len] = '\0';
+  return 0;
 }
 
 /** Create and return a new buf with capacity <b>size</b>.
@@ -366,19 +350,22 @@ int fetch_from_buf(char *string, size_t string_len, buf_t *buf) {
 int fetch_from_buf_http(buf_t *buf,
                         char **headers_out, int max_headerlen,
                         char **body_out, int *body_used, int max_bodylen) {
-  char *headers, *body;
-  int i;
+  char *headers, *body, *p;
   int headerlen, bodylen, contentlen;
 
   assert_buf_ok(buf);
 
   headers = buf->mem;
-  i = find_mem_in_mem("\r\n\r\n", 4, buf->mem, buf->datalen);
-  if(i < 0) {
+  if (buf_nul_terminate(buf)<0) {
+    log_fn(LOG_WARN,"Couldn't nul-terminate buffer");
+    return -1;
+  }
+  body = strstr(headers,"\r\n\r\n");
+  if (!body) {
     log_fn(LOG_DEBUG,"headers not all here yet.");
     return 0;
   }
-  body = buf->mem+i;
+  body += 4; /* Skip the the CRLFCRLF */
   headerlen = body-headers; /* includes the CRLFCRLF */
   bodylen = buf->datalen - headerlen;
   log_fn(LOG_DEBUG,"headerlen %d, bodylen %d.", headerlen, bodylen);
@@ -393,10 +380,9 @@ int fetch_from_buf_http(buf_t *buf,
   }
 
 #define CONTENT_LENGTH "\r\nContent-Length: "
-  i = find_mem_in_mem(CONTENT_LENGTH, strlen(CONTENT_LENGTH),
-                      headers, headerlen);
-  if(i > 0) {
-    contentlen = atoi(headers+i);
+  p = strstr(headers, CONTENT_LENGTH);
+  if (p) {
+    contentlen = atoi(p+strlen(CONTENT_LENGTH));
     /* if content-length is malformed, then our body length is 0. fine. */
     log_fn(LOG_DEBUG,"Got a contentlen of %d.",contentlen);
     if(bodylen < contentlen) {

src/or/circuitlist.c

@@ -419,25 +419,23 @@ void assert_cpath_layer_ok(const crypt_path_t *cp)
  * correct. Trigger an assert if anything is invalid.
  */
 static void
- assert_cpath_ok(const crypt_path_t *cp)
+assert_cpath_ok(const crypt_path_t *cp)
 {
-  while(cp->prev)
-    cp = cp->prev;
-  //XXX this is broken. cp is a doubly linked list.
+  const crypt_path_t *start = cp;
 
-  while(cp->next) {
+  do {
     assert_cpath_layer_ok(cp);
     /* layers must be in sequence of: "open* awaiting? closed*" */
-    if (cp->prev) {
-      if (cp->prev->state == CPATH_STATE_OPEN) {
-        tor_assert(cp->state == CPATH_STATE_CLOSED ||
-                   cp->state == CPATH_STATE_AWAITING_KEYS);
-      } else {
-        tor_assert(cp->state == CPATH_STATE_CLOSED);
+    if (cp != start) {
+      if (cp->state == CPATH_STATE_AWAITING_KEYS) {
+        tor_assert(cp->prev->state == CPATH_STATE_OPEN);
+      } else if (cp->state == CPATH_STATE_OPEN) {
+        tor_assert(cp->prev->state == CPATH_STATE_OPEN);
       }
     }
     cp = cp->next;
-  }
+    tor_assert(cp);
+  } while (cp != start);
 }
 
