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stop checking for clock skew, even for servers.
this means we are vulnerable to an attack where somebody recovers and uses a really old certificate. however, if they do that, they probably can get our identity key just as easily. svn:r3241
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@ -391,6 +391,7 @@ connection_tls_finish_handshake(connection_t *conn) {
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log_fn(LOG_WARN, "Identity key not as expected for router claiming to be '%s' (%s:%d) ", nickname, conn->address, conn->port);
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return -1;
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}
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#if 0
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if (router_get_by_digest(digest_rcvd)) {
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/* This is a known router; don't cut it slack with its clock skew. */
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if (tor_tls_check_lifetime(conn->tls, TIGHT_CERT_ALLOW_SKEW)<0) {
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@ -399,6 +400,7 @@ connection_tls_finish_handshake(connection_t *conn) {
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return -1;
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}
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}
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#endif
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if (connection_or_nonopen_was_started_here(conn)) {
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/* I initiated this connection. */
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