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some more thoughts on scope; probably should not get into the final
paper as-is. ok, i'm done for now. svn:r3431
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@ -273,7 +273,16 @@ networks.
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\subsection{Other}
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Tor's scope: How much should Tor aim to do? Applications that leak
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data. We can say they're not our problem, but they're somebody's problem.
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data: we can say they're not our problem, but they're somebody's problem.
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Also, the more widely deployed Tor becomes, the more people who need a
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deployed overlay network tell us they'd like to use us if only we added
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the following more features. For example, Blossom \cite{blossom} and
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random community wireless projects both want source-routable overlay
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networks for their own purposes. Fortunately, our modular design separates
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routing from node discovery; so we could implement Morphmix in Tor just
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by implementing the Morphmix-specific node discovery and path selection
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pieces. On the other hand, we could easily get distracted building a
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general-purpose overlay library, and we're only a few developers.
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Should we allow revocation of anonymity if a threshold of
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servers want to?
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