 /** Verify that circuit <b>c</b> has all of its invariants
@@ -479,8 +477,7 @@ void assert_circuit_ok(const circuit_t *c)
     }
   }
   if (c->cpath) {
-//    assert_cpath_ok(c->cpath);
-// XXX the above call causes an infinite loop.
+    assert_cpath_ok(c->cpath);
   }
   if (c->purpose == CIRCUIT_PURPOSE_REND_ESTABLISHED) {
     if (!c->marked_for_close) {

src/or/dirserv.c

@@ -331,9 +331,12 @@ dirserv_add_descriptor(const char **desc)
     free_descriptor_entry(*desc_ent_ptr);
   } else {
     /* Add this at the end. */
+    if (n_descriptors >= MAX_ROUTERS_IN_DIR) {
+      log_fn(LOG_WARN,"Too many descriptors in directory; can't add another.");
+    } else {
       log_fn(LOG_INFO,"Dirserv adding desc for nickname %s",ri->nickname);
       desc_ent_ptr = &descriptor_list[n_descriptors++];
-    /* XXX check if n_descriptors is too big */
+    }
   }
 
   (*desc_ent_ptr) = tor_malloc(sizeof(descriptor_entry_t));

src/or/main.c

@@ -215,8 +215,6 @@ static void conn_read(int i) {
     connection_handle_read(conn) < 0) {
       if (!conn->marked_for_close) {
         /* this connection is broken. remove it */
-        /* XXX This shouldn't ever happen anymore. */
-        /* XXX but it'll clearly happen on MS_WINDOWS from POLLERR, right? */
         log_fn(LOG_ERR,"Unhandled error on read for %s connection (fd %d); removing",
                CONN_TYPE_TO_STRING(conn->type), conn->s);
         connection_mark_for_close(conn);
@@ -289,7 +287,6 @@ static void conn_close_if_marked(int i) {
     if(connection_speaks_cells(conn)) {
       if(conn->state == OR_CONN_STATE_OPEN) {
         retval = flush_buf_tls(conn->tls, conn->outbuf, &conn->outbuf_flushlen);
-        /* XXX actually, some non-zero results are maybe ok. which ones? */
       } else
         retval = -1; /* never flush non-open broken tls connections */
     } else {

src/or/rendcommon.c

@@ -44,7 +44,7 @@ rend_encode_service_descriptor(rend_service_descriptor_t *desc,
   char *buf, *cp, *ipoint;
   int i, keylen, asn1len;
   keylen = crypto_pk_keysize(desc->pk);
-  buf = tor_malloc(keylen*2); /* XXXX */
+  buf = tor_malloc(keylen*2); /* Too long, but that's okay. */
   asn1len = crypto_pk_asn1_encode(desc->pk, buf, keylen*2);
   if (asn1len<0) {
     tor_free(buf);

src/or/rendservice.c

@@ -482,7 +482,7 @@ rend_service_relaunch_rendezvous(circuit_t *oldcirc)
   circuit_t *newcirc;
   cpath_build_state_t *newstate, *oldstate;
 
-  /* XXXX assert type and build_state */
+  tor_assert(oldcirc->purpose == CIRCUIT_PURPOSE_S_CONNECT_REND);
 
   if (!oldcirc->build_state ||
       oldcirc->build_state->failure_count > MAX_REND_FAILURES) {

src/or/rephist.c

@@ -154,10 +154,9 @@ void rep_hist_note_connection_died(const char* nickname, time_t when)
 {
   or_history_t *hist;
   if(!nickname) {
-    /* XXX
-     * If conn has no nickname, it's either an OP, or it is an OR
+    /* If conn has no nickname, it's either an OP, or it is an OR
      * which didn't complete its handshake (or did and was unapproved).
-     * Ignore it. Is there anything better we could do?
+     * Ignore it.
      */
     return;
   }

src/or/routerparse.c

@@ -8,10 +8,9 @@
  * \brief Code to parse and validate router descriptors and directories.
  **/
 
-#define _GNU_SOURCE
-/* XXX this is required on rh7 to make strptime not complain. how bad
- * is this for portability?
+/* This is required on rh7 to make strptime not complain.
  */
+#define _GNU_SOURCE
 
 #include "or.h"
 
@@ -32,7 +31,7 @@ typedef enum {
   K_SIGNED_DIRECTORY,
   K_SIGNING_KEY,
   K_ONION_KEY,
-  K_LINK_KEY, /* XXXX obsolete */
+  K_LINK_KEY, /* XXXX obsolete; remove in June. */
   K_ROUTER_SIGNATURE,
   K_PUBLISHED,
   K_RUNNING_ROUTERS,