nihilist/tor
1
0
Fork 0
mirror of https://gitlab.torproject.org/tpo/core/tor.git synced 2024-11-24 20:33:31 +01:00
Code Issues Packages Projects Releases Wiki Activity

some more thoughts on scope; probably should not get into the final

Browse Source 
paper as-is. ok, i'm done for now.


svn:r3431
This commit is contained in:
Roger Dingledine 2005-01-26 12:49:34 +00:00
parent 69a46ff522
commit 7187ab480e
1 changed files with 10 additions and 1 deletions
Show Stats Download Patch File Download Diff File Expand all files Collapse all files

11
doc/design-paper/challenges.tex
View File

@ -273,7 +273,16 @@ networks.
\subsection{Other} \subsection{Other}
Tor's scope: How much should Tor aim to do? Applications that leak Tor's scope: How much should Tor aim to do? Applications that leak
data. We can say they're not our problem, but they're somebody's problem. data: we can say they're not our problem, but they're somebody's problem.
Also, the more widely deployed Tor becomes, the more people who need a
deployed overlay network tell us they'd like to use us if only we added
the following more features. For example, Blossom \cite{blossom} and
random community wireless projects both want source-routable overlay
networks for their own purposes. Fortunately, our modular design separates
routing from node discovery; so we could implement Morphmix in Tor just
by implementing the Morphmix-specific node discovery and path selection
pieces. On the other hand, we could easily get distracted building a
general-purpose overlay library, and we're only a few developers.
Should we allow revocation of anonymity if a threshold of Should we allow revocation of anonymity if a threshold of
servers want to? servers want to?