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https://gitlab.torproject.org/tpo/core/tor.git
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Implement cert/auth cell reading
This commit is contained in:
Nick Mathewson
parent
81024f43ec
commit
6c7f28454e
278
src/or/command.c
278
src/or/command.c
@ -660,3 +660,281 @@ command_process_netinfo_cell(cell_t *cell, or_connection_t *conn)
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assert_connection_ok(TO_CONN(conn),time(NULL));
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}
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/** Process a CERT cell from an OR connection.
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*
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* If the other side should not have sent us a CERT cell, or the cell is
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* malformed, or it is supposed to authenticate the TLS key but it doesn't,
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* then mark the connection.
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*
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* If the cell has a good cert chain and we're doing a v3 handshake, then
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* store the certificates in or_handshake_state. If this is the client side
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* of the connection, we then authenticate the server or mark the connection.
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* If it's the server side, wait for an AUTHENTICATE cell.
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*/
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static void
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command_process_cert_cell(var_cell_t *cell, or_connection_t *conn)
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{
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#define ERR(s) \
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do { \
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log_fn(LOG_PROTOCOL_WARN, LD_PROTOCOL, \
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"Received a bad CERT cell from %s:%d: %s", \
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conn->_base.address, conn->_base.port, (s)); \
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connection_mark_for_close(TO_CONN(conn)); \
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goto err; \
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} while (0)
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tor_cert_t *link_cert = NULL;
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tor_cert_t *id_cert = NULL;
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tor_cert_t *auth_cert = NULL;
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uint8_t *ptr;
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int n_certs, i;
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if (conn->_base.state != OR_CONN_STATE_OR_HANDSHAKING_V3)
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ERR("We're not doing a v3 handshake!");
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if (conn->handshake_state->received_cert_cell)
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ERR("We already got one");
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if (cell->payload_len < 1)
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ERR("It had no body");
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if (cell->circ_id)
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ERR("It had a nonzero circuit ID");
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n_certs = cell->payload[0];
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ptr = cell->payload + 1;
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for (i = 0; i < n_certs; ++i) {
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uint8_t cert_type;
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uint16_t cert_len;
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if (ptr + 3 > cell->payload + cell->payload_len) {
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goto truncated;
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}
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cert_type = *ptr;
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cert_len = ntohs(get_uint16(ptr+1));
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if (ptr + 3 + cert_len > cell->payload + cell->payload_len) {
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goto truncated;
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}
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if (cert_type == OR_CERT_TYPE_TLS_LINK ||
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cert_type == OR_CERT_TYPE_ID_1024 ||
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cert_type == OR_CERT_TYPE_AUTH_1024) {
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tor_cert_t *cert = tor_cert_decode(ptr + 3, cert_len);
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if (!cert) {
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log_fn(LOG_PROTOCOL_WARN, LD_PROTOCOL,
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"Received undecodable certificate in CERT cell from %s:%d",
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conn->_base.address, conn->_base.port);
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} else {
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if (cert_type == OR_CERT_TYPE_TLS_LINK && !link_cert)
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link_cert = cert;
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else if (cert_type == OR_CERT_TYPE_ID_1024 && !id_cert)
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id_cert = cert;
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else if (cert_type == OR_CERT_TYPE_AUTH_1024 && !auth_cert)
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auth_cert = cert;
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else
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tor_cert_free(cert);
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}
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}
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ptr += 3 + cert_len;
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continue;
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truncated:
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ERR("It ends in the middle of a certificate");
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}
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if (conn->handshake_state->started_here) {
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if (! (id_cert && link_cert))
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ERR("The certs we wanted were missing");
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/* Okay. We should be able to check the certificates now. */
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if (! tor_tls_cert_matches_key(conn->tls, link_cert)) {
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ERR("The link certificate didn't match the TLS public key");
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}
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if (! tor_tls_cert_is_valid(link_cert, id_cert))
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ERR("The link certificate was not valid");
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if (! tor_tls_cert_is_valid(id_cert, id_cert))
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ERR("The ID certificate was not valid");
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/* XXXX okay, we just got authentication. Do something about that. */
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conn->handshake_state->id_cert = id_cert;
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id_cert = NULL;
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} else {
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if (! (id_cert && auth_cert))
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ERR("The certs we wanted were missing");
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/* Remember these certificates so we can check an AUTHENTICATE cell */
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conn->handshake_state->id_cert = id_cert;
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conn->handshake_state->auth_cert = auth_cert;
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if (! tor_tls_cert_is_valid(auth_cert, id_cert))
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ERR("The authentication certificate was not valid");
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if (! tor_tls_cert_is_valid(id_cert, id_cert))
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ERR("The ID certificate was not valid");
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/* XXXX check more stuff? */
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id_cert = auth_cert = NULL;
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}
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conn->handshake_state->received_cert_cell = 1;
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err:
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tor_cert_free(id_cert);
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tor_cert_free(link_cert);
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tor_cert_free(auth_cert);
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#undef ERR
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}
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/** Process an AUTH_CHALLENGE cell from an OR connection.
