nihilist/tor
1
0
Fork 0
mirror of https://gitlab.torproject.org/tpo/core/tor.git synced 2024-11-28 14:23:30 +01:00
Code Issues Packages Projects Releases Wiki Activity

hs: Refactor the service exit connection code

Browse Source 
This commit simply moves the code from the if condition of a rendezvous
circuit to a function to handle such a connection. No code was modified
_except_ the use or rh.stream_id changed to n_stream->stream_id so we don't
have to pass the cell header to the function.

This is groundwork for prop224 support which will break down the
handle_hs_exit_conn() depending on the version of hidden service the circuit
and edge connection is for.

Signed-off-by: David Goulet <dgoulet@torproject.org>
This commit is contained in:
David Goulet 2017-05-10 13:43:37 -04:00 committed by Nick Mathewson
parent 5d2506d70c
commit 7163ce7f62
1 changed files with 61 additions and 51 deletions
Show Stats Download Patch File Download Diff File Expand all files Collapse all files

112
src/or/connection_edge.c
View File

@ -3066,6 +3066,64 @@ begin_cell_parse(const cell_t *cell, begin_cell_t *bcell,
return 0;
}
/** For the given <b>circ</b> and the edge connection <b>n_stream</b>, setup
* the the connection, attach it to the circ and connect it. Return 0 on
* success or END_CIRC_AT_ORIGIN if we can't find the requested hidden
* service port where the caller should close the circuit. */
static int
handle_hs_exit_conn(circuit_t *circ, edge_connection_t *n_stream)
{
origin_circuit_t *origin_circ = TO_ORIGIN_CIRCUIT(circ);
log_info(LD_REND,"begin is for rendezvous. configuring stream.");
n_stream->base_.address = tor_strdup("(rendezvous)");
n_stream->base_.state = EXIT_CONN_STATE_CONNECTING;
n_stream->rend_data = rend_data_dup(origin_circ->rend_data);
tor_assert(connection_edge_is_rendezvous_stream(n_stream));
assert_circuit_ok(circ);
const int r = rend_service_set_connection_addr_port(n_stream, origin_circ);
if (r < 0) {
log_info(LD_REND,"Didn't find rendezvous service (port %d)",
n_stream->base_.port);
/* Send back reason DONE because we want to make hidden service port
* scanning harder thus instead of returning that the exit policy
* didn't match, which makes it obvious that the port is closed,
* return DONE and kill the circuit. That way, a user (malicious or
* not) needs one circuit per bad port unless it matches the policy of
* the hidden service. */
relay_send_end_cell_from_edge(n_stream->stream_id, circ,
END_STREAM_REASON_DONE,
origin_circ->cpath->prev);
connection_free(TO_CONN(n_stream));
/* Drop the circuit here since it might be someone deliberately
* scanning the hidden service ports. Note that this mitigates port
* scanning by adding more work on the attacker side to successfully
* scan but does not fully solve it. */
if (r < -1)
return END_CIRC_AT_ORIGIN;
else
return 0;
}
assert_circuit_ok(circ);
log_debug(LD_REND,"Finished assigning addr/port");
n_stream->cpath_layer = origin_circ->cpath->prev; /* link it */
/* add it into the linked list of p_streams on this circuit */
n_stream->next_stream = origin_circ->p_streams;
n_stream->on_circuit = circ;
origin_circ->p_streams = n_stream;
assert_circuit_ok(circ);
origin_circ->rend_data->nr_streams++;
connection_exit_connect(n_stream);
/* For path bias: This circuit was used successfully */
pathbias_mark_use_success(origin_circ);
return 0;
}
/** A relay 'begin' or 'begin_dir' cell has arrived, and either we are
* an exit hop for the circuit, or we are the origin and it is a
* rendezvous begin.
@ -3217,58 +3275,10 @@ connection_exit_begin_conn(cell_t *cell, circuit_t *circ)
n_stream->deliver_window = STREAMWINDOW_START;
if (circ->purpose == CIRCUIT_PURPOSE_S_REND_JOINED) {
tor_assert(origin_circ);
log_info(LD_REND,"begin is for rendezvous. configuring stream.");
n_stream->base_.address = tor_strdup("(rendezvous)");
n_stream->base_.state = EXIT_CONN_STATE_CONNECTING;
n_stream->rend_data = rend_data_dup(origin_circ->rend_data);
tor_assert(connection_edge_is_rendezvous_stream(n_stream));
assert_circuit_ok(circ);
const int r = rend_service_set_connection_addr_port(n_stream, origin_circ);
if (r < 0) {
log_info(LD_REND,"Didn't find rendezvous service (port %d)",
n_stream->base_.port);
/* Send back reason DONE because we want to make hidden service port
* scanning harder thus instead of returning that the exit policy
* didn't match, which makes it obvious that the port is closed,
* return DONE and kill the circuit. That way, a user (malicious or
* not) needs one circuit per bad port unless it matches the policy of
* the hidden service. */
relay_send_end_cell_from_edge(rh.stream_id, circ,
END_STREAM_REASON_DONE,
layer_hint);
connection_free(TO_CONN(n_stream));
tor_free(address);
/* Drop the circuit here since it might be someone deliberately
* scanning the hidden service ports. Note that this mitigates port
* scanning by adding more work on the attacker side to successfully
* scan but does not fully solve it. */
if (r < -1)
return END_CIRC_AT_ORIGIN;
else
return 0;
}
assert_circuit_ok(circ);
log_debug(LD_REND,"Finished assigning addr/port");
n_stream->cpath_layer = origin_circ->cpath->prev; /* link it */
/* add it into the linked list of p_streams on this circuit */
n_stream->next_stream = origin_circ->p_streams;
n_stream->on_circuit = circ;
origin_circ->p_streams = n_stream;
assert_circuit_ok(circ);
origin_circ->rend_data->nr_streams++;
connection_exit_connect(n_stream);
/* For path bias: This circuit was used successfully */
pathbias_mark_use_success(origin_circ);
tor_free(address);
return 0;
/* We handle this circuit and stream in this function for all supported
* hidden service version. */
return handle_hs_exit_conn(circ, n_stream);
}
tor_strlower(address);
n_stream->base_.address = address;