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*
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* If we weren't supposed to get one (for example, because we're not the
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* originator of the connection), or it's ill-formed, or we aren't doing a v3
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* handshake, mark the connection. If the cell is well-formed but we don't
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* want to authenticate, just drop it. If the cell is well-formed *and* we
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* want to authenticate, send an AUTHENTICATE cell. */
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static void
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command_process_auth_challenge_cell(var_cell_t *cell, or_connection_t *conn)
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{
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int n_types, i, use_type = -1;
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uint8_t *cp;
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#define ERR(s) \
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do { \
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log_fn(LOG_PROTOCOL_WARN, LD_PROTOCOL, \
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"Received a bad AUTH_CHALLENGE cell from %s:%d: %s", \
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conn->_base.address, conn->_base.port, (s)); \
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connection_mark_for_close(TO_CONN(conn)); \
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return; \
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} while (0)
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if (conn->_base.state != OR_CONN_STATE_OR_HANDSHAKING_V3)
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ERR("We're not currently doing a v3 handshake");
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if (! conn->handshake_state->started_here)
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ERR("We didn't originate this connection");
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if (conn->handshake_state->received_auth_challenge)
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ERR("We already received one");
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if (cell->payload_len < OR_AUTH_CHALLENGE_LEN + 2)
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ERR("It was too short");
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if (cell->circ_id)
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ERR("It had a nonzero circuit ID");
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n_types = ntohs(get_uint16(cell->payload + OR_AUTH_CHALLENGE_LEN));
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if (cell->payload_len < OR_AUTH_CHALLENGE_LEN + 2 + 2*n_types)
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ERR("It looks truncated");
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memcpy(conn->handshake_state->auth_challenge, cell->payload,
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OR_AUTH_CHALLENGE_LEN);
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/* Now see if there is an authentication type we can use */
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cp=cell->payload+OR_AUTH_CHALLENGE_LEN+2;
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for (i=0; i < n_types; ++i, cp += 2) {
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uint16_t authtype = ntohs(get_uint16(cp));
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if (authtype == AUTHTYPE_RSA_SHA256_TLSSECRET)
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use_type = authtype;
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}
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conn->handshake_state->received_auth_challenge = 1;
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/* Send back authentication if we want, and if use_type is set */
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#undef ERR
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}
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/** Process an AUTHENTICATE cell from an OR connection.
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*
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* If it's ill-formed or we weren't supposed to get one or we're not doing a
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* v3 handshake, then mark the connection. If it does not authenticate the
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* other side of the connection successfully (because it isn't signed right,
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* we didn't get a CERT cell, etc) mark the connection. Otherwise, accept
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* the identity of the router on the other side of the connection.
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*/
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static void
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command_process_authenticate_cell(or_connection_t *conn, var_cell_t *cell)
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{
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uint8_t expected[V3_AUTH_FIXED_PART_LEN];
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const uint8_t *auth;
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int authlen;
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#define ERR(s) \
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do { \
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log_fn(LOG_PROTOCOL_WARN, LD_PROTOCOL, \
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"Received a bad AUTHETNICATE cell from %s:%d: %s", \
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conn->_base.address, conn->_base.port, (s)); \
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connection_mark_for_close(TO_CONN(conn)); \
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return; \
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} while (0)
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if (conn->_base.state != OR_CONN_STATE_OR_HANDSHAKING_V3)
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ERR("We're not doing a v3 handshake");
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if (! conn->handshake_state->started_here)
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ERR("We originated this connection");
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if (conn->handshake_state->received_authenticate)
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ERR("We already got one!");
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if (conn->handshake_state->auth_cert == NULL)
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ERR("We never got an authentication certificate");
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if (cell->payload_len < 4)
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ERR("Cell was way too short");
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auth = cell->payload;
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{
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uint16_t type = ntohs(get_uint16(auth));
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uint16_t len = ntohs(get_uint16(auth+2));
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if (4 + len > cell->payload_len)
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ERR("Authenticator was truncated");
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if (type != AUTHTYPE_RSA_SHA256_TLSSECRET)
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ERR("Authenticator type was not recognized");
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auth += 4;
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authlen = len;
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}
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if (authlen < V3_AUTH_BODY_LEN + 1)
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ERR("Authenticator was too short");
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if (connection_or_compute_authenticate_cell_body(
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conn, expected, sizeof(expected), NULL, 1) < 0)
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ERR("Couldn't compute expected AUTHENTICATE cell body");
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if (tor_memneq(expected, auth, sizeof(expected)))
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ERR("Some field in the AUTHENTICATE cell body was not as expected");
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{
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crypto_pk_env_t *pk = tor_tls_cert_get_key(
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conn->handshake_state->auth_cert);
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char d[DIGEST256_LEN];
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char *signed_data;
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size_t keysize;
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int signed_len;
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crypto_digest256(d, (char*)auth, V3_AUTH_BODY_LEN, DIGEST_SHA256);
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keysize = crypto_pk_keysize(pk);
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signed_data = tor_malloc(keysize);
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signed_len = crypto_pk_public_checksig(pk, signed_data, keysize,
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(char*)auth + V3_AUTH_BODY_LEN,
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authlen - V3_AUTH_BODY_LEN);
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if (signed_len < 0) {
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tor_free(signed_data);
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ERR("Signature wasn't valid");
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}
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if (signed_len < DIGEST256_LEN) {
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tor_free(signed_data);
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ERR("Not enough data was signed");
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}
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if (tor_memneq(signed_data, d, DIGEST256_LEN)) {
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tor_free(signed_data);
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ERR("Signature did not match data to be signed.");
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}
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tor_free(signed_data);
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}
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/* XXXX we're authenticated. Now remember the fact, and remember whom we're
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authenticated to. */
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conn->handshake_state->received_authenticate = 1;
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#undef ERR
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}
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void dummy_function(void);
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void dummy_function(void)
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{
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/* this is only here to avoid 'static function isn't used' warnings */
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command_process_auth_challenge_cell(NULL, NULL);
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command_process_cert_cell(NULL, NULL);
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command_process_authenticate_cell(NULL, NULL);
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}
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@ -1761,10 +1761,6 @@ connection_or_send_netinfo(or_connection_t *conn)
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return 0;
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}
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/** DOCDOC */
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#define OR_CERT_TYPE_TLS_LINK 1
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#define OR_CERT_TYPE_ID_1024 2
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/** Send a CERT cell on the connection <b>conn</b>. Return 0 on success, -1
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* on failure. */
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int
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@ -1846,23 +1842,17 @@ connection_or_send_auth_challenge_cell(or_connection_t *conn)
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return 0;
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}
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/** DOCDOC */
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#define V3_HS_AUTH_FIXED_PART_LEN (8+(32*6))
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#define V3_HS_AUTH_BODY_LEN (V3_HS_AUTH_FIXED_PART_LEN + 8 + 16)
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#define AUTHTYPE_RSA_SHA256_TLSSECRET 1
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/** Compute the main body of an AUTHENTICATE cell that a client can use
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* to authenticate itself on a v3 handshake for <b>conn</b>. Write it to the
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* <b>outlen</b>-byte buffer at <b>out</b>.
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*
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* If <b>server</b> is true, only calculate the first
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* V3_HS_AUTH_FIXED_PART_LEN bytes -- the part of the authenticator that's
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* V3_AUTH_FIXED_PART_LEN bytes -- the part of the authenticator that's
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* determined by the rest of the handshake, and which match the provided value
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* exactly.
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*
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* If <b>server</b> is false and <b>signing_key</b> is NULL, calculate the
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* first V3_HS_AUTH_BODY_LEN bytes of the authenticator (that is, everything
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* first V3_AUTH_BODY_LEN bytes of the authenticator (that is, everything
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* that should be signed), but don't actually sign it.
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*
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* If <b>server</b> is false and <b>signing_key</b> is provided, calculate the
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@ -1878,8 +1868,8 @@ connection_or_compute_authenticate_cell_body(or_connection_t *conn,
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/* assert state is reasonable XXXX */
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if (outlen < V3_HS_AUTH_FIXED_PART_LEN ||
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(!server && outlen < V3_HS_AUTH_BODY_LEN))
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if (outlen < V3_AUTH_FIXED_PART_LEN ||
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(!server && outlen < V3_AUTH_BODY_LEN))
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return -1;
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ptr = out;
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@ -1950,7 +1940,7 @@ connection_or_compute_authenticate_cell_body(or_connection_t *conn,
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tor_tls_get_tlssecrets(conn->tls, ptr);
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ptr += 32;
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tor_assert(ptr - out == V3_HS_AUTH_FIXED_PART_LEN);
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tor_assert(ptr - out == V3_AUTH_FIXED_PART_LEN);
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if (server)
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return ptr-out;
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@ -1969,7 +1959,7 @@ connection_or_compute_authenticate_cell_body(or_connection_t *conn,
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crypto_rand((char*)ptr, 16);
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ptr += 16;
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tor_assert(ptr - out == V3_HS_AUTH_BODY_LEN);
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tor_assert(ptr - out == V3_AUTH_BODY_LEN);
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if (!signing_key)
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return ptr - out;
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@ -2004,7 +1994,7 @@ connection_or_send_authenticate_cell(or_connection_t *conn)
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if (!pk)
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return -1;/*XXXX log*/
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cell_maxlen = 4 + /* overhead */
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V3_HS_AUTH_BODY_LEN + /* Authentication body */
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V3_AUTH_BODY_LEN + /* Authentication body */
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crypto_pk_keysize(pk) + /* Max signature length */
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16 /* just in case XXXX */ ;
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53
src/or/or.h
53
src/or/or.h
@ -1087,6 +1087,43 @@ typedef struct listener_connection_t {
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/** Minimum length of the random part of an AUTH_CHALLENGE cell. */
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#define OR_AUTH_CHALLENGE_LEN 32
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/**
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* @name Certificate types for CERT cells.
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*
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* These values are defined by the protocol, and affect how an X509
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* certificate in a CERT cell is interpreted and used.
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*
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* @{ */
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/** A certificate that authenticates a TLS link key. The subject key
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* must match the key used in the TLS handshake; it must be signed by
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* the identity key. */
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#define OR_CERT_TYPE_TLS_LINK 1
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/** A self-signed identity certificate. The subject key must be a
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* 1024-bit RSA key. */
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#define OR_CERT_TYPE_ID_1024 2
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/** A certificate that authenticates a key used in an AUTHENTICATE cell
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* in the v3 handshake. The subject key must be a 1024-bit RSA key; it
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* must be signed by the identity key */
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#define OR_CERT_TYPE_AUTH_1024 3
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/**@}*/
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/** The one currently supported type of AUTHENTICATE cell. It contains
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* a bunch of structures signed with an RSA1024 key. The signed
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* structures include a HMAC using negotiated TLS secrets, and a digest
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* of all cells sent or received before the AUTHENTICATE cell (including
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* the random server-generated AUTH_CHALLENGE cell).
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*/
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#define AUTHTYPE_RSA_SHA256_TLSSECRET 1
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/** The length of the part of the AUTHENTICATE cell body that the client and
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* server can generate independently (when using RSA_SHA256_TLSSECRET). It
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* contains everything except the client's timestamp, the client's randomly
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* generated nonce, and the signature. */
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#define V3_AUTH_FIXED_PART_LEN (8+(32*6))
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/** The length of the part of the AUTHENTICATE cell body that the client
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* signs. */
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#define V3_AUTH_BODY_LEN (V3_AUTH_FIXED_PART_LEN + 8 + 16)
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/** Stores flags and information related to the portion of a v2/v3 Tor OR
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* connection handshake that happens after the TLS handshake is finished.
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*/
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@ -1098,6 +1135,12 @@ typedef struct or_handshake_state_t {
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unsigned int started_here : 1;
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/** True iff we have received and processed a VERSIONS cell. */
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unsigned int received_versions : 1;
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/** True iff we have received and processed an AUTH_CHALLENGE cell */
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unsigned int received_auth_challenge : 1;
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/** True iff we have received and processed a CERT cell. */
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unsigned int received_cert_cell : 1;
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/** True iff we have received and processed an AUTHENTICATE cell */
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unsigned int received_authenticate : 1;
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/** Digests of the cells that we have sent or received as part of a V3
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* handshake. Used for making and checking AUTHENTICATE cells.
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@ -1108,6 +1151,16 @@ typedef struct or_handshake_state_t {
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crypto_digest_env_t *digest_received;
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/** @} */
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/** Certificates that a connection initiator sent us in a CERT cell; we're
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* holding on to them until we get an AUTHENTICATE cell.
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*
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* @{
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*/
|
||||
/** The cert for the key that's supposed to sign the AUTHENTICATE cell */
|
||||
tor_cert_t *auth_cert;
|
||||
/** A self-signed identity certificate */
|
||||
tor_cert_t *id_cert;
|
||||
/**@}*/
|
||||
} or_handshake_state_t;
|
||||
|
||||
/** Subtype of connection_t for an "OR connection" -- that is, one that speaks
|
||||
|
||||
Loading…
Reference in New Issue
Block